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系統識別號 U0026-2506201219160700
論文名稱(中文) 高階主管薪酬與公司績效間不對稱關聯性
論文名稱(英文) Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Compensation to Firm Performance
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生(中文) 黃俊嚴
研究生(英文) Jyun-Yan Huang
學號 R16991117
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 64頁
口試委員 指導教授-郭啟賢
口試委員-林松宏
口試委員-余士迪
中文關鍵字 高階主管薪酬  公司績效與薪酬  關聯性  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 CEO compensation  pay-for-performance sensitivity  corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究自ExecuComp資料庫蒐集1992年至2010年間所有美國S&P1500公司資料,對其高階主管薪酬(包含現金及權益獎酬)與公司績效(以資產報酬率與股票報酬率為指標)之關聯性進行實證研究。首先,實證結果顯示,較佳或較差績效的公司中,高階主管現金薪酬與資產報酬率之關聯性較弱。此乃與Murphy (1999)之數據分析一致;於主管獎金合約中,現金薪酬與資產報酬率之線性關係存在上界(upper bound)與下界(lower bound)。其次,實證結果顯示,績效較差之公司其高階主管現金薪酬與股票報酬率之關聯性較弱。此結果顯示高階主管現金薪酬並未因公司績效較差而受到懲罰。此結果與Shaw and Zhang (2010)結論一致。並且,相對於一般績效之公司,績效最佳之公司其高階主管現金薪酬與股票報酬率之關聯性較弱,此上界可推論受獎金合約之上界效果影響。
而對於高階主管權益獎酬,Dechow (2006)推論高階主管權益獎酬可減少下行風險(limit downside risk)對高階主管獎酬之影響,將促使高階主管追逐風險及高績效。然而實證結果顯示,對於公司績效較差時,高階主管流通在外選擇權價值與股票報酬率之關聯性並無顯著較弱。本研究推論此結果之導因為高階主管選擇權持有之數量。進一步以實證探討,其結果顯示在公司績效較差時,選擇權每權之價值與公司績效之關聯性顯著減少。此乃印證Dechow (2006)之推論。而額外實證結果亦顯示高階主管權益獎酬存在減緩下行風險對高階主管薪酬影響之效果。
英文摘要 In this work, I collect all S&P1500 firms data in Execucomp over the period 1992 to 2010 and study the sensitivity of CEO compensation (cash and equity-based reward) to firm performance (proxy with ROA and stock returns.) First, I find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to ROA for poorly and well performing firms, related to the intermediate performing firms. It is consistent with Murphy (1999) that there’re the upper and lower bounds in bonus contracts. Second, the empirical evidence shows that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to stock returns for poor performers. That is, CEO cash compensation is not punished for poor firm performance, which is consistent with Shaw and Zhang’s (2010) conclusions. Third, there’re the upper bounds in the relation between CEO cash compensation and stock returns for well performing firms duo to the upper bound in bonus contracts (Shaw and Zhang, 2010).
For CEO equity-based compensation, I found the sensitivity of total value of CEO outstanding options to stock returns is not lessened for poor stock return performance, related to intermediate stock return performance. However, the evidence against Dechow’s (2006) conjecture that total value of CEO outstanding options limits the downside risk of stock price movements could be driven by the numbers of CEO outstanding options. Further, the empirical test figures out the value per CEO outstanding options is less sensitive to stock returns for poor stock return performance. The result supports Dechow’s (2006) conjecture. And the additional empirical results also prove CEO equity-based compensation limit the downside risk of stock return performance.
論文目次 ABSTRACT I
1. Introduction 1
2. Empirical Framework and Research Questions 4
2.1. The Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance 5
2.1.1. The Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance: The Ex Post Settling Up Problem 5
2.1.2. The Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance: ROA-based Compensation Curve 7
2.2. Research Questions and Hypothesizes 9
2.2.1. Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Earnings and Stock Returns 11
2.2.2. Sensitivity of CEO Equity-Based Compensation to Earnings and Stock Returns 12
3. Empirical Models and Variables 15
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 21
4.1. Sample Selection 21
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 22
5. Empirical Results 24
5.1. Partitioning by Stock Return Performance 24
5.2. Partitioning by Earnings Performance Measure 28
5.3. The Sensitivity of CEO Outstanding Equity-Based Compensation to Firm Performance 29
5.4. The Sensitivity of Bonus Pay to Firm Performance 32
5.5. The Sensitivity of CEO Compensation to Firm Performance With High Board Independence 33
5.6. Do Numbers of Partition Matter? 35
6. Conclusion 38
APPENDIX 60
REFERENCES 62
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