進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-2706201300080200
論文名稱(中文) 薪酬委員會成立對董監薪酬之影響-以台灣公司為例
論文名稱(英文) Effect of Compensation Committee on the Directors and Supervisors’ Compensation-Evidence from Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生(中文) 許惟禎
研究生(英文) Wei-Chen Hsu
學號 r16001132
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 68頁
口試委員 指導教授-郭啟賢
口試委員-黎明淵
口試委員-余士迪
中文關鍵字 薪酬委員會  公司治理  董監薪酬 
英文關鍵字 Compensation Committee  corporate governance  directors and supervisors’ compensation 
學科別分類
中文摘要 我國證券交易所於2010年4月1日公布了連續2年度稅後虧損,惟董監事酬金總額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加的公司,立法者為解決此種「肥貓」問題,改善高階主管及董監事薪酬制度,保障股東權益,於2010年11月24日通過《證券交易法》修訂案,增訂第十四條之六,強制國內證交所上市或於證券商營業處買賣的公開發行股票(包含興櫃)之公司於2011年12月31日前設置「薪資報酬委員會」,期能健全企業高階管理者之績效考核與薪酬管理制度,使薪酬制度合理化。
本研究以2008年至2011年共四個年度間,在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市、上櫃及興櫃之公司作為研究對象。探討在薪酬委員會強制設立後,董監薪酬發放不合理的情況是否有改善,以及公司治理機制是能否發揮監督的效果,對董監薪酬產生關連性影響。
實證結果顯示,在成立薪酬委員會之後,平均每位董監薪酬之發放水準並無顯著下降之趨勢,而平均每位董監事超額薪酬的現象降低,但也未達統計顯著,表示薪酬委員會之設立對董監薪酬尚未產生立即性之影響,可能原因為多數公司均於2011年底才匆匆設置完成,而新成立的委員會成員之委任選定不易,其制度可能並非完善;且並未制訂相關之罰則,使有些公司可能存有僥倖之心態,使其薪酬委員會監督之效力不彰。
英文摘要 Taiwan stock exchange (TSE) on April 1, 2010, released a list of companies which reported net loss for two consecutive years but increased their directors and supervisors’ compensation. To solve this "fat cat" issue and protect shareholders' interests, the legislator revised the Securities Exchange Act, Article XIV on November 24, 2010, requiring firms listed in YSE, OTC and emerging companies to establish “Compensation Committee (CC)” before 31 December, 2011. The purpose of CC is to improve the compensation management system, and justify the directors and supervisors’ compensation.
The sample comprises all TSE, OTC and emerging companies between 2008 and 2011. I found that the level of director and supervisor compensation does not significantly decrease in the first year after the CC establishment after controlling for factors which may affect director and supervisor compensation.
In addition, I did find that director and supervisor compensation decreased after 2011 for firms within the high-tech industry; however, it is not significant. If excessive pay is used instead of average pay, it decreased but not significant either. The system was first elect in Taiwan and there were no penalties for violating, making the effectiveness of the compensation committee unapparent.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章 文獻探討 5
第一節 薪酬委員會 5
第二節 代理理論與薪酬制度 9
第三節 公司治理對董監薪酬之影響 14
第參章 研究方法 25
第一節 研究假說 25
第二節 實證模型與變數衡量 25
第三節 資料來源與樣本選取 33
第肆章 實證結果與分析 35
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析 35
第二節 迴歸結果分析 40
第三節 敏感性分析 43
第伍章 結論與建議 55
第一節 研究結論 55
第二節 研究限制與建議 57
參考文獻 58
參考文獻 王建仁,2005,探討高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素,國立成功大學會計研究所碩士論文。
池美佳,2005,公司法下的利益衝突與規範策略-以股東、經理人與債權人間的利益衝突為中心,台灣大學國家發展研究所碩士論文。
呂學焜,2008,公司治理與公司績效對董事酬勞影響之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系碩士論文。
