系統識別號 U0026-2808201222422400
論文名稱(中文) 自由貿易協定對反傾銷控訴案件數量的影響-以美國為例
論文名稱(英文) The Effects of FTA on the Number of Antidumping Filings: Evidences from the U.S.
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 經濟學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Economics
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生(中文) 趙東榆
研究生(英文) Dong-Yu Zhao
學號 u56981032
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 88頁
口試委員 指導教授-謝文真
中文關鍵字 自由貿易協定  反傾銷  美國  負二項迴歸 
英文關鍵字 free trade agreement  antidumping  the United States  negative binomial regression 
中文摘要 反傾銷措施已經成為國際貿易上最常用的貿易救濟工具之一,而自世界貿易組織(World Trade Organization, WTO)杜哈回合多邊貿易談判(Doha Round Negotiation)陷入僵局後,為拓展外貿市場與減少貿易障礙,各國積極轉向國與國間的貿易談判,並簽訂以雙邊貿易為主的自由貿易協定(Free Trade Agreements, FTA),本研究即以美國為例,探討自由貿易協定對於反傾銷控訴申請件數的影響,並使用負二項迴歸模型(negative binomial regression model)分析1990年至2009年美國對其27個主要進口商品來源國的反傾銷控訴案件數量追蹤資料(panel data)。迴歸的結果顯示,如果自由貿易協定中存在針對反傾銷的特殊規定,或許可以減少來自美國製造業廠商的反傾銷控訴申請件數。以設有爭端解決機制的北美自由貿易協定為例,其可以顯著的減少58.98%~60.06%的反傾銷控訴案件數量。但是,其他對反傾銷措施並無特殊規定的自由貿易協定,則無法顯著的減少來自美國廠商的反傾銷控訴。因此,本研究建議以出口為導向的經濟體,在展開新的自由貿易協定談判時,可思考仿效北美自由貿易協定中的爭端解決機制,以利較為公平且迅速的解決因反傾銷所引起的貿易爭端。
英文摘要 Anti-dumping duty has become one of the most commonly used trade barriers in international trade. Since the World Trade Organization remains stuck in the deadlock of the Doha Round Negotiation, the members turned to negotiations between/among countries and signed bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) for expanding markets and mitigating trade barriers. This thesis studies the effect of FTA on the antidumping filings of the U.S. to its 27 major importing countries from 1990 to 2009. The collected set of panel data is analyzed by means of negative binomial regression. The regression results suggest that if there are special provisions of antidumping in FTA, then the antidumping filings from the U.S. manufacturers can be reduced. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes a special dispute settlement mechanism for antidumping, significantly reduces filings by 58.98%~60.06%. By contrast, other FTAs with no special provisions of antidumping cannot significantly reduce filings from the U.S. Therefore, to smooth international trade, we recommend that when an export-oriented economy starts a new FTA negotiation with other countries, a special consideration on antidumping similar to the mechanism designed in NAFTA could be included to provide a well-balanced and more expeditious dispute settlement.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究方法 6
第四節 研究流程與架構 7
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第一節 反傾銷措施的定義、歷史與現行規定 9
第二節 美國的反傾銷制度 25
第三節 自由貿易協定與反傾銷 36
第四節 北美自由貿易協定與反傾銷 45
第三章 研究方法 52
第一節 模型建構 52
第二節 計量模型 58
第三節 資料來源 72
第四章 實證結果分析 75
第五章 結論 80
參考文獻 82
附錄一 解釋變數相關係數 86
附錄二 樣本國家明細表 87
附錄三 樣本國家反傾銷控訴案件數量明細 88
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