進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-2907201614344500
論文名稱(中文) 主要銀行的外部董事對盈餘管理的影響
論文名稱(英文) Impact of Outside Board Members from Main Banks on Earnings Management in Japan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際企業研究所
系所名稱(英) Institute of International Business
學年度 104
學期 2
出版年 105
研究生(中文) 小堀和彦
研究生(英文) Kazuhiko Kobori
學號 R68957046
學位類別 博士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 110頁
口試委員 指導教授-蔡耀全
指導教授-吳清在
口試委員-許永明
口試委員-蔡彥卿
口試委員-潘忠煜
口試委員-黃瀞瑩
中文關鍵字 公司治理  盈餘管理  主要銀行  外部董事 
英文關鍵字 Corporate governance  earnings management  main bank  outside board member 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究主要目的、在探討主要銀行的外部董事對於盈餘管理所帶來的影響。日本在2015年6月頒布的公司治理準則,我們可以從第一條第四項裡看到(現在日本國內)規定了傳統主要銀行的體系,準則當中提到傳統主要銀行不應再放款給收益沒有持續上升的企業客戶。再者,2008年4月頒布了日版沙氏法案(J-SOX)。其目的在於提升財務報表的可信度以及提升公司治理的重要性。

第一項研究目標是主要銀行體系,啟今為止數不清的研究都指出,日本的主要銀行逐漸勢微。一直以來,銀行除了擔任企業的監督者之外,在企業周轉困難的時候提供資金,但現在,這層關係已不再如此緊密。第二項研究目標是沙士法案,然而近期的研究著眼於實質的營運管理,尤Cohen et al. (2008)文獻指出,在沙氏法案執行後,相較於舊式的盈餘管理,企業多採用實質的營運管理報告。

第一個問題是,企業和主要銀行的,是否對企業的財務報表品質產生影響。研究問題二為,沙士法案之行後,對主要銀行及盈餘管理是否有影響。

樣本的期限是2006年到2015年。大多數的日本企業的期末為三月末。財務報表是使用合併會計報表。我們的模型是兩個。第一個模型是主要銀行監督的回歸模型、第二個模型是執行沙士發案後的回歸模型。

研究問題的回答是第一,雖然企業和主要銀行的關係逐漸勢微,商業銀行仍扮演有效的監督角色。第二,執行日本沙士法案後,主要銀行團對於企業的營運操縱能有效控制。

此項研究的意義在於由於企業和主要銀行團的關係逐漸勢微,商業銀行更積極要求企業提供高品質的財務報表,換句話說,因為銀行重視企業的財務報表品質進而達到了監督的效果。接著要報告的是這項研究的研究限制,此次的研究樣本只包含日本的大企業,因此若套用在中小企業可能會無法適用,再者若套用在台灣或東亞地區各國,得出的結果可能會有所不同。為了延續探討本主體,未來的研究方向將會納入台灣的企業樣本,使研究結果更能被廣反運用。
英文摘要 There has been increasing interest in determining whether and how outside board members affect client firms’ financial reporting quality. Following this frontier, this study examines whether the outside board members from main bank groups are related to earnings management or not.
Using Japanese listed companies during sample period of 2006 - 2015, we confirm whether outside board members from main bank groups deter client firms’ earnings management. Our study found that main bank groups as well as commercial banks in main bank groups regulate client firms’ earnings management behaviour and affect the quality of corporate clients’ financial reporting in spite of the weakened main bank relationship.
Furthermore, in analysing the effect of J-SOX, main bank groups do not appear to regulate earnings management with regard to accounting discretion, discretionary accruals, but the main bank groups do deter client firms’ real earnings management. In particular, these banks have regulated manipulation of discretionary expenses since J-SOX. Our findings are consistent with the findings of Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008).
論文目次 1. Introduction P.1
2. Literature review P.18
3. Sample and methodology P.35
4. Empirical results P.47
5. Sensitivity analyses P.93
6. Conclusion and discussion P.98

