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系統識別號 U0026-2212201117184600
論文名稱(中文) 管理者之超額薪酬與公司治理、公司特性、公司未來績效及盈餘管理行為之關聯性研究
論文名稱(英文) The Relationship between Top Executive Excess Compensation and Corporate Governance, Firm Characteristics, Firm Performance, and Earnings Management
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 100
學期 1
出版年 100
研究生(中文) 林佳緯
研究生(英文) Jia-Wei Lin
電子信箱 jerrylien99@hotmail.com
學號 r16981316
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 95頁
口試委員 指導教授-賴秀卿
共同指導教授-李宏志
口試委員-楊朝旭
口試委員-黃華瑋
中文關鍵字 超額薪酬  公司治理  公司特性  經營績效  盈餘管理 
英文關鍵字 Top executive excess compensation  corporate governance  firm characteristics  financial performance  earnings management 
學科別分類
中文摘要 近年來高階管理者超額薪酬越來越受到投資人注意,過去國內外的超額薪酬相關研究,大部分探討高階管理者超額薪酬高低對於公司績效影響,公司治理與高階管理者薪酬關係,及薪酬相關之法令、政策、薪酬委員會實施後對於高階管理者薪酬影響。本研究探討公司治理及公司特性對超額薪酬之影響。
本研究選取國內2006至2010年上市櫃公司,以超額薪酬作為模型之應變數,公司治理、公司特性為解釋變數。實證結果顯示,主要經理人持股、公司存在金字塔持股結構、經理人董監事比例對高階管理者超額薪酬有正向顯著影響,大股東持股、董監事持股、董監事會規模、控制股東董監事會席次比例、外部董監事比例及總經理之更動頻率對高階管理者超額薪酬有負向顯著影響,而機構投資人持股、股份盈餘偏離差、資訊揭露評鑑等級、董事長兼任總經理、控制股東兼任董事長或總經理等變數則無顯著影響。此外,本研究也測試高階管理者之超額薪酬與公司未來績效上之關聯性,結果顯示高階管理者超額薪酬越高未來績效會持平或較佳,表示國內上市櫃公司傾向利用較高的薪酬,來吸引或者留住高品質的管理人才;最後本研究探討高階管理者超額薪酬與盈餘管理行為之關聯性,發現當管理者超額薪酬越高,則其盈餘管理行為會越明顯,顯示管理者會透過盈餘管理增加公司盈餘,從而提高其薪酬。
英文摘要 Top executive compensation has been topically and controversially receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders recently. Most previous studies explore the influence of top executive excess compensation on firm future performance, the relationship between corporate governance and top executive compensation, and the impact of the implementation of relevant policies, regulations and compensation committee on top executive compensation. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance and firm characteristics on executive excess compensation.
The sample of this study consists of all publicly traded and OTC companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) from 2006 to 2010. We use top executive excess compensation as dependent variable and corporate governance and firm characteristics as explanatory variables. The result indicates that main manager shareholdings, pyramid structure, percentage of inside directors have significantly positive impact on top executive excess compensation. Blockholder shareholdings, director shareholdings, board size, percentage of control shareholders on the board, percentage of outside directors, and CEO turnover have significantly negative impact on top executive excess compensation. However, institutional investor shareholdings, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, information disclosure and evaluation rank, CEO duality, and controlling shareholder serving as president or CEO at the same time have insignificant effect on top executive excess compensation.
In addition, we test the relationship between executive excess compensation and subsequent firm financial performance. The result shows that there exist positive and no association between excess compensation and subsequent performance, implying that domestic firms reflect some dimension of demanding for a high-quality executive. Furthermore, we also examine the relationship between top executive excess compensation and firm’s earnings management. We find that the higher excess compensation of executive, the more earnings management. In other words, the firm will engage in more earnings management.
論文目次 第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………………4
第三節 研究貢獻………………………………………………………………5
第四節 研究流程………………………………………………………………6

第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………………7
第一節 超額薪酬相關文獻……………………………………………………7
第二節 薪酬與公司治理相關文獻……………………………………………12
第三節 薪酬委員會相關文獻…………………………………………………16

第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………20
第一節 研究假說………………………………………………………………20
第二節 研究期間、資料來源…………………………………………………32
第三節 研究模型與變數衡量…………………………………………………33

第四章 實證結果………………………………………………………………43
第一節 研究期間與樣本選取…………………………………………………43
第二節 估計合理薪酬…………………………………………………………46
第三節 公司治理與公司特性影響超額薪酬…………………………………51
第四節 超額薪酬與公司未來績效及管理者盈餘管理行為…………………66
第五節 敏感性分析……………………………………………………………73

第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………79
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………79
第二節 研究建議………………………………………………………………80
第三節 研究限制與未來方向…………………………………………………82

參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………………83
附錄一 ……………………………………………………………………………89
附錄二 ……………………………………………………………………………92
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