宋致皓,2006,董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究,國立政治大學會計研究所未碩士論文。
李貞儀,2002,高階主管與績效關聯性之研究-考慮不同景氣時期,國立成功大學會計研究所碩士論文。
李淑慧,2010,公司績效、公司治理特性及員工分紅費用化對董監酬勞之影響,輔仁大學會計學系在職專班碩士論文。
沈筱玲、吳岳忠,2004,機構投資人、公司治理與公司價值之研究,以台灣電子業為例,2004科技整合管理國際研討會。
林峰成,1996,台灣上市公司高階主管酬勞、公司績效與控制權型態之關聯性實證研究,國立中正大學會計研究所碩士論文。
林穎芬、洪晨桓、陳佳成,2012,台灣上市公司董事薪酬影響因子之研究,台大管理論叢,第二十三卷第一期,頁175-208。
俞海琴與周本鄂,1994,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q關係之研究,管理評論。
洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍,2005,公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點,輔仁管理評論,第三期,頁23-30。
孫誠偉,2008,公司治理面向下董事報酬及酬勞法制─結構、決定及監控,國立東華大學財經法律研究所未出版之碩士論文。
徐欣怡,2004,股權結構、高階管理者薪酬與公司價值之研究,國立中興大學竊業管理學系研究所碩士論文。
張明峰,1991,股權結構對公司績效之研究,國立政治大學企業管理研究所,碩士論文。
陳在鴻,2006,董監事酬勞與公司績效相關性之研究,中正大學財務金融所碩士論文。
陳明園、石雅慧,2004,高階經理人薪酬-代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究,台大管理論叢,第十五卷第一期,頁131-166。
陳明園、張家萍,2006,高階經理人薪酬變動之決定因素,經濟論文叢刊,第三十四卷第三期,頁285-316。
陳彥良,2009,由美國AIG事件看我國新修公司法紓困及反肥貓條款,台灣法學雜誌,第一百二十六期,頁1-7。
陳相甄,2009,公司治理機制與兼任董事總經理酬勞關聯性之研究,國立雲林科技大學會計系研究所碩士論文。
陳韻珊,2005,公司治理機制、代理成本與盈餘品質機的關聯性,中原大學會計學系碩士論文。
曾玉潔,2000,我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究,國立中正大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
黃于珊,2012,公司治理與企業績效對董監薪酬之影響,大葉大學會計系學系碩士論文。
黃千芳,2007,企業績效、國家品質獎與董監事薪酬關係之研究,中正大學企業管理所碩士論文。
葉旻其,2008,公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
葉銀華,2008,實踐公司治理,聯經出版社。
廖一成,2004,機構投資人與外部董事對高階管理者薪酬影響之研究,國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
劉連煜,2003,健全獨立董監事與公司治理之法制研究-公司自治、外部監控與政府規制之交錯,律師雜誌,第三百零五期,頁15-29。
劉連煜,2011,肥貓與薪酬委員會,台灣法學雜誌,第一百八十五期,頁147-142。
蔡昌憲,2012,評我國強制設置薪酬委員會之立法政策-從經濟分析及國金融改革法談起,中研院法學期刊,第11卷,頁250-340。
鄭為庠,1992,高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究,國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
蕭雨萱,2012,董事會控制力、高階管理者薪酬與公司績效之探討,國立中央大學人力資源管理研究所碩士論文。
錢逸達,2003,內部人士薪酬之決定因素-公司績效或公司治理,國立成功大學會計學系碩士論文。

Bacon, J., 1973, “Corporate directorship practices:membership and committees of the boards”, New York:The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries.
Barnea, A., R. Haugen, and L. Senbet, 1985, “Agency problems and financial contracting, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey:Prentice Hall Foundations of Finance Series.”
Becher, D. A., Campbell II, T. L., & Frye, M. B, 2005, “Incentive compensation for bank directors: The impact of deregulation.” The Journal of Business, vol.78 (5):pp.1753-1778.
Berle, A. A. and G. C. Meams, 1968, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property, “Rev. ed. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Boyd, B. K., 1994, “Board control and CEO compensation.” Stratrgic Management Journal, vol.15:pp.335-344.
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K, 2006, “CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.12 (3):pp.403-423
Brickley, J. and C. James, 1987, “The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition and Ownership Structure:The Case of Banking,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol.30:pp.161-180.
