進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-2710201903341400
論文名稱(中文) Design of Optimal Supply Chain Network under Two Competition Environments for a Proprietary Component Manufacturer
論文名稱(英文) Design of Optimal Supply Chain Network under Two Competition Environments for a Proprietary Component Manufacturer
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際經營管理研究所碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Institute of International Management (IIMBA--Master)(on the job class)
學年度 108
學期 2
出版年 109
研究生(中文) 蔡佩珊
研究生(英文) Pei-Shan Tsai
學號 RA7061216
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 99頁
口試委員 指導教授-張巍勳
召集委員-吳政翰
口試委員-張佑宇
中文關鍵字 供應鏈網絡  賽局理論  營利模式  專有零件製造商 
英文關鍵字 Supply chain network  Game theory  Profit model  Proprietary component manufacturer 
學科別分類
中文摘要 在這份研究中,我們檢視專有零件製造商針對最優化供應鏈網絡的設計決策。總的來說,專有零件製造商具備足以影響該整體產業供應鏈結構的主導權;亦即,其不但能夠決定自身的供應鏈網絡,更能夠間接甚或直接支配該供應鏈中其他成員的網絡之決策及其市場劃分之策略.然而,當競爭環境出現改變時,若該專有零件製造商未有效調整其網絡模式,則可能無法確保其最優化之獲利表現;考量其相似的市場背景,我們依據賽局理論建立了兩個獨立的獲利模型,並且分析該專有零件製造商於個別的市場結構之下是否產生不同之最佳設計決策.研究結果顯示,任何一個成本因子之變動皆會影響專有零件製造商之整體獲利表現以及其對應的最優化供應鏈網絡之決策,這說明了當競爭強度出現變化時,專有零件製造商必須權衡垂直整合以及專業分工之優劣以確保最佳獲利績效;且,結果指出,在兩個不相同的競爭結構之下,專有零件製造商並無明顯之設計決策差異.這項研究有助於學術界及公司之管理階層了解供應鏈網絡之設計如何影響公司的營運表現,並留意當競爭環境出現變化時其可能之策略差異.
英文摘要 In this study, we examine the design of optimal supply chain network (SCN) for a proprietary component manufacturer (PCM) which has the capability of traversing two vertical-echelon markets in one supply chain via specializing in the industries with a specific proprietary component. Our premise is that the manufacturer of proprietary components is often considered the main decider of the supply chain structures, which dominates the design of its supply network as well as those of the relevant segments within the chain. However, the entities in such a position may not assure themselves of sustaining profitability whenever competition environments change. Accordingly, we develop mathematical models based on the game theory of Cournot, and investigate the differences of the optimal strategies under the two independent structures. We find that when an individual cost factor changes the profit composition as well as the overall margins will be influenced correspondingly. It is essential for the PCM to consider the tradeoffs between leveraging the capability of vertical integrations and subcontracting the processes that barely make money when competition intensity varies. Also, we figure out that the PCM in the respective market structures will be recommended with similar SCNs although the profit-generation capability between the two models will be of diversity as the player in a monopoly will always have higher flexibility and benefits compared with that in a duopoly while all numerical sets are the same.
論文目次 中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS V
LIST OF TABLES VII
LIST OF FIGURES VIII
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Research Background. 1
1.2 Research Motivation and Contributions. 10
1.3 Research Objectives. 15
1.4 Research Scope. 16
1.4.1 Limitations. 16
1.4.2 Assumptions. 17
1.5 Research Process and Structure. 19
1.5.1 Research Flowchart. 19
1.5.2 Research Structure. 21
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 22
2.1 Game Theory. 22
2.1.1 Cournot Competition. 24
2.2 Supply Chain Network. 25
2.3 Co-opetitive Supply Chains. 29
2.4 Interlocking Relationship. 31
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 34
3.1 General Description. 34
3.2 Model Formulation. 38
3.2.1.Nominations. 40
3.2.2 Monopolistic PCM Model. 41
3.2.3 Duopolistic PCM Model. 47
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH RESULTS 56
4.1 Monopolistic PCM Model. 56
4.2 Duopolistic PCM Model. 65
4.3 Comparison. 74
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 86
5.1 Conclusion. 86
5.2 Managerial Implication. 88
5.3 Limitation. 90
5.4 Suggestions. 90
REFERENCES 92
APPENDICES 95
參考文獻 Arya, A., Mittendorf, B., & Sappington, D. (2007). The bright side of supplier encroachment. Marketing Science, 26(5), pp. 651-659.
