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系統識別號 U0026-3006201610300400
論文名稱(中文) 在交流與直流狀態估測下利用線性迴歸對智慧電網作假數據注入攻擊
論文名稱(英文) False Data Injection Attack using Linear Regression under AC and DC State Estimation in Smart Grid
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 工程科學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Engineering Science
學年度 104
學期 2
出版年 105
研究生(中文) 李駿宏
研究生(英文) Chun-Hung Lee
學號 N96034138
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 83頁
口試委員 指導教授-卿文龍
口試委員-郭文光
口試委員-陳曉華
口試委員-陳紹基
口試委員-梁耀仁
中文關鍵字 假數據注入攻擊  線性回歸  智慧電網  交流狀態估測  直流狀態估測 
英文關鍵字 False Data Injection Attack  Linear Regression  Smart Grid  AC State Estimation  DC State Estimation 
學科別分類
中文摘要 智慧電網中的資訊保護問題日趨重要,除了探討防護方法外,部分學者則是探討攻擊方式。其中最具代表的即為假數據注入攻擊(false data injection attack, FDIA),而後有人提出利用主成分分析做進階的假數據注入攻擊─不需得知此電力系統的架構且電力系統的狀態訊號為任意分布。然而此方法依舊有部分條件限制,如電力系統須為直流狀態估測,不得為交流狀態估測,這限制了它的應用。本篇論文嘗試提出能應用在交流狀態估測的攻擊方法,利用迴歸分析搭配廣義反矩陣找出電力系統量測資料的變化資訊,並使用此資訊達到注入隨機數據攻擊的目的。此方法只需要分析一段時間的量測值以產生有效的攻擊,不需要事先取得受到極為嚴密保護的電力系統架構資料,減少產生攻擊所需的時間和成本。
英文摘要 The information protection issues are becoming increasingly important in smart grid. In addition to explore the protective methods, some scholars explore attacking methods. One of the most representative of those methods is the false data injection attacks (false data injection attack, FDIA). Someone suggested that the use of principal component analysis for the advanced false data injection attacks─do not need to know the architecture of the power system and the status of signal is arbitrary distribution. However, this method is still has some limitations, such as DC power system state estimation shall not be for the exchange of AC power system state estimation, which limits its application. This paper tries to put forward a kind of attack that can be applied in AC state estimation. Regression analysis with pseudo-inverse method is used to identify changes in the power system measurement data, and use this information to achieve the purpose of injecting random data attacks. The proposed method doesn’t require the architecture data of the power system. Intruders only need to obtain a period of time’s measurement data. That makes the attack becomes more easily to produce because the protection of architecture data is harder than the protection of measurement data.
論文目次 書名頁..............................................................i
中文摘要............................................................i
英文摘要............................................................ii
誌謝................................................................vi
目錄................................................................vii
圖目錄..............................................................ix
符號說明...........................................................xiii
第一章、導論........................................................1
1.1 背景知識....................................................1
1.2 研究動機及貢獻..............................................3
1.3 文獻探討....................................................5
1.4 論文架構....................................................8
第二章、系統架構....................................................9
2.1 交流電力潮流................................................ 9
2.2 交流狀態估測............................................... 11
2.3 不良資料偵測............................................... 13
第三章、假數據注入攻擊..............................................14
3.1 直流狀態估測下的攻擊方式................................... 14
3.2 交流狀態估測下的攻擊方式................................... 17
第四章、使用主成分分析的假數據攻擊..................................18
4.1 概述....................................................... 18
4.2 主成分分析原理............................................. 19
4.3 利用主成分分析在資訊有限的狀況下發動攻擊................... 22
第五章、利用線性迴歸搭配廣義反矩陣原理求交流狀態估測下之攻擊向量....24
5.1 概述....................................................... 24
5.2 使用LR搭配廣義反矩陣向量之原理產生攻擊向量................ 27
5.3 模擬與討論................................................. 40
5.3.1 攻擊方式不同.............................................. 44
5.3.2 攻擊訊號對雜訊的訊雜比不同................................ 56
5.3.3 量測向量的樣本數t不同.....................................68
5.3.4 不同攻擊方式所需時間比較(狀態訊號為全非高斯).............. 80
第六章、結論和未來展望.............................................81
參考文獻...........................................................82
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