進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-2201201420575100
論文名稱(中文) 紡織產業之公司治理機制與經營績效之關聯性研究
論文名稱(英文) A Study on the Relationship among Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance in Taiwan Textile Industry
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 經營管理碩士學位學程(AMBA)
系所名稱(英) Advanced Master of Business Administration (AMBA)
學年度 102
學期 1
出版年 103
研究生(中文) 李重諺
研究生(英文) Chung-Yen Lee
學號 rd6014131
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 63頁
口試委員 指導教授-利德江
口試委員-戴文禮
口試委員-張哲榮
口試委員-葉俊吾
中文關鍵字 經營績效  公司治理  股權結構  董事會 
英文關鍵字 Operational performance  Corporate governance  Ownership 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究以台灣紡織業上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,樣本期間為2008年3月到2012年12月的季資料,利用每股盈餘(EPS)作為衡量經營績效的指標,採用敘述統計分析、Pearson相關係數分析與多元迴歸分析,探討公司治理機制之股權結構與董事會組成等因素對公司經營績效的影響。
實證結果發現︰公司治理變數中「大股東持股比例」、「經理人持股比率」、「國內法人持股比例」、「外國法人持股比例」與「獨立董事席位比例」對每股盈餘均具有顯著的影響。
其中,「大股東持股比率」對每股盈餘具顯著的負向影響;「經理人持股比率」、「國內法人持股比例」、「外國法人持股比例」與「獨立董事席位比例」對每股盈餘具顯著的正向影響。
英文摘要 Since the year of 1998, many of the Tsec-listed and OTC-listed companies in Taiwan had gone through financial crises one after another. Examples include Kuo Yang Construction Co., Ltd., Hongfu Group Corporation, New Magnitude Group, Tong Lung Metal Industry Co., Ltd., Tai Yu Products Corporation, Kuangsan Enterprise Group, Procomp Informatics Ltd., Infodisc Technology Co., ABIT, Summit Computer Technology Co., etc. As a result, their stock prices dropped in a major way. The steep falls in prices led to serious losses of the people who had made related investments. As for other foreign countries, even though the United States has already had a company governance mechanism which is quite complete, still, it is still unavoidable that, since the end of the year 2001, many large sized and well known companies, such as Enron Corporation, World Com Inc., Xerox Co., Ltd., Merck & Co., Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., Tyco International Ltd., Adelphia Communication Corporation, Enron Corporation, America Online (AOL) Time Warner Inc., Bristol Myers Squibb Co., and more, had been, one after another, involved in scandals such as creating fake financial reports or inflating profits or surpluses. These scandals had not only caused the rapid drops of those companies' market values, but also led to many of the external stock holders of those companies having to sustain serious losses. In addition, the security and credit mechanisms of those companies and the related markets were also damaged. And the governing authority of the higher competent bodies was challenged as well. Due to the various domestic and foreign tank stock related events mentioned above, it is found that, besides the situations of information not being transparent or public were revealed, there were also major defects in the company governance mechanisms inside those corporations. For this reason, the researcher of this study was motivated to conduct this study which aimed to find out and examine the relationships between companies' governance mechanisms and their performances in business operations.
In the aspect of domestic and foreign studies of related issues, the study by Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-Hsiu Li, and Cheng-En Ko (2002) indicated that a huge percentage of a company's performances in its business operations could be explained by the company's governance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) pointed out that companies may be under the influences of political factors. If the number of external board members of the board of directors of a company is increased due to some political reason, it is likely that the company's performances in its business operations would get worse. Singh and Davidson (2003) and Pao-Chiung Chen (2013) both found that there is a positive relationship between a company's performances in its business operations and the percentage of the company's stock held by its managers. Pound (1988) proposed the efficient monitoring hypothesis, which believes that institutional investors of a company can be more efficient in performing monitoring on the management level of the company, for they are rather adequate with more sufficient professional knowledge and related talents. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) argued that if, for a company, the percentage of stocks held by institutional legal persons is high, it would be more likely that the behaviors of the managers of the company to hurt shareholders equity can be prevented. Hsiu-Ying Li and Chun-Ju Fang (2008) suggested that, compared with general boards of directors, independent boards of directors are more specific in their powers, authorities, and job responsibilities; and systems of independent boards of directors can enhance and increase the independence of boards of directors, in order to maintain and defend the overall benefits, interests, and values of enterprises. According to the literature mentioned above, it can be seen that there is an influence, to some degree, of a company's governance mechanism on the company's performances in its business operations. For this reason, this study aimed to explore the general situations of the governance mechanisms of the Tsec-listed and OTC-listed companies in the textile industry in Taiwan, based on the companies' equity share structures and compositions of boards of directors. This study also examined whether the findings regarding the influences of equity share structures and boards of directors of the companies in Taiwan on the companies' performances in their business operations consistent with those of other foreign studies, for the purpose of finding out if the differences in national conditions and management models would lead to different research results and conclusions. It is also hoped that the improvement suggestions and programs in relation to company governance systems proposed by this study, to help enterprises to establish good internal control systems, which can further increase their performances in their business operations. Lastly, it is hoped that the research results of this study can be provided to general companies as references and inducements while they are promoting their company governance mechanisms, to protect their shareholders' legal rights and interests while also taking other interested parties' benefits into consideration.