Bako, B., & Kalecz-Simon, A. (2012). Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Economics Letters, 116(3), pp. 301-303.
Breton, M., Turki, A., & Zaccour, G. (2004). Dynamic model of R&D, spillovers, and efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 123(1), pp. 1-25.
Busty, J., & Fan, I. (1993). The extended manufacturing enterprise: its nature and its needs. International Journal of Technology Management, 8(4), pp. 294-308.
Chiang, W., Chhajed, D., & Hess, J. (2003). Direct-marketing, indirect profits: a strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science, 49(1), pp. 1-20.
Choi, E. (2007). To outsource or not to outsource in an integrated world. International Review of Economics & Finance, 16(0), pp. 521-527.
Choi, K., Narasimhan, R., & Kim, S. (2016). Opening the technological innovation black box: The case of the electronics industry in Korea. European Journal of Operational Research, 250(1), pp. 192-203.
Cohen, M., & Lee, H. (1988). Strategic analysis of integrated production–distribution systems: Models and methods. Operations Research, 36(2), pp. 216-228.
Ettlie, J. (1998). R&D and global manufacturing performance. Management Science, 44(1), pp. 1-11.
Fahimi, K., Seyed Hosseini, S., & Makui, A. (2018). Centralized supply chain network design: Monopoly, duopoly, and oligopoly competitions under certainty. Journal of Optimization in Industrial Engineering, 11(2), pp. 37-56.
Fan, Y., Xie, T., & Du, J. (2012). Complex dynamics of duopoly game with heterogeneous players: A further analysis of the output model. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 218(15), pp. 7829-7838.
Green, K. (2005). Game theory, simulated interaction, and unaided judgement for forecasting decisions in conflicts: Further evidence. International Journal of Forecasting, 21(3), pp. 463-472.
Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (2002). Integration versus outsourcing in industry equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), pp. 85-120.
Hazledine, T. (2006). Price discrimination in Cournot-Nash oligopoly. Economics Letters, 93(3), pp. 413-420.
Ingene, C. A., Brown, J. R., & Dant, P. R. (2019). Handbook of Research on Distribution Channels. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Jagev, H., & Browne , J. (1998). The extended enterprise- a context for manufacturing. Production Planning & Control, 9(3), pp. 216-229.
Johnston, R., & Lawrence, L. (1988). Beyond vertical integration – the rise of the value-adding partnership. Harvard Business Review, 66(4), pp. 94-101.
Kalanje, C. M. (2005). Role of Intellectual Property in Innovation and New Product Development. Retrieved from World Intellectual Property Organization.
Kwok, J., & Lee, D. (2015). Coopetitive supply chain relationship model: application to the smartphone manufacturing network. PLoS ONE, 10(7), p. 1~16.
Leenders, M., & Nollet, J. (1984). The Gray Zone in Make or Buy. Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, 20(3), pp. 10-15.
Lin, Y.-T., & Chen, Y.-J. (2015). Competitive outsourcing: choosing between value-added services and key component supplying capability. International Journal of Production Research, 53(12), pp. 3635-3650.
Ma, J., & Ren, H. (2018). The impact of variable cost on a dynamic Cournot-Stackelberg game with two decision-making stages. Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 62(0), pp. 184-201.
Masoumi, A., Yu, M., & Nagurney, A. (2012). A supply chain generalized network oligopoly model for pharmaceuticals under brand differentiation and perishability. Transportation Research Part E-logistics ogistics and Transportation Review, 48(4), pp. 762-780.
McGrath, R. G., & Gourlay, A. (2013). The End of Competitive Advantage: How to Keep Your Strategy Moving as Fast as Your Business. Massachusetts, United States: Harvard Business Review Press.
