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系統識別號 U0026-2706201916341700
論文名稱(中文) 商業策略與盈餘管理之關聯性:兼論自願性採用薪酬索回條款之效果
論文名稱(英文) The Association between Business Strategy and Earnings Management: the Effect of Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 107
學期 2
出版年 108
研究生(中文) 羅雅莙
研究生(英文) Ya-Chun Lo
電子信箱 yachunlo21@gmail.com
學號 r16061027
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 93頁
口試委員 指導教授-楊朝旭
口試委員-蔡柳卿
口試委員-周庭楷
口試委員-黃炳勳
中文關鍵字 商業策略  應計盈餘管理  實質盈餘管理  薪酬索回條款 
英文關鍵字 Business Stategy  Accruals Management  Real Transactions Management  Clawback Provisions 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文旨在探討商業策略與盈餘管理行為的關係,並進一步考量薪酬索回條款之採用對此兩者關係的影響。本研究以2014年至2016年羅素3000指數(Russell 3000 Index)的公司為樣本,實證結果發現:首先,相較於傾向防禦性策略公司,傾向前瞻性策略公司的應計盈餘管理程度較低,而實質盈餘管理程度較高,並且實質盈餘管理程度超過應計盈餘管理程度,因而總盈餘管理程度較高。歸咎原因為前瞻性策略公司操縱實質盈餘的空間較大、成本較低、沒有迴轉效果,並且對於獲利波動性高之前瞻性策略公司而言,使用實質盈餘管理較易達成盈餘目標,因此管理階層較不受限於操縱實質盈餘管理,遂偏向使用實質盈餘管理來達成盈餘目標。其次,納入薪酬索回條款考量後,本研究發現自願性採用薪酬索回條款對於傾向前瞻性策略公司的應計和實質盈餘管理皆沒有抑制效果,代表薪酬索回條款無法控制前瞻性策略公司之管理階層的行為。
英文摘要 This thesis aims to examine the relationship between business strategy and earnings management, and further consider the impact of voluntary adoption of compensation clawback provisions on the relationship between the two. Using a sample of Russell 3000 firms from 2014 to 2016, I have several empirical findings. First, this study finds that firms with greater prospector-like characteristics are less likely to engage in accruals manipulation, but they are more likely to engage in real transactions manipulation. In addition, the increase in real transactions management dominates the reduction in accruals manipulation, thereby leading to a marginal increase in the total amount of earnings management. Secondly, after taking compensation clawback provisions into consideration, I also find that compensation clawback provisions have no suppression effect on the accruals management and real transactions management of firms with greater prospector-like characteristics. This study provides results implying that the compensation clawback provisions can not control the behavior of management of firms with greater prospector-like.
論文目次 摘要 i
誌謝 vii
目錄 viii
表目錄 x
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與目的 1
第二節 研究發現 2
第三節 研究重要性及貢獻 3
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 5
第一節 商業策略與盈餘管理之關係 5
一、 採用前瞻性策略公司之盈餘管理程度低 5
二、 採用前瞻性策略公司之盈餘管理程度高 7
第二節 自願性採用薪酬索回條款對盈餘管理的影響 8
一、 薪酬索回條款採用現狀 9
二、 採用薪酬索回條款的公司會降低盈餘管理 9
三、 採用薪酬索回條款的公司應計盈餘管理轉向實質盈餘管理且總盈餘管理增加 11
第參章 研究方法 13
第一節 變數定義 13
一、 應計盈餘管理(AM) 13
二、 實質盈餘管理(RTM) 15
三、 總盈餘管理(EM) 17
四、 商業策略(STRATEGY) 17
第二節 研究模型建立 21
一、 檢測假說一之模型 21
二、 檢測假說二a及二b之模型 25
第三節 樣本選取、分佈與資料來源 27
一、 資料來源 27
二、 樣本期間 27
三、 樣本範圍 27
四、 樣本分佈 29
第肆章 實證分析結果 40
第一節 敘述統計 40
一、 樣本商業策略(STRATEGY)衡量變數之敘述統計 40
二、 樣本所有變數之敘述統計 44
第二節 相關係數 52
第三節 迴歸分析結果 63
一、 假說一之實證結果:商業策略與盈餘管理之關係 63
二、 假說二之實證結果 70
第伍章 研究結論、貢獻與建議 79
第一節 研究結論 79
第二節 研究貢獻 82
第三節 研究限制與建議 83
參考文獻 84
附錄 90
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