Bryan, S., Hwang, L., Klein, A., & Lilien, S, 2000, “Compensation of outside directors: An empirical analysis of economic determinants.” Working Paper, Social Science Research Network.
Bushee, B., and C. Noe, 2001, “Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility.” Journal of Accounting Research, vol.38(3):pp.171-202.
Byrd, J. and A. Hickman, 1992, “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence
Ching-Ping Shao, 2010, “Corporate Governance Globe Trends vs. Local Needs:A Comparison Between U.S. Reform and Taiwan’s Regime,” International Conference on Financial Law Reform, NTU College of Low 3.
Christopher John Gulinello, 2003, “The Revision of Taiwan’s Company Law:The Structure toward a Shareholder-oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia,” 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 75, 85.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P, 2000, “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.58 (1-2) : pp.81-112.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., & Lang, L. H. P, 2002, “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings.” Journal of Finance, vol.57 (6) :pp.2741-2771.
Clay, D., 2000, “The Effect of Institutional Investment on CEO Compensation”, Working Paper, University of Southern California.
Conyon, M. J. and D. Leech, 1994, “Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate Governance.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol.56(3):pp.229-247.
Cordeiro, J., R. Veliyath, E. J. Eramus and M. Tax, 2000, “An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Outside Director Compensation.” Corporate Governance, vol.83:pp.268-279.
Cordtz, D.,1993, “ Corporate Hangmen,” Financial World, vol.162:pp.24-28.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker, 1999, “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.51:pp.371-406.
Coughlan, A. T., and R. M. Schmidt, 1985, “Compensation, management turnover firm performance:an empirical investigation.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol.7:pp.43-66.
Cyert, R. M., S. H. Kang. and P. Kumar, 2002, “Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation:Theory and evidence.” Management Science, vol.48:pp.453-470.
Dahya, J., A. A. Lonie, and D. M. Power, 1996, “The case for separating the roles of chairman and ceo:an analysis of stock market and accounting data.” Corporate Governance-an International Review, vol.4(2):pp.71-77.
Daily, C. M. and Dalton, D.R., 1994, “Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure.” Academy of Management Journal, vol.37(6):pp.1603-1617.
DeAngelo, H. and E. Rice, 1983, “Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.11(1-4):pp.329-361.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney, 1996, ” Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC,” Contemporary Accounting Research, vol.13:pp.1-36.
Donaldson. L. and Davis. J., 1991, “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory:CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns.” Academy of Management Review, vol.20(1):pp.65.
Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989, “Agency Theory:An Assessment and Review.”, Academy of Management Review, vol(14):pp.57-74.
Fama, E, 1980, “Agency problems and theory of the firm.” The journal of Political Economy, vol.88(2):pp.288-307.
Fama, E. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, “Agency Problem and Residual Claims,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol.26:pp.327-349.
Fama, E. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, “Separation of ownership and control,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol.26:pp.301-325.
Fama, E., 1985, “What’s Different about Banks”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.15: pp.29-40.
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A., 2005, “The impact of stock-option compensation for outside directors on firm value.” The Journal of Business, vol.78(6):pp.2229-2254.
form Tender Offer Bids,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.32:pp.195-221.
Freedman, Sara R., Robert T. Keller, and John R. Montanari, 1982, “The Compensation Program:Balancing Organization and Employee Needs.” Compensation Review, vol.14(2):pp.47-53.
Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. M, 1997, “Reframing executive compensation: An assessment and outlook.” Journal of Management, vol.23(3): pp.291-374.
Gorton, G., and F. A. Schmid, 2000, “Universal banking and the performance of German firms.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.58(1-2): pp.29-80.
Harold Demsetz, 1983, “The Structure of Ownweship and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Law and Economics, vol.26(2):pp.375-390.
Hartzall, J. and L. Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation.” Journal of Finance, vol.48:pp.2351-2374.
Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach, 2003, “Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution:a survey of the economic literature.” Economic Policy Review, vol.9:pp.7-26.
Hill, C. W. and S. A. Shnell, 1989, “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity,” Academy of Management Journal, vol.32(1):pp.25-46.