The research purposes of this study are summarized and listed below: (1) To explore the influences of enterprises' equity share structures (percentages of stock held by major shareholders, percentages of stock held by managers, and percentages of stock held by foreign legal persons) on their performances in their business operations; (2) To explore the influences of compositions of boards of directors (pledge ratios of board supervisors, board sizes, and whether board chairmen hold a concurrent post of C.E.O.) on their performances in their business operations; (3) To provide the research results of this study to government institutions at various levels and the industries as references to promote their policies regarding company governance mechanisms.
In this study, Taiwan's textile listed companies as the research object, and the sample period is from March 2008 to December 2012. Using the Earnings per Share (EPS) to measure the operational performance. The data analysis employed in this study includes the descriptive statistics, Pearson’s correlation, and Regression analysis. To explore the ownership structure and the characteristics of board directors on the operational performance of the affected. The empirical results found that: "Blockholder ownership", "Managerial ownership", "Ownership of Domestic Institutional Investors", "Ownership of Foreign Institutional Investors" and "Independent Director Hold" have a significant impact on EPS. Among them, "Blockholder ownership" has a significant negative correlation to the EPS. "Managerial ownership", "Ownership of Domestic Institutional Investors", "Ownership of Foreign Institutional Investors" and "Independent Director Hold" has a significant positive correlation to the EPS.
論文目次 Abstract ii
誌謝 vi
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機 2
第三節 研究目的 3
第四節 研究流程 4
第五節 資料收集方法 5
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司治理 6
第二節 經營績效 11
第三節 公司治理機制與經營績效相關研究 15
第參章 研究方法 30
第一節 研究架構 30
第二節 研究假說 31
第三節 變數之操作型定義 31
第四節 資料分析工具 34
第肆章 實證結果 36
第一節 敘述統計分析 36
第二節 Pearson相關係數分析 37
第三節 多元迴歸分析 39
第四節 小結 40
第伍章 結論與建議 41
第一節 結論 41
第二節 研究限制 43
第三節 建議 43
參考文獻 44
一、中文部份 44
二、英文部分 48


參考文獻 一、中文部份
1. 王玉珍(2002),「股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
2. 王美華(2005),「公司治理機制與經營績效之關係研究-以台灣金融控股公司為例」,朝陽科技大學財務金融系碩士論文。
3. 王鼎立(2002),「董事會結構與公司盈餘的傳遞效果」,東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
4. 司徒大年、王賢英(2000),「“OECD原則”的影響力大大超出了我們的預期─與OECD公司事務部主管里查德˙佛雷得里克先生對話錄」,上市公司,第十二期。
5. 何森雄(2003),「台中港倉儲轉運公司經營績效評估」,逢甲大學工業工程研究所在職專班碩士論文。
6. 何進村(2012),「最大股東持股比例對公司績效之影響」,東海大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
7. 吳元評(2012),「海運承攬業發展多國併櫃業務之創新策略與經營績效關係之研究」,國立臺灣海洋大學航運管理學系碩士論文。
8. 吳美穎(2004),「內在公司治理機治之探討-股東組成與股權集中度對公司治理績效之影響」,輔仁大學管理學研究所碩士論文。
9. 吳樂群、周行一、施敏雄、陳筃琦、簡淑芬等著(2001),公司管控-董事及監察人如何執行職務,台北:財團法人中華民國證券暨期貨市場發展基金會。
10. 呂佩蓉、莊嘉建(2008),「股權結構、關係人交易與公司財務績效關聯性之研究」,蘭陽學報,7,頁86-94。
11. 李建華,方文寶(1996),企業績效評估理論與實務,台北,超越。
12. 李春安、徐傳瑛(2010),董事會獨立性與企業財務危機關係之研究,管理與系統,17,3,頁467-499。
13. 李維安、武立東等著(2002),公司治理教程,上海:上海人民出版社。
14. 李驥等著,見粱能等編(2000),超產權論與企業績效,公司治理結構:中國的實踐與美國的經驗,北京:中國人民大學出版社,2000 年,頁 4-5。
15. 沈梵慈(2013),「多角化程度對銀行績效的影響-董事會結構的角色」,靜宜大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
16. 林財源(2002),財務分析報表,台北:台北自刊。
17. 林淑棻,(2003),「公司股權結構、董事會組成結構以及財務政策與公司經營績效關係之研究」,國立政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
18. 林慧珍、陳香如、洪榮華(2007),「公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及公司績效之影響-研發密集產業之實證」,中山管理評論,1,頁37-60。
19. 邱亭彰(1993),「台灣企業對外投資經營策略與績效之探討」,國立中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
20. 邱偉侖(2012),「公司信用評等與董監事股權質押之關連性」,中原大學會計研究所碩士論文。
21. 邱照瑋(2013),「公司治理、高管薪酬與公司績效之研究:以中國上市金融業為例」,國立臺北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
22. 柯承恩(2000),「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議」,會計研究月刊,第173、174期。
23. 柯芳枝(2012),公司法論(上),第八版,三民書局,頁 208。
24. 洪榮華、李易政、陳香如和謝可杉(2009),「家族企業特性與負債水準關係之研究」,商管科技季刊,10(3),頁491-525。
25. 洪榮華、陳香如、王玉珍(2005),「公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點」,輔仁管理評論,3,頁23-40。
26. 洪榮華、陳香如、林慧珍(2007),「公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及公司績效之影響-研發密集產業之實證」,中山管理評論,15(1),頁37-60。
27. 洪瓊瑋(2003),「金融控股公司法實施後金融機構公司治理改變與績效關聯之研究」,國防管理學院國防財務資源研究所碩士論文。
28. 徐燕山(2003),「公司股權結構、董事會組成結構以及財務政策與公司經營績效關係之研究」,國立政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
29. 張明峰(1991),「股權結構對公司績效影響之研究」,國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
30. 張庭瑄(2012),「大股東持股及董監持股高低交互關係對公司經營績效影響之研究」,銘傳大學資訊管理學系碩士論文。
31. 張訓華(1991),「股權結構、董事會組成與企業當年財務績效—以77 年度會計報酬率為準」,東吳大學管理學研究所碩士論文。
32. 莊嘉建、呂佩蓉(2008),「股權結構、關係人交易與公司財務績效關聯性之研究」,蘭陽學報,第7期,頁86-94。
33. 許和鈞、謝國文、及楊之宜(2002),「管理者持股與公司經營績效」,亞太社會科技學報,頁81-101。
34. 陳宏姿(2001),「董監事結構與企業財務績效之關聯」,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
35. 陳采葳(2012),「從資源依賴理論分析我國上市公司獨立董事對企業經營績效之影響」,國立臺北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
36. 陳春山著(2002),資本市場與企業法制改造的策略。
37. 陳美杏(2008),「公司治理對經營績效之影響-以董事長與總經理是否為同一人之研究」,淡江大學國際貿易學系碩士論文。
38. 陳麗娟(2004),「董事會組成、股權結構、關係人交易與企業績效關係之研究-以紡織業及電子業為實証」,成功大學高階管理碩士在職專班碩士論文。
39. 陳寶瓊(2013),「公司治理與經營績效關係之研究-以台灣上市上櫃營建業為例」,大葉大學管理學院碩士論文。
40. 陶文哲(2009),「董事會結構與資訊揭露對公司價值之影響」,國立臺北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
41. 曾宛如(2008),公司管理與資本市場法制專論(二),元照出版。
42. 黃璟琦(2002),「上市公司董監事持股、持股質押、市值與經營績效關聯性之研究」,高雄第一科技大學金融營運所碩士論文。
43. 楊麗弘(1999),「台灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效之研究」,私立長庚大學管理究所碩士論文。
44. 葉匡時(2001),公司治理:企業成敗的最後關鍵,台北:天下遠見出版股份有限公司。
45. 葉銀華(1998),家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效-台灣家族企業管治機制之研究,行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
46. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩(2002),公司治理與評等系統,台北︰商智文化。
47. 熊大中(2000),「我國企業財務危機與董監股權質押關連性之研究」,成功大學會計學系碩士論文。
48. 劉文平(1993),經營分析與企業診斷—企業經營系統觀,台北:德森文化事業公司。
49. 劉紹樑,(2002),從莊子到安隆─A+公司治理,台北市:天下雜誌。
50. 蔡中主(2013),「公司治理對台灣銀行業獲利及逾放比的影響」,國立中央大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
51. 鄭祥和(2006),「公司治理與財務危機關聯性之探討」,東吳大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。
52. 鄭富紘(2009),「供應鏈整合績效之探討─以台灣半導體產業為例」,南台科技大學科技管理研究所碩士論文。
53. 謝淑娟(1994),「探討股權結構與公司績效之關係-以台灣上市公司為實證」,國立交通大學管理科學研究所碩士論文。
54. 證基會真像王:http://sfi.anyan.com.tw/sfi/service.htm。
55. 嚴文筆(2004),「從內部控制觀點建構舞弊訴訟預警模型」,國立中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文。
56. 蘇麗娟(2013),「台灣中小企業採行企業社會責任方式對企業形象與經營績效之關係研究」,朝陽科技大學財務金融系碩士論文。
二、英文部分
1. Agrawal, A., and C. R. “Knoeber (1998), Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover”, Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 219-39.