Appendix P.103
References P.106
參考文獻 Aboody, D. and Kasznik, R. (2000) CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 73-100.
Aoki, M. (1990) Toward an economic model of the Japanese firm. Journal of Economic Literature, 1-27.
Aoki, M. (1994) Monitoring characteristics of the main bank system: An analytical and developmental view (No. 94). Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M. and Courteau, L. (2004) The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23, 13-35.
Campbell, J. Y. and Hamao, Y. (1993) Changing patterns in corporate financing and the main bank system in Japan.
Chung, R., Firth, M. and Kim, J. B. (2002) Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 29-48.
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A. and Lys, T. Z. (2008) Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The accounting review, 83, 757-787.
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J. and Tehranian, H. (2008) Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 357-373.
Diamond, D. W. (1984) Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393-414.
Davidson, R., Goodwin‐Stewart, J. and Kent, P. (2005) Internal governance structures and earnings management. Accounting & Finance, 45, 241-267.
Fama, E. F. (1985) What's different about banks?.Journal of monetary economics, 15, 29-39.
Fang, C. J., Lee, H. Y. and Long, C. L. (2008) The Effects of Independent Director and Supervisor on Firm Performance and Earnings Quality-The Moderating Effect of Controlling Shareholder. Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance, 5, 55-80. (Chinese).
Firth, M., Fung, P. M. and Rui, O. M. (2007) Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings–Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26, 463-496.
Gao, W. (2008) Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16, 389-410.
Hanazaki, M. and Horiuchi, A. (2004) Can the financial restraint theory explain the postwar experience of Japan’s financial system?. with Masaharu Hanazaki) in Joseph PH Fan, Masaharu Hanazaki, and Juro Teranjshi (eds.), Designing Financial Systems in East Asia and Japan, Routledge Curzon2004, 19-46.
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A. and Scharfstein, D. (1990) The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 67-88.
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A. and Scharfstein, D. (1991) Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 33-60.
Iwasaki, T. (2009) Kansayaku kai to torishimariyakukai no tokucho ga riekichousei ni ataeru eikyo [Characteristic of board of company auditors, board of directors, and earnings management: Evidence from Japan]. Rokko Dai Ronshu, 56, 77-105.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Kaplan, S. N. (1994) Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the US (No. w4065). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kaplan, S. N. and Minton, B. A. (1994) Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 36, 225-258.
Kawai, M., Hashimoto, J. and Izumida, S. (1996) Japanese firms in financial distress and main banks: Analyses of interest-rate premia. Japan and the World Economy, 8, 175-194.
Kinyucho. (2010) Yuukashoukenhoukokusho [Stock and Shares Report], Tokyo: Kinyucho [Financial Services Agency].
Klein, A. (2002) Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 375-400.
Kubo, K. (2001) Director's Incentives in Japan and the UK. Vierteljahrsheftezur Wirtschaftsforschung/Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, 70, 228-232.
Midorikawa, K. (2008) Main bank kankeitokigyokyuusai: bubble houkai go no kyuusaikinou he no hyouka [Main bank relationship and rescue client firms: Valuation of rescue mechanism after bubble economy]. Zeimukeirikyoukai, Tokyo.
Morck, R. and Nakamura, M. (1999) Banks and corporate control in Japan. The Journal of Finance, 54, 319-339.
Nemoto, T., Fukunuma, H. and Watanabe, W. (2006) Sogyokiniokeruseifukinyukikan no yakuwari [The Role of Government-Affiliated Financial Institutions in the Startup Period]. Rieti Discussion Paper Series, 06-J-004, 1-24.
Numata, S. and Takeda, F. (2010) Stock market reactions to audit failure in Japan: The case of Kanebo and ChuoAoyama. The International Journal of Accounting, 45, 175-199.
Osma, B. G. and Noguer, B. G. D. A. (2007) The effect of the board composition and its monitoring committees on earnings management: Evidence from Spain. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 1413-1428.
Park, Y. W. and Shin, H. H. (2004) Board composition and earnings management in Canada. Journal of corporate Finance, 10, 431-457.
