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系統識別號 U0026-1806201920505000
論文名稱(中文) 銀行產業的績效、風險與忙碌獨立董事的關聯性分析-以臺灣銀行業為例
論文名稱(英文) Analysis of the Relationship between Banking Industry Performance, Risk and Busy Independent Directors-Evidence from the banking industry in Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance
學年度 107
學期 2
出版年 108
研究生(中文) 賴俊廷
研究生(英文) Jyun-Ting Lai
學號 R86061102
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 27頁
口試委員 指導教授-梁少懷
口試委員-周庭楷
口試委員-王澤世
中文關鍵字 忙碌獨立董事  銀行績效  銀行風險 
英文關鍵字 Busy independent directors  Bank performance  Bank risk 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究使用2008至2018年之台灣上市櫃銀行作為研究樣本,主要探討我國忙碌獨立董事問題與銀行績效、風險是否存在非線性關係(倒U型與U型)而非線性關係,即當獨立董事兼職數小於最適忙碌程度時支持聲譽效果,獨立董事兼職所帶來的好處大於壞處,直到超過最適忙碌程度時,獨立董事會因為過度忙碌而無法給予公司有效的監督與諮詢,產生忙碌效果的影響。研究結果發現獨立董事忙碌程度與銀行績效之間具有顯著的倒U型關係,但對銀行風險並未具有顯著的U型關係,我們認為獨立董事過度兼職的問題確實會對銀行績效造成影響,特別是在股東權益的部份,該結論證明了忙碌董事問題並非只支持聲譽或忙碌效果其中一種,而是會依照兼職數的不同而帶來不同的影響。
英文摘要 Based on data of listed banks of Taiwan through 2008 to 2018, this paper mainly discuss whether there is a non-linear relationship between busy independent directors, bank performance and risk (inverted U-shaped and U-shaped). When the busy level of independent director lower than optimal level, the advantages of holding multiple directorships will outweigh the disadvantages (reputation effect). When the busy level of independent director exceeds the optimal level, independent directors will be less committed to supervising or advising the bank due to their busyness (busyness effect). In our result, we find that there is a significant inverted U-shape relationship between busy independent directors and bank performance, but there is no significant U-shape relationship between busy directors and bank risk. We consider that busy directors problem indeed have an impact on bank performance, especially in the part of shareholders' equity. This result shows that the problem of busy independent directors supports both reputation effect and busyness effect, according to the number of directorship they holds.
論文目次 摘要 II
英文延伸摘要 III
目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻回顧 3
一、我國獨立董事制度的沿革 3
二、銀行公司治理的獨特性 4
三、忙碌董事(Busy directors)的問題 5
參、資料、研究變數與方法 8
一、資料來源 8
二、研究變數 8
三、研究方法 11
肆、實證結果 13
一、敘述統計量與相關係數 13
二、獨立董事忙碌程度與銀行績效、風險之線性關係 17
三、獨立董事忙碌程度與銀行績效、風險之非線性關係 20
伍、研究結論與建議 23
參考文獻 25

表目錄
表1 研究變數定義說明 10
表2 樣本敘述統計量 15
表3 主要變數與控制變數之相關係數矩陣 16
表4 獨立董事忙碌程度與銀行績效、風險之線性迴歸結果 19
表5 獨立董事忙碌程度與銀行績效、風險之非線性迴歸結果 22
參考文獻 中文部分:
丁秀儀與陳于欣,2010。公司獨立董事為何忙碌?管理學報,第二十七卷第三期:291-318。
丁秀儀與翁天龍,2013。忙碌獨立董事可以降低公司績效波動性嗎?證券市場 發展季刊,第二十五卷第二期:161-194。
張元與葉清雄,2014。忙碌董事,風險承擔與債務資金成本。兩岸金融季刊,第二卷第三期:1-54。
張元與萬欣芝,2016。董事兼職會影響新上市上櫃公司的後續績效表現嗎?兩岸金融季刊,第四卷第二期:83-128。
證券交易法、95年1月11日華總一義字第09500002801號令、107年12月19日金管證發字第1070345233號令。
公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法、95年3月28日金管證一字第095000161 5號令、96年3月19日金管證一字第0960010070號令。

英文部分:
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Elyasiani, E., & Zhang, L. (2015). Bank holding company performance, risk, and “busy” board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 60, 239-251.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087-1111.
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Goyeau, D., & Tarazi, A. (1992). Evaluation du risque de défaillance bancaire en Europe. Revue d'économie politique, 102(2), 249-280.
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7‐8), 1034-1062.
Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 389-410.
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. (2006). Multiple directorships and corporate performance in Australian listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 530-546.
Kutubi, S. S., Ahmed, K., & Khan, H. (2018). Bank performance and risk-taking — Does directors' busyness matter? Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 50, 184-199.
Lepetit, L., Nys, E., Rous, P., & Tarazi, A. (2008). Bank income structure and risk: An empirical analysis of European banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(8), 1452-1467.
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Perry, T., & Peyer, U. (2005). Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholder's perspective. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 2083-2123.
Pombo, C., & Gutiérrez, L. H. (2011). Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups. Journal of Economics and Business, 63(4), 251-277.
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Sarkar, J., & Sarkar, S. (2009). Multiple board appointments and firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from India. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17(2), 271-293.
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Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 113-142.
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