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系統識別號 U0026-3107201211375800
論文名稱(中文) 第三方物流業參與逆向拍賣下之最適艙位訂購策略
論文名稱(英文) The Optimal Space Ordering under Reverse Auction for The 3PLs
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 交通管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Transportation & Communication Management Science
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生(中文) 王泰為
研究生(英文) Tai-Wei Wang
電子信箱 jr20051216@gmail.com
學號 r56981102
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 70頁
口試委員 召集委員-陳穆臻
口試委員-黃光渠
指導教授-林正章
中文關鍵字 第三方物流業  逆向拍賣  最適艙位配置 
英文關鍵字 The 3PLs  Reverse Auction  The optimal allocation of space 
學科別分類
中文摘要 有鑑於以往第三方物流承攬業作為貨主與航商間之仲介代理商,既沒有實體運輸工具也沒有貨物所有權,其經營方式主要為透過蒐集各方貨物以較大規模之貨物數量向實體貨物運輸業者換取較低之運送成本,賺取中間之差價作為利潤。本研究在此將第三方物流業視為貨運承攬業,由貨運承攬業(或稱為貨物代理人)之角度,透過簽訂服務契約之方式提前向航商(海運船公司或是空運航空公司)鎖定貨物量和運費價格,期望透過在需求發生前之不確定情境下以大量的貨物運送需求藉以換得遠低於未來市場之預期價格。同時,為了成功吸取更多貨物量,貨運承攬業者除了降低販售價格外亦透過數學規劃並做出競標決策以獲得更多利潤。
本研究為了解決兩階段之需求不確定問題,使用連續L型演算法透過多次疊代運算並加入新的限制式使原本母問題(Master Problem)擴展為擴充母問題(Expanded-Master problem)以求解問題,最佳化承攬業之契約簽訂數量和最適競標與出價策略。透過本研究可發現,海運承攬業者為了降低風險因此不願意於需求不確定情況下進行定艙或是販售艙位,但透過歷史資訊之預測以統計機率方式歸納未來艙位價格機率後得以更客觀方式有效降低風險同時取得更低廉的艙位成本。
此外,本研究同時引用了某中部地區之中型木材合板加工企業之相關出貨與運價等實證資料,搭配第三方網站之市場運價等資料做數值分析,建議該企業之現行海運承攬業者得以透過前期之服務契約簽訂方式同時增加貨量規模且以更低廉的運輸成本於市場上販售,對承攬業者而言亦可得到相較於以往傳統銷售模式下之超額利潤。
英文摘要 The role of the third party logistics (3PLs) in the transportation supply chain is a broker. For the 3PLs, they don’t have any transportation vehicle or capacity to transport the goods that they forwarded from the shippers. The 3PLs (or the forwarders) earned from the price gap between the cost of the maritime company and the sales price to the shippers. In this research, we provide another ways to earned by signing the service contract. By signing the contract advanced to share part of the demand uncertainty risk and use lot size to take a lower transportation cost. Because of the lot size is hard to collect from several shippers, forwarders could participate the auctions which held from the shippers. The shippers auctioned the demand of logistic in the period. By mathematical programming, we can solve the optimal order quantity of the contract and decided the most profitable bidding strategy and price.
To solve the problem of two stage demand uncertainty, we use the continuous L-shaped cutting plan algorithm. This algorithm can add more and more cutting constraints by iterating. We found the reasons for the 3PLs not signing the contract advanced is to reduce the risk of demand uncertainty. But using history information and probability concept could find the accurate future demand. In this research, we also refer some experimental data from one of the middle size company in the central Taiwan. Using the experimental data to verify the model and provide some suggestions and comments to related stakeholder.
論文目次 目錄 I
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的 3
1.3 研究限制與範圍 3
1.4 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻回顧 8
2.1 供應鏈管理 8
2.1.1供應鏈的定義 8
2.1.2供應鏈最佳化模式 9
2.2 第三方物流服務業 10
2.2.1 貨物承攬運送業 10
2.2.2 第三方物流業 11
2.2.3 運輸業定價方法與策略 13
2.3 拍賣理論(Auction) 17
2.3.1拍賣的種類與定義 17
2.3.2逆向拍賣(Reverse-Auction) 19
2.3.3 物流業拍賣的特性 21
2.4 隨機規劃 24
2.4.1 隨機規劃 25
2.4.2產能規劃問題 26
2.4.3 運輸產能隨機規劃 27
2.5 小結 28
第三章 貨運承攬業市場概況 29
3.1 貨運承攬業市場概況 29
3.1.1 世界與台灣地區海運承攬業務比例 30
3.1.2 海運業之運費決策 32
3.2 貨運承攬業之托運行為 33
3.2.1 海運服務契約 34
3.2.2 海運承攬業一般定艙流程 36
3.3 小結 37
第四章 數學模式建構與求解 39
4.1 模式假設與範圍 39
4.1.1 研究架構與決策時點 39
4.1.2本研究之假設與範圍 40
4.1.3第三方物流業之艙位需求模式 41
4.2 參數與變數之符號 42
4.3 數學規劃模式 43
4.3.1 數學模式 43
4.4 演算流程與步驟 46
4.4.1 連續L型演算法 46
4.4.2 求解流程與步驟 46
4.4.3 最適切割之推導 47
第五章 數值分析 50
5.1 實證參數設定 50
5.2 演算過程與數值分析 53
5.3 敏感度分析 58
5.3.1競標規模之敏感度分析 58
5.3.2航商所願意提供合約之最大簽約量 59
5.3.3航商所面對之市場需求波動幅大較大時 60
5.3.4航商所面對之不同市場價格下之利潤變動情況 61
第六章 結論與建議 63
6.1 結論 63
6.2 建議 65
參考文獻 66
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