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F. and Young, S. (2005) Board monitoring and earnings management: do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?.Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32, 1311-1346.
Piot, C. and Janin, R. (2007) External auditors, audit committees and earnings management in France. European Accounting Review, 16, 429-454.
Pong, C. K. and Kita, T. (2006) Influence of banks on company auditor choice: The case of Japan. International Journal of Auditing, 10, 87-98.
Prawitt, D. F., Smith, J. L. and Wood, D. A. (2009) Internal audit quality and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 84, 1255-1280.
PRONEXUS INC. (2014) YuukaShoukenHoukokusyo, retrived from the EOL database.
Raghunandan, K., Rama, D. V. and Read, W. J. (2001) Audit committee composition, “gray directors,” and interaction with internal auditing. Accounting Horizons, 15, 105-118.
Solomon, J. F., Lin, S. W., Norton, S. D. and Solomon, A. (2003) Corporate governance in Taiwan: Empirical evidence from Taiwanese company directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11, 235-248.
Saporoschenko, A. (2002) The sensitivity of Japanese bank stock returns to economic factors: an examination of asset/liability differences and main bank status. Global Finance Journal, 13, 253-270.
Scher, M. J. (1997) Japanese interfirm networks and their main banks. Macmillan.
Scott, W. R. (2009) Financial accounting theory, 5th Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Sheard, P. (1989) The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 11, 399-422.
Shin, G. H., Fraser, D. R. and Kolari, J. W. (2003) How does banking industry consolidation affect bank–firm relationships? Evidence from a large Japanese bank merger. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 11, 285-304.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1989) Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123-139.
Shuto, A. (2006) Wagakuni no kabushikisyoyukouzou to rieki no jyouhouryo [Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings: empirical evidence from Japan]. SenshuSyogakuRonshu, 83, 115 -134.
Shuto, A. (2007) Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16, 1-26.
Shuto, A. (2010) Earning management: Theory and empirical evidence from Japan. ChuoKeizaiSha, Tokyo.
Skinner, D. J. and Srinivasan, S. (2012) Audit quality and auditor reputation: Evidence from Japan. The Accounting Review, 87, 1737-1765.
Sueyoshi, T., Goto, M. and Omi, Y. (2010) Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from Japanese manufacturing industries after the lost decade. European Journal of Operational Research, 203, 724-736.
Suzuki, K. (2005) Main bank kankei to kabushikisougomochiai no genjyo [On the main bank system and the crossholding of shares]. SyougakuRonsan, 46, 219-249.
Tsai, Y., Wu, C. T. and Kobori, K. (2014) The influence of external monitoring on earnings management in Japan. Working Paper.
Vafeas, N. (2005) Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 22, 1093-1122.
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J. and Wild, K. L. (1995) Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 61-91.
Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1986) Positive accounting theory, Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N. and DaDalt, P. J. (2003) Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 295-316.
Xu, P. (1997) Executive salaries as tournament prizes and executive bonuses as managerial incentives in Japan. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 11, 319-346.
Yamanaka, H. (2002) Main bank sei no henyou [The change of Main bank system]. ZeimuKeiriKyoukai, Tokyo.
Yamori, N. and Murakami, A. (1999) Does bank relationship have an economic value?: The effect of main bank failure on client firms. Economics Letters, 65, 115-120.
Yang, J. S. and Krishnan, J. (2005) Audit committees and quarterly earnings management. International Journal of Auditing, 9, 201-219.
Yazawa, K. (2004) Corporate governance to sairyotekikaikeihatsuseidaka: Torishimariyaku kai no kouzou o chushintoshite [Corporate governance and discretionary accruals: The structure of board of directors]. The Hitotsubashi Review, 131, 155-173.
Yermack, D. (1997) Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements. The Journal of Finance, 52, 449-476.
YuukaShoukenHoukokusyo (2010) Stock and shares report, Okabunushi no jokyo, and yakuin no jokyo.

論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2020-07-22起公開。
  • 同意授權校外瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2021-07-29起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw