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系統識別號 U0026-2208201700255600
論文名稱(中文) CEO年齡與租稅規避
論文名稱(英文) CEO AGE AND TAX AVOIDANCE
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance (on the job class)
學年度 105
學期 2
出版年 106
研究生(中文) 鄭天銘
研究生(英文) Tien-Ming Cheng
學號 R87011134
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 16頁
口試委員 指導教授-周庭楷
口試委員-梁少懷
口試委員-謝喻婷
中文關鍵字 CEO年齡  租稅規避  有效稅率  現金有效稅率 
英文關鍵字 Tax aggressiveness  Tax avoidance  CEO AGE  Risk-aversion 
學科別分類
中文摘要 研究資料指出CEO人格特質會影響公司投資決策與融資策略,同時,也有文獻指出CEO年齡影響其風險偏好及冒險行為,但各文獻結論不一。本文以CEO關注於提昇昇公司價值,而租稅減少即是公司所得稅費用的降低,因此公司應採取租稅規避行為,降低其稅負,但事實並非如此,因不同產業與公司的租稅負擔差異極大,顯示租稅規避行為必定隱含其他成本,如:實行成本、遭主管機關認定為違法事實的罰金及對公司聲譽的傷害…等,此外,激進的租稅規避行為往往欠缺交易安排與事實佐證,因此容易遭受主管機關與投資人的挑戰與嚴格檢視(Rego and Wilson 2012)。當租稅規避行為被主管機關認定為違法時,公司就可能受到重大裁罰(Lisowsky 2009),進而提高上述成本的可能性,代表租稅規避行為有著一定程度的冒險行為,故本研究以CEO年齡與租稅規避行為為研究主題,探討其中關聯。本文以1992年至2015年間ExecuComp中所有公司為研究對象,但排除公用事業與融資公司,探討CEO年齡與企業租稅規避行為之關聯。本文以有效稅率(ETR)與現金有效稅率(CETR)來測試租稅規避程度,實證結果發現,有效稅率(ETR)與現金有效稅率(CETR)分別與CEO年齡呈現顯著正相關,也就是說相對於年長的CEO,年輕的CEO較易採行積極的租稅規避行為。
英文摘要 In the past, the author points out that the CEO personality is related to the company's investment decision-making and financing strategy. At the same time, it is pointed out that the CEO age affects its risk preference and risk-taking behavior, but the literature conclusion is different. In this paper, the CEO is focused on raising the value of the company, and the tax reduction is reduced by the cost of accounting. All companies should be committed to the reduction of tax, but this is not the case, which must contain significant costs, such as the implementation of costs, the penalty fines for the illegal facts by the competent authorities and the damage to the company's reputation ... and so on. In addition, the tax avoidance is built on a weak base, vulnerable to question by the audit staff and the competent authorities, and thus increase the possibility of the above. Tax avoidance behavior has a certain degree of risk-taking behavior, so this study takes CEO age and tax avoidance behavior as the research topic to explore the association. This paper examines all firms in ExecuComp from 1992 to 2015, but excludes utility and finance companies to explore the relationship between CEO age and corporate tax avoidance. In this paper, the effective tax rate (ETR) and the cash effective tax rate (CETR) are used to test the tax avoidance degree. The empirical results show that the effective tax rate (ETR) and cash effective tax rate (CETR) show a significant positive correlation with the CEO age respectively. Compared to older CEOs, young CEOs are more likely to adopt active tax avoidance.
論文目次 第一章 緒論.......................................1
第一節 研究背景........................................1
第二節 研究動機........................................1
第二章 假說設計...................................3
第一節 年齡與冒險行為...................................3
第二節 租稅規避與冒險行為...............................4
第三節 假說建立.........................................5
第三章 研究方法與理論.............................5
第一節 樣本收集........................................5
第二節 研究設計........................................5
第四章 實證結果與分析.............................7
第一節 敘述統計量分析..................................7
第二節 相關係數分析....................................9
第三節 迴歸係數分析....................................11
第五章 研究結論與意涵............................13
參考文獻.........................................14
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