
系統識別號 
U00262507201911330600 
論文名稱(中文) 
根據奈許合作議價模式的兩階段計算策略設計具公平利益分配方案之分散型供應鏈 
論文名稱(英文) 
A TwoStep Computation Strategy for Designing Decentralized Supply Chains with Fair Profit Allocation Plans Using Nash Cooperative Bargaining Model 
校院名稱 
成功大學 
系所名稱(中) 
化學工程學系 
系所名稱(英) 
Department of Chemical Engineering 
學年度 
107 
學期 
2 
出版年 
108 
研究生(中文) 
陳利勇 
研究生(英文) 
Eric Yonathan 
學號 
N36067058 
學位類別 
碩士 
語文別 
英文 
論文頁數 
93頁 
口試委員 
口試委員李豪業 口試委員郭文生 口試委員吳煒 指導教授張珏庭

中文關鍵字 
none

英文關鍵字 
Game theory
Optimization
Fair profit allocation
Nash cooperative bargaining approach

學科別分類 

中文摘要 
none

英文摘要 
Traditional supplychain management methods often treated the given system as a whole, without considering the conflicting interests of its participants. Game theory was adopted in a number of prior studies to identify fair prices and throughputs of the intermediates so as to maintain sustainable operations. In particular, the mathematical frameworks of a series of fictitious systems have already been proposed in the literature. The proper designs of distributed processing systems were generated to facilitate implementation of a decentralized optimization strategy. In these supply chains, the supplierproduced intermediates were bought by consumers to manufacture the final products. However, when the total profit of a supply chain is maximized without constraints, the maximum total profit may not be divided and allocated to every actor fairly. This deficiency could lead to various negative impacts, including dissatisfaction of actors, instability of coalition, loss of markets, and reduction in revenue. For this reason, a cooperative game theory has already been applied to generate fairprofit allocation plans among the supplier(s) and consumer(s) so as to establish a longterm working relationship. The present work developed a twostep approach addresses this issue. Finding the maximum total profit of the whole chain is the primary task of the first step, while the Nash cooperative bargaining approach is adopted in the second step so as to distribute the total proﬁt among the actors fairly. Consequently, the corresponding intermediate prices and throughputs can also be estimated as well. Various case studies in fictitious systems and the petroleum supply chain are provided as examples to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach. It can be observed from the optimization results of various case studies in fictitious systems and the petroleum supply chain that the goal to get the fair profit allocation plans can be achieved while still maintaining the maximum total profit of the whole chain.

論文目次 
Abstract I
Acknowledgments III
Table of Contents IV
List of Figures VII
List of Tables IX
Nomenclature XI
Chapter 1 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Literature Review 1
1.3 Research Objectives 4
1.4 Thesis Structure 4
Chapter 2 6
2.1 Incentive for More Studies 6
2.2 Existing Approach 7
2.2.1 Model Structure 7
2.2.2 Mathematical Model 8
2.2.3 Optimization Formulation 13
2.2.4 Example 1 14
2.3 Revenue Sharing Scheme (Yue and You, 2014) 17
2.4 Nash Cooperative Bargaining Method 18
2.5 The Proposed Solution Procedure 18
2.5.1 Step 1 18
2.5.2 Step 2 19
2.6 Simple Examples 19
2.6.1 Example 1: 1 Supplier, 1 Consumer and 1 Intermediate Product 19
2.6.2 Example 2: 1 Supplier, 2 Consumers and 2 Intermediate Products 21
2.6.3 Example 3: 1 Supplier, 2 Consumers and 1 Intermediate Product 23
Chapter 3 26
3.1 Model Structure 26
3.2 General Model Formulations 30
3.2.1 Model I – the separation process 30
3.2.2 Model II – the reactionseparation process 31
3.2.3 Model III – the storage process 34
3.2.4 Profit and cost models 34
3.3 Specific Unit Models 36
3.3.1 Atmospheric distillation (S) 36
3.3.2 LPG retailer (C1) 37
3.3.3 Reformer (C2) 38
3.3.4 Naphtha cracker (C3) 39
3.3.5 Kerosene retailer (C4) 40
3.3.6 Hydrotreater (C5) 40
3.3.7 Vacuum distillation (C6) 41
3.4 Extension 42
3.4.1 Gasoline retailer (E1) 44
3.5 Objective Functions 45
3.5.1 Base case 45
3.5.2 Extended case 46
Chapter 4 48
4.1 Base Case 48
4.2 Extended Case 54
4.3 Grouping Structures 67
4.3.1 Structure I 67
4.3.2 Structure II 76
4.3.3 Concluding remark 86
Chapter 5 87
5.1 Conclusions 87
5.2 Future Works 87
References 89

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