Holmström, B, 1979, “Moral hazard and observability.” Bell Journal of Economics, vol.10 (1):pp.74-91.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.3(4):pp.305-360
Jensen, M. C., 1993, “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems”, Journal of Finance, vol.48:pp.831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and Ruback, R. S., 1983, “The Market for Corporate Control:The Scientific Evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp.5-50.
Karathanassis, G. A., and A. A. Drakos., 2004, “A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece.” Managerial and Decision Economics, vol.25: pp. 537-547.
Kesner, I. F. and D. R. Dalton, 1987, “Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors:An International Perspective.” Journal of International Business Studies, vol.18:pp.33-42.
Klein, 2012, “Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence”, Managerial Finance, vol.38:pp.188-205.
Kole, S. R., 1997, “The Complexity of Compensation Contracts.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.43:pp.79-104.
La Porta Finkelstein, S.and Hambrick, D. C., 1988, “Chief Executive Compensation: A Synthesis and Reconciliation.” Strategic Management Journal, vol.9(6):pp.543-558.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A, 1999, “Corporate ownership around the world.” Journal of Finance, 54 (2):pp.471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W, 2002, ”Investor protection and corporate valuation.” Journal of Finance, 57 (3):pp.1147-1170.
Leland H. E. and D. H. Pyle, 1997, “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Finance Intermediator,” Journal of Finance, vol.32:pp.371-387.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W, 1992, “A modest proposal for improved corporate governance.” Business Lawyer, vol.48 (1): pp.59-77.
Lloyd W. P., J. H. Hand and N. K. Modani, 1987, “The Effect of the Degree of Ownership Control on Firm Diversification, Market Value, and Merger Activity,” Journal of Business Research, vol.15:pp.303-312.
Main, B. G. M., A. Bruce, and T. Buck, 1996, “Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance.” The Economic Journal, vol.106(439):pp.1627-1644.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes., 1990, “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.27:pp. 595-612.
Mehran, H., 1995, “Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.38:pp.163-184.
Niehaus G. R., 1989, “Ownership Structure and Inventory Method Choice,” Accounting Review, vol.64:pp.269-284.
Oviatt, B. M., 1988, “Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-shareholder Relationship, Incentives for Congruent Interests.” Academy of Management Review, vol.13:pp.214-225.
Patton, A. and J. C. Baker, 1987,” Why Won’t Directors Rock the Boat?” Harvard Business Review, pp.10-18.
Perry, T, 1999, “Incentive compensation for outside directors and CEO turnover.“ Working Paper, Indian University-Kelly School of Business.
Pound, J., 1988, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.20:pp.237-265.
Rafel, C. C. and C. Gispert, 2003, “Total Board Compensation, Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies.” Labour, vol.17(1):pp.103-126.
Rajgopal, S. and M.Venkatachalam, 1998,“ The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Gpvernance:An Empirical Investigation,” Working Paper.
Ryan Jr. H. E., and Wiggins. III. R. A, 2001, “The Influence of Firm- and Manager-Specific Characteristics on the Structure of Executive Compensation.” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.7:pp.101-123.
Shalit, S. S. and U. Sankar, 1997, “The Measurement of the Firm Size.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 59(3):pp.290-298.
Sloan, R. G., 1996, “Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?” The Accounting Review, vol.71:pp.289-315.
Sun, J., Cahan, S. F., and Emanuel, D., 2009, ”Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants and future firm performance”, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.33(8):pp.1507-1519.
Suwina, C. and F. Michael, 2005, “Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong.” Corporate Governance vol.13:pp.291-302.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman, 1986, “Positive accounting theory.” Prentice Hall.
Weir, C. and D. Liang, 2001, “Governance Structures, Director Independence and Corporate Performance in the U.K.” European Business Review, vol.13(2):pp.86-95.
Wong, K. A. and T. C. Yek, 1991, “Shareholdings of Board of directors and Corporate Performance:Evidence from Singapore”, Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research, vol.2(2):pp.211-225.
Yermack, D, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.40 (2): pp.185-211.
Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce, 1989, “Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrated Model.” Journal of Management, vol.15:pp.291- 334.
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2023-01-01起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw