||Impact of Outside Board Members from Main Banks on Earnings Management in Japan
||Institute of International Business
outside board member
第一項研究目標是主要銀行體系，啟今為止數不清的研究都指出，日本的主要銀行逐漸勢微。一直以來，銀行除了擔任企業的監督者之外，在企業周轉困難的時候提供資金，但現在，這層關係已不再如此緊密。第二項研究目標是沙士法案，然而近期的研究著眼於實質的營運管理，尤Cohen et al. (2008)文獻指出，在沙氏法案執行後，相較於舊式的盈餘管理，企業多採用實質的營運管理報告。
There has been increasing interest in determining whether and how outside board members affect client firms’ financial reporting quality. Following this frontier, this study examines whether the outside board members from main bank groups are related to earnings management or not.
Using Japanese listed companies during sample period of 2006 - 2015, we confirm whether outside board members from main bank groups deter client firms’ earnings management. Our study found that main bank groups as well as commercial banks in main bank groups regulate client firms’ earnings management behaviour and affect the quality of corporate clients’ financial reporting in spite of the weakened main bank relationship.
Furthermore, in analysing the effect of J-SOX, main bank groups do not appear to regulate earnings management with regard to accounting discretion, discretionary accruals, but the main bank groups do deter client firms’ real earnings management. In particular, these banks have regulated manipulation of discretionary expenses since J-SOX. Our findings are consistent with the findings of Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008).
1. Introduction P.1
2. Literature review P.18
3. Sample and methodology P.35
4. Empirical results P.47
5. Sensitivity analyses P.93
6. Conclusion and discussion P.98
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