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系統識別號 U0026-2706201300184400
論文名稱(中文) 薪酬委員會對於董監事薪酬與公司績效之間敏感度的影響 ―台灣公司之證據
論文名稱(英文) The Effect of Compensation Committee on the Pay-Performance Sensitivity―Evidence from Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生(中文) 張惠雯
研究生(英文) Hui-Wen Chang
學號 r16001166
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 72頁
口試委員 指導教授-郭啟賢
口試委員-余士迪
口試委員-黎明淵
中文關鍵字 董監事薪酬  薪酬委員會  薪酬績效敏感度 
英文關鍵字 Director and Supervisor Compensation  Compensation Committee  Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
學科別分類
中文摘要 全球對於強化公司治理機制的研究眾多,有效的薪酬契約可提升代理人的激勵效果,促使代理人提高努力程度,為股東創造財富,而薪酬委員會屬公司治理機制中重要的一環,國外研究證明在薪酬委員會制度的建立之下,強化對於董監事或高階經理人薪酬的監督機制,增加薪酬與績效間的敏感度(Pay-Performance Sensitivity),使提高薪酬契約的激勵效果,減輕資訊不對稱造成的代理問題。
2010年,台灣增訂證券交易法第14條之6,強制台灣上市(櫃)以及興櫃公司設置薪酬委員會,希望藉由增強公司治理機制,薪酬委員會成員透過職權檢視董監事的實際績效表現以強化薪酬的合理性,並提出建議於董事會。此制度建立後,使董監事薪酬的訂定過程透明化且保障股東的權益。本文使用台灣2008年至2011年上市(櫃)以及興櫃公司的資料,探討薪酬委員會對於董監事薪酬與公司績效間敏感度的影響程度。實證結果發現,公司在設置薪酬委員會後,會計績效指標(即EPS)與平均每位董監事薪酬間的敏感度減弱。即在薪酬委員會成立後,對於每增加一單位EPS之績效時,公司支付給每位董監事薪酬平均有減少的現象。另一方面,董監事薪酬與市場績效表現(即RET)間的敏感度有提升的現象。即公司價值及董監事薪酬的連結程度有強化的現象。此結果說明在薪酬委員會設置後,或許透過強化公司治理機制的監督效能,因而有效的連結董監事薪酬與公司績效指標。
英文摘要 Previous research indicated that effective compensation contracts can improve the incentive effect for agents, prompting agents to make their best effort to increase shareholder wealth. The Compensation Committee plays an important role in corporate governance mechanism. Prior studies have shown that the establishment of the Compensation Committee can enhance the compensation’s oversight of directors, supervisors and managerial officers, thereby increasing the sensitivity between pay and performance, strengthening the effects of pay contract, and reducing information asymmetry caused by agency problems.
In 2010, Taiwan modified the Securities Exchange Act, requiring companies whose stock is listed in the Taiwan stock exchange (TSE) or traded over-the-counter (OTC) shall set up a Compensation Committee. This study uses samples companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2011 to investigate the influence of Compensation Committee establishment on the pay-performance sensitivity. The empirical results show that after Compensation Committee is established, the accounting-based performance measures (i.e. EPS) has a negative incremental impact on the average director and supervisor compensation. By contrast, the association between market-based performance measures (i.e. RET) and the average director and supervisor compensation enhances significantly after the implementation of Compensation Committee. The results indicated that the establishment of Compensation Committee strengthens the link between the director and supervisor compensation and company performance as evident by the higher degree of pay-performance sensitivity.
論文目次 第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機..................................................................................1
第二節 研究貢獻..............................................................................................3
第三節 研究流程與論文架構..........................................................................5
第二章 文獻回顧與探討
第一節 董監事薪酬之概述..............................................................................7
第二節 強制設置薪酬委員會前,國內監督董監事薪酬的機制................10
第三節 薪酬績效敏感度(Pay - Performance Sensitivity)..............................13
第四節 薪酬委員會 (Compensation Committee)..........................................17
第五節 薪酬委員會對於董監事薪酬與公司績效之間敏感度的影響........20
第三章 研究設計
第一節 假說發展............................................................................................23
第二節 實證模型與變數定義........................................................................29
第三節 資料來源與樣本選取........................................................................35
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計 ......................................................................................37
第二節 相關係數分析 ..................................................................................41
第三節 台灣強制設置薪酬委員會後, 對於薪酬績效敏感度
(Pay-Performance Sensitivity)的影響之實證結果 ..........................44
第四節 補強性測試 ......................................................................................49
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結果 ..........................................................................................61
第二節 研究限制 ..........................................................................................64
第三節 研究建議 ..........................................................................................66
參考文獻...................................................................................................................67
參考文獻 中文參考文獻
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 黃于珊 (2013),公司治理與企業績效對董監薪酬之影響,大葉大學管理學院碩士在職專班碩士論文。
 黃于庭、蕭雨萱,薪酬委員會與公司治理:政府應該要求所有上市上櫃公司設置薪酬委員會嗎?,國立中央大學人力資源管理研究所未出版論文
 鄧穎懋、李秀玲 (2012),薪酬委員會之功能及運作模式:評析證券交易法第14條之6,朝陽商管評論,第11卷第1期
 廖益均 (2013),我國薪酬委員會設置現況概述,貨幣觀測與信用評等,(99)102/01,57-64

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