Miles, R., & Snow, C. (1984). Designing Strategic Human-Resource Systems. Organizational Dynamics, 13(1), pp. 36-52.
Miles, R., & Snow, C. (1984). Fit, Failure and the Hall of Fame. California Management Review, 26(3), pp. 10-28.
Mitraille, S., & Moreaux, M. (2013). Inventories and endogenous Stackelberg leadership in two-peiod Cournot oligopoly. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 22(4), pp. 852-874.
Niu, B., Chen, K., Fang, X., Yue, X., & Wang, X. (2019). Technology Specifications and Production Timing in a Co-Opetitive Supply Chain. Production and Operations Management, 28(0), pp. 1990-2007.
Niu, B., Wang, Y., & Guo, P. (2015). Equilibrium pricing sequence in a co-opetitive supply chain with the ODM as a downstream rival of its OEM. Omega-Ineternational Journal of Management Science, 57(0), pp. 249-270.
Nocke, V., & Rey, P. (2018). Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships. Journal of Economic Theory, 177(0), pp. 183-221.
Peldschus, F. (2008). Experience of the game theory application in construction management. Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 14(4), pp. 531-545.
Puu, T., & Tramontana, F. (2019). Can Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies be combined? Chaos Solutions & Fractals, 125(0), pp. 97-107.
Qiu, L. (1997). On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 75(1), pp. 213-229.
Rey, P., & Verge, T. (2010). Resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships. Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(4), pp. 928-961.
Reyes, P. (2005). Logistics networks: A game theory application for solving the transshipment problem. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 168(2), pp. 1419-1431.
Singh, H. (1999). Introduction to game theory and its application in electric power markets. IEEE Computer Applications in Power, 12(4), pp. 18-22.
Snow, C., Miles, R., & Coleman, H. (1992). Managing 21st century network organizations. Organizational Dynamics , 20(3), pp. 5-20.
Sodhi, M., & Tang, C. (2013). Strategies and tactics of Chinese contract manufacturers and western OEMs (2001-2011). International Journal of Production Economics, 146(1), pp. 14-24.
Spiegel, Y. (1993). Horizontal Subcontracting. RAND Journal of Economics, 24(4), pp. 570-590.
Talluri, S., & Baker, R. (2002). A multi-phase mathematical programming approach for effective supply chain design. European Journal of Operational Research, 141(3), pp. 544-558.
Tsay, A., & Agrawal, N. (2004). Channel conflict and coordination in the E-commerce age. Production and Operations Management, 13(1), pp. 93-110.
Ulsaker, S. (2016). Interlocking relationships and quantity rationing. Economics Letters, 146(0), pp. 47-49.
VazquezBrage, M., VandenNouweland, A., & GarciaJurado, I. (1997). Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees. Mathematical Social Sciences, 34(3), pp. 273-286.
Venkatesh, R., Chintagunta, P., & Mahajan, V. (2006). Research note-sole entrant—co-optor, or component supplier: Optimal end-product strategies for manufacturers of proprietary component brands. Management Science, 52(4), pp. 613-622.
Wang, Y., Niu, B., & Guo, P. (2013). On the advantage of quantity leadership when outsourcing production to a competitive contract manufacturer. Production and Operations Management, 22(1), pp. 104-119.
Xiao, T., Xia, Y., & Zhang, P. G. (2007). Strategic outsourcing decisions for manufacturers that produce partially substitutable products in a quantity-setting duopoly situation. Decision Sciences, 38(1), pp. 81-106.
Xu, Y., Gurnani, H., & Desiraju, R. (2010). Strategic supply chain structure design for a proprietary component manufacturer. Production and Operations Management, 19(4), pp. 371-389.
Zhou, F., Wang, X., Goh, M., Zhou, L., & He, Y. (2019). Supplier portfolio of key outsourcing parts selection using a two-stage decision making framework for Chinese domestic auto-maker. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 128(0), pp.559-575.
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2025-04-01起公開。
  • 同意授權校外瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2025-04-01起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw