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系統識別號 U0026-2008201008131900
論文名稱(中文) 金融危機下之公司治理~以美國通用汽車為例
論文名稱(英文) Corporate Governance during Financial Crisis~From the Perspective of Measures Taken by General Motors Company
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 法律學系
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Legal Sciences
學年度 98
學期 2
出版年 99
研究生(中文) 黃繼穎
研究生(英文) Chi-Ying Huang
學號 u2697113
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 170頁
口試委員 指導教授-陳俊仁
口試委員-王志誠
口試委員-葉錦鴻
中文關鍵字 金融危機  公司治理  經濟合作暨發展組織  美國通用汽車公司  重整  股東  董事會  董事長  首席執行官 
英文關鍵字 Financial Crisis  Corporate Governance  OECD  General Motors Company  Reorganization  Shareholders  Board of Directors  Chairman  CEO 
學科別分類
中文摘要 2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒閉,美國次級房貸風暴所引發之全球金融海嘯隨之而來,許多因素直接或間接造成當今金融危機發生,美國金融危機調查委員會(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission)針對公司治理、衍生性金融商品、風險管理、監理制度等22個特定領域進行實質性調查,不完善之公司治理制度為當今金融危機發生之原因之一,推動健全的公司治理制度成為全球金融監理機關為重整金融市場秩序、穩定經濟的重要任務。
公司治理(Corporate Governance)內容涵括甚廣,但其概念之發展,起源於現代股份有限公司所有權與經營權分離後,所有權人與經營者之間所衍生之代理問題,如何有效制衡強勢之經營者,使其對所有權人負責,實為公司治理之核心課題。
在各國不同之股權結構與公司法架構下,監控課題不盡相同,相似處為公司治理之主要任務,皆在使公司內部之經營者善加營運,並對股東負責。美國公司法無監察人制度且股權較為分散,較少存在控制股東,小股東需透過董事會對經營者監督,執行長、董事等須對股東負忠實義務,確保經營者不背離股東利益,透過內外部監控機制使經營者之目標與股東一致。公司治理內部監控機制是指,在股東、董事會成員和管理團隊最有效追求公司的運行目標的過程中,對參與者的職責予以明確規範的一種制度安排。股東選任董事,組成董事會;而由董事會任命和監督管理團隊,以創造股東最大價值。
以具有百年歷史的美國通用汽車公司(General Motors Company)為例,曾經蟬連80年全球最大汽車製造商卻於西元2009年6月1日向美國紐約曼哈頓區破產法庭依美國破產法第十一章申請重整,這是美國工業史上最大重整案。重組後的「新通用汽車公司」將繼承「舊通用汽車公司」的優質資產,剝離大部分債務、縮減八大品牌中的四個,以及關閉多餘的工廠和經銷商後重新營運。按照公布的重組計畫,新通用汽車公司的股權結構為:美國財政部持有該公司60%的股份,加拿大政府將出資95億美元換得12.5%的股權,汽車工會持股17.5%,債券持有人獲得另外10%的股份。
很多人認為突如其來的金融危機是通用汽車公司申請重組的主要原因,其實,金融危機只是壓倒通用汽車的最後一根稻草。其經營管理決策失誤,董事會淪為經營管理階層橡皮圖章,無法有效監督,才是使百年企業走向衰落的深層次原因。
公司治理與董事會相關之議題,包括董事長與執行長是否應由不同人擔任,經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)認為執行長不應同時擔任公司之董事長,且董事長應由外部人而非公司經營者擔任,以助於董事會對經營者之監督。關於董事長與執行長此二角色的分離是否真能導致公司表現改善,目前仍有爭論。從美國近來發生問題之企業以觀,如通用汽車,執行長身兼董事長集大權於一身,掌控董事會人事與決策甚至自肥往往是導致企業腐化與產生問題之根源。
英文摘要 The financial crisis of 2007–2010 is a crisis triggered by an insolvent United States banking system. It has resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many areas, the housing market has also suffered, resulting in numerous evictions, foreclosures and prolonged vacancies. It is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Many factors directly and indirectly caused the ongoing Financial crisis of 2007-2010 (which started with the US subprime mortgage crisis ), with experts placing different weights upon particular causes. The complexity and interdependence of many of the causes, as well as competing political, economic and organizational interests, have resulted in a variety of narratives describing the crisis. One category of causes created a vulnerable or fragile financial system, including complex financial securities, a dependence on short-term funding markets, and international trade imbalances. Other causes increased the stress on this fragile system, such as high corporate and consumer debt levels. Still others represent shocks to that system, such as the ongoing foreclosure crisis and the failures of key financial institutions. Regulatory and market-based controls did not effectively protect this system or measure the buildup of risk. Some causes relate to particular markets, such as the stock market or housing market, while others relate to the global economy more broadly.
The financial crisis has revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, they often failed to provide the checks and balance that
companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Beyond the management of the current financial and economic crisis, policy makers are seeking to find solutions to the following questions: What caused the financial crisis? How can we reduce its negative impact on the wider economy and bring about a swift return to economic growth and job creation? How can we enhance the sustainability of financial markets and reduce the potential scale of any future crisis?
The post-2000 market and macroeconomic environment demanded the most out of corporate governance arrangements: boards had to be clear about the strategy and risk appetite of the company and to respond in a timely manner, requiring efficient reporting systems. They also needed to oversee risk management and remuneration systems compatible with their objectives and risk appetite. However the evidence cited in the following part points to severe weaknesses in what were broadly considered to be sophisticated institutions. The type of risk management that was needed is also related to the incentive structure in a company. There appears to have been in many cases a severe mismatch between the incentive system, risk management and internal control systems. The available evidence also suggests some potential reasons for the failures.
On June 1, 2009, General Motors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, GM said the split would be accomplished through what is called a Section 363 sale. The new GM assets would transfer to an entity owned by the U.S. and Canadian governments, the UAW and GM's unsecured creditors. The financial crisis is not the sole reason for GM downfall. GM has failed because of an insular, self-absorbed culture that has lacked foresight and has failed to create flexible enough business plans. The main internal factors of why did GM fail were too many brands, too many dealerships, high executive pay, too focus on trucks and SUV, slow on hybrids , fumbled electric vehicles , ineffective leadership, lousy corporate governance.
The ongoing financial crisis reflected poorly on GM corporate governance. All of the executive problems were already affecting GM. The massive recession just helped put the nail in the coffin for GM. As crisis generated potential market and regulatory reforms are debated, what is the single most important corporate governance reform needed to restore trust? Splitting the roles is the right thing to do if you believe that a system of checks and balances is the best protection against unrestrained power.
Board members often serve at the pleasure of the CEO, who controls the perks of board membership. The result is often, but not always, boards that rubber-stamp the decisions of the CEO and his or her inner circle. GM has long needed an independent board which provides the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices.
As crisis generated potential market and regulatory reforms are debated, what is the single most important corporate governance reform needed to restore trust? Splitting the roles is the right thing to do if you believe that a system of checks and balances is the best protection against unrestrained power.
論文目次
Acknowledgement……… ………………………………I
Abstracts………………… ……………………III
Table of Contents…………… …………………IX  


Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………1

Chapter 2 Financial Crisis of 2007-2010……………13
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………13
2.2 Possible Factors of Financial Crisis of 2007-2010………16
2.2.1 Housing Market………16
2.2.2 Risk taking behavior…………………………19
2.2.3 Financial Market Factors…………………………22
2.2.4 Macroeconomic conditions…………………………24
2.2.5 Mortgage compensation model, executive pay and bonuses……28
2.2.6 Commodity Price Volatility…………29
2.2.7 Failure of Corporate Governance……………………30
2.3 Effects of Financial Crisis of 2007-2010………………31
2.3.1 Financial Markets…………………………………31
2.3.2 Global Economy………………………………………32
2.3.3 Automotive Industry Crisis on the United States of 2008-2010……35
2.4 The Wall Street Reform………………………35
2.4.1 President Obama Says Promising News From the Auto Industry Doesn’t Reduce
Need for Wall Street Reform…… ……………35
2.4.2 The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act……36

Chapter 3 Corporate governance and the Financial Crisis………41
3.1 Introduction………………………………41
3.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 2004…………43
3.2.1 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework ....43
3.2.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions… ……44
3.2.3 The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders………………48
3.2.4 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance…49
3.2.5 Disclosure and Transparency………51
3.2.6 The Responsibilities of the Board…………53
3.3 The Corporate Governance Lessons from Financial Crisis………57
3.3.1 Remuneration and Incentive Systems: An Old Issue in New Form…58
3.3.2 Risk Management Practices and Standards: A Missing Element…61
3.3.3 Many Signs Point to the Boards: Can They Cope? ……63
3.3.4 Are Shareholders Able to Protect Their Interests? …… ……64
3.3.5 Supporting Effective Implementation…… ……………66
3.4 Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles of Corporate Governance..........67
3.4.1 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework …69
3.4.2 Governance of Remuneration and Incentives… …………70
3.4.3 Improving the Governance of Risk Management………………73
3.4.4 Improving Board Practices………………… ……………77
3.4.5 The Exercise of Shareholder Rights…………………83

Chapter 4 The End of an Old GM, and the Beginning of a New GM…94
4.1 General Motors Chapter 11 Reorganization……………94
4.1.1 Old GM (Motors Liquidation Company)…………96
4.1.2 New GM……………………………………97
4.2 Why Did General Motors Fail?............99
4.2.1 Internal Factors………………………………101
4.2.1.1 Management……………………………………101
4.2.1.2 United Auto Workers……………………110
4.2.2 External Factors……………………………113
4.2.2.1 Financial Crisis………………………113
4.2.2.2 Gas Prices………………………………………115
4.2.2.3 Foreign Competition…………………116
4.3General Motors Restructuring………………………117

Chapter 5 A Review and Analysis of GM Corporate Governance after Financial Crisis …………………122
5.1 Is Combined Chairman and CEO Really Suitable for GM?......122
5.2 What Are the Respective Duties of a CEO, Chair, and Lead Director in
Chair/CEO and Separate Chair Model ?........... .....130
5.3 Debate to the combined CEO and Chairman Model……………132
5.3.1 Most U.S. Boards Are Well Served by a Board Structure in Which the CEO Also Serves as Chairman of the Board ?.................... 132
5.3.2 Potential for Confusion and Duplication?...........133
5.3.3 Potential for Animosities?......... ............133
5.3.4 Inefficiency in Decision-Making?.................134
5.3.5 Cost Considerations?.........................134
5.3.6 The Independent Chair Model is Just Unworkable in Practice?............ 135
5.3.7 Lead or Presiding Director is an Equivalent (or Superior) Form of Independent Leadership ?.........136
5.3.8 Different Board Leadership Structures May Be Appropriate for Different Companies?.................................. ............................137
5.4 The Reasons for Separating the Positions of Board Chair and CEO… ….138
5.4.1 Conflict of Interest…………………………… .………………139
5.4.2 Eliminating the Conflict of Function (The Substantial Duties of an Effective Chair of Today’s Boards…………………………… ………...140
5.5 What for GM Corporate Governance now?.................... ......................140
5.5.1 Old GM & New GM Board of Directors Corporate Governance Guidelines ..140
5.5.2 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60280 (July 10, 2009)… ……...146
5.5.3 Summary................................ .................................................151

Chapter 6 Conclusion………………… …………………155

Bibliography……………………… ………………………i
1. Periodicals……………………………………………i
2. Books……………………………………… …………iv
3. Internet Source…………………………… …………………vi



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3. Internet Source:
(1). The Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com
(2). The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/
(3). The White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/search/site/general%20motors?page=8
(4). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
http://www.fcic.gov/
(5). CNN
http://www.cnn.com/
(6). General Motors Company
http://www.gm.com/
(7). Motors Liquidation Company
https://www.motorsliquidation.com/
(8). OECD
http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html


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