||Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Acquirers’ Agency Costs-Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
||Department of Accountancy
Mergers and Acquisitions
早先研究顯示購併公司在進行購併後多表現不佳，箇中原因也相當多；本研究旨在：1.) 比較中國購併公司購併前、後之代理成本以及2.) 發掘代理成本與公司績效間之關係。本研究對於代理理論之貢獻在於將購併公司於購併後之低獲利能力與其代理成本作連結。本研究之購併資料來自於Securities Data Company (SDC)，財務與公司治理資料則來自於中國經濟金融數據庫 (CCER)、Datastream與台灣經濟新報資料庫 (TEJ)。自1,200比樣本購併公司與規模類似之非購併公司資料中，本研究顯示出購併公司於購併後相對於非購併公司有增加之代理成本與降低之績效。
Prior literatures had reported acquirers’ poor post-merger performances. However, the reasons behind could be as many as possible. This paper is motivated to: 1.) compare pre- and post-merger agency costs of Chinese acquirers and 2.) discover the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. We contribute to agency theory by relating acquirer’s poor post-merger profitability to increased agency costs after merge. Our mergers and acquisitions data are from Securities Data Company (SDC), while data regarding financials and corporate governance are from the SINOFIN of China Center for Economic Research (CCER), Datastream, and Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). With 1,200 sample acquirers and similar-sized non-acquirers from China equity market, we evidenced increased agency cost and decreased performance of acquirers relative to similar-sized non-acquirers after merge.
I.Introduction-The growing economy of China and its M&A market - 1 -
II.Literature review and hypotheses - 4 -
1.Agency theory - 4 -
2.Share classes and equity structure in China - 4 -
3.Prior literatures on M&A - 5 -
4.Agency cost - 7 -
5.Corporate governance - 7 -
III.Sample and methodology - 9 -
1.Data - 9 -
2.Research design - 9 -
2.1Dependent variable - 9 -
2.2Independent variables - 9 -
3.Descriptive statistics - 10 -
IV.Empirical result - 12 -
Regression analysis - 12 -
V.Conclusions - 13 -
Reference - 14 -
Appendix - 17 -
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