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系統識別號 U0026-2606201915003600
論文名稱(中文) 惡意併購失敗與重新聚焦
論文名稱(英文) Failed Hostile Acquisition Attempts and Refocusing
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 經營管理碩士學位學程(AMBA)
系所名稱(英) Advanced Master of Business Administration (AMBA)
學年度 107
學期 2
出版年 108
研究生(中文) 陳盈穎
研究生(英文) Ying-Ying Chen
電子信箱 nefertari8055@gmail.com
學號 RD6051010
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 55頁
口試委員 指導教授-曾瓊慧
口試委員-張紹基
口試委員-陳寶蓮
中文關鍵字 重新聚焦  惡意併購  代理問題 
英文關鍵字 Refocusing  hostile acquisition  agency problem 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文旨在研究惡意併購(合併與收購)如何作為一個訊號機制,在其被拒絕後影響著被併公司的重新聚焦。本研究從被併公司的戰略面、績效面及資源面提出四個預測因子,並試著驗證這些因素會如何影響被併公司在拒絕惡意併購後是否選擇重新聚焦。本研究並以代理理論為基礎,認為那些有著較寬廣的業務經營範圍(business coverage)、事前防禦被併購策略(ex ante defensive plan)、較差的公司績效表現(performance growth)及較少的寬裕資源(slack resources)的被併公司有較高的可能將惡意併購當作警訊,進而選擇重新聚焦回核心業務,以避免未來再次被惡意併購。
本論文蒐集了於1991年至2017年之間,以被併目標為美國公司之失敗的惡意併購資料,共計292筆。透過二元邏輯回歸分析,研究結果顯示,對於被併公司在惡意併購失敗後的重新聚焦決策,其業務經營範圍對此有著正向的影響,而事前防禦被併購策略有著負向的影響。然而,研究結果亦顯示,公司績效表現及寬裕資源對於重新聚焦的影響則並不顯著。本研究表明,事前因素的分析有助於預測惡意併購失敗後被併公司經營策略的改變:是否會選擇重新聚焦。
英文摘要 To better understand how a hostile merge and acquisition (M&A) attempt acts as signaling mechanism and influences a target firm’s reaction after they rejected the M&A, this study identified four predictors related to a target firm’s prior strategies and performance, and investigated how these factors affect target firms’ choice of whether to refocus or not. Based on agency theory, this study argued that target firms with wider business coverage, ex ante defensive plans, lower performance growth and lesser slack resources are more likely to regard the hostile acquisition as a ‘wake-up call’, and it would motivate them to take refocusing actions in order to avoid future hostile acquisitions.
These hypotheses were empirically tested by using a sample of 292 U.S-based target firms of failed hostile acquisitions between 1991 and 2017. This study found a positive impact of business coverage and a negative impact of ex ante defensive plan on the likelihood of refocusing. However, it is also shown that the influence of performance growth and slack resources are not salient. This study suggests that ex ante factors can help predict change in business strategies following a failed M&A.
論文目次 Contents
Abstract I
摘要 II
誌謝 III
Contents IV
List of Tables VI
List of Figures VII
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Hypothesis Development 7
2.1 Business Coverage 9
2.2 Ex ante Defensive Plan 11
2.3 Financial Performance 13
2.4 Slack Resources 16
Chapter 3 Methods 19
3.1 Sample and Data Sources 19
3.2 Variables and Measures 21
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 21
3.2.2 Independent Variables 24
3.2.3 Control Variables 27
Chapter 4 Results 33
Chapter 5 Conclusion And Implications 43
5.1 Contributions 45
5.1.1 Theoretical Contribution 45
5.1.2 Managerial Contribution 46
5.2 Limitation and Suggestion for Future Research 48
References 51

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