2. Arthur, J. B. (1994), “Effects of human resource systems on manufacturing performance and turnover”, Academy of Management Journal, 37, 670-687.
3. Bacon, J. (1973), Corporate Directorship Practice: Member and Committees of the Board, New York: The conference board.
4. Bainbridge, S. (2002), Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance, UCLA, School of Law Research Paper, No. 02-06, 1-70.
5. Barnhart, S. W. and Rosenstein, S. (1998), “Board Composition, Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis”, The Financial Review, 33, 1-16.
6. Brickly, J. A., Lease, R. C. and Smith, C.W. jr. (1988), “Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267-291.
7. Cadbruy A. (1999), “What Are the Trends in Corporate Governance? How will They Impact Your Company? ”, Long Range Planning Journal, 5, 12-9.
8. Chaganti, R. S., Mahajan, V. and Sharma, S. (1985), “Corporate Board Size, Composition, and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry”, Journal of Management Studies, 22, 400-17.
9. Chen, Y., and Hu, S. (2001), The controlling shareholder’s personal stock loan and firm performance, working paper, National Taiwan University.
10. Chen, M. J., Su, K. H., and Tsai, W.(2007), “Competitive tension: The awareness – motivation - capability perspective”, Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1):101-118.
11. Cheung, Y. L., Jiang, P., Limpaphayom, P. & Lu, T. (2010), “Corporate governance in China: a step forward”, European Financial Management, 16 (1), 94-123.
12. Chiang, H. T. (2005), “An empirical study of corporate governance and corporate performance”, Journal of American Academy of Business, 6, 95-101.
13. Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
14. Drucker, P. F., (1974), Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, NY: Harper and Row.
15. Ferrell, C. (1979), “A national customer satisfaction barometer: The swedish experience”, Journal of Marketing, 55, 1-22.
16. Gillan, S. L, Starks, L. T. (1998), “A survey of shareholder activism: motivation and empirical evidence”, Contemporary Finance Digest, 2 (3), 10 –34.
17. Holderness, C. G. (2001), “A survey of blockholders and corporate control”, Economic Policy Review.
18. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, M., (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
19. Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, R. S., (1983), “The Market for Corporate Control”, Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
20. Jensen, M., (1993), “Presidential Address: The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”, Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880.
21. Kassem, M. S., and Moursi, M. A. (1971), “Managerial Effectiveness”, Academy of Management Journal, 14 (3), 381-385.
22. Kast, F. E and J. E. Rosenzweig, (1974), Organizational and Management: a Systems and Contingency Approach, McGraw-Hill, New York.
23. McConnell, J. J., and Servaes, H. (1995), “Equity Ownership and Two Factors of Debt”, Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 131-157.
24. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988), “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
25. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, (1999), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
26. Patton, A., and Baker, J. C. (1987), “Why won’t director rock the boat ? ”, Harvard Business Review, 10-18.
27. Pound, J. (1988), “Proxy Contests and The Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 237-265.
28. Robbins, S. P. (1996), Organizational Behavior: Concepts, controversies and applications Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
29. School of Law Research Paper No. 02-06, 1-70.
30. Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W.(1997), “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance, 25, 737-783.
31. Simunic, D., and Stein, M. (1987), “Product differentiation in auditing: auditor choice in the market for unseasoned new issue”, The Canadian Certifield General Accounting Research Foundation.
32. Singh, M., and Davidson, W. N., (2003), “Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanism”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 793-816.
33. Standard & Poors 標準普爾公司網站 http://www.standardpoor.com
34. Szilagyi, I. (1981), Management and Performance, Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc.
35. Szilagyi,jr.,A.D.(1984), Management and Performance, New Jersey: Scott, Foreman and Company, 2nd.
36. Venkatraman, N., and Ramanujam, V. (1986), “Measurement of business performance on strategy research: A comparison of approach”, Academy of Management Review, 11 (4), 801-814.
37. Weir, C., and Laing, D. (2001), “Governance structures, director independence and corporate performance in the UK”, European Business Review, 13 (2), 86-95.
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2019-01-28起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw