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系統識別號 U0026-1605201714021900
論文名稱(中文) 審計委員會、連結性與盈餘品質的關聯性
論文名稱(英文) The Association Between Audit Committee, Interlocking and Earnings Quality
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 105
學期 2
出版年 106
研究生(中文) 白蕢至
研究生(英文) Kuei-Chih Pai
學號 R16041140
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 45頁
口試委員 指導教授-林囿成
口試委員-黃華瑋
口試委員-陳俊合
口試委員-謝喻婷
中文關鍵字 審計委員會  連結性  連結性傳遞效果  盈餘品質 
英文關鍵字 Audit committee  Interlocking  Contagion effects  Earnings quality 
學科別分類
中文摘要   本研究以2014-2015年台灣上市上櫃公司為研究樣本,主要探討審計委員會的設立、審計委員會的連結性(Audit Committee Interlocking)與審計委員會連結的傳遞效果(Contagion Effects)對公司盈餘品質的影響。本研究為台灣推動公司治理的方向提供了一些實證上的證據。
  本研究第一階段發現審計委員會的設立能夠顯著地降低裁決性應計數,表示審計委員會的監督效果確實能夠提高盈餘品質,不同於以往文獻認為自願設置審計委員會能夠提高盈餘品質(葉銀華與林志豪,2014),我們研究證實審計委員會的設立不論是出於公司自願或法令強制都不影響其提高盈餘品質的結果。
  第二階段在探討連結性的部分時發現僅有審計委員會連結性以及會計財務專家連結性會顯著地降低盈餘品質,表示審計委員會成員一旦兼任其他公司負有監督職責的職務時就會影響其監督效果。在連結強度的部分發現董監事連結強度、獨立董監事連結強度以及審計委員會連結強度都會顯著降低盈餘品質,表示若以兼任數量來衡量連結特性的話,審計委員會成員兼任越多其他公司的治理單位職務都會使其監督效果下降,而不僅限於是否兼任過多其他公司的審計委員會職務。此外,不同於連結性的結果,會計財務專家的連結強度並不會顯著影響盈餘品質,推測是成員具備的會計與財務專長能夠避免因為身兼過多的公司職務進一步地損害盈餘品質。
  最後本研究也發現透過審計委員會而連結在一起的公司會以審計委員會成員作為盈餘品質的傳遞途徑,當資訊傳遞公司有較佳的盈餘品質時,資訊接收公司的盈餘品質也會有所提升。
英文摘要   We test the relationship between earnings quality and audit committee interlocking. First, our empirical result shows that audit committee can improves earnings quality significantly no matter it was established voluntarily or mandatorily. Then we find that firms which were interlocked by their audit committee (or interlocked by member of audit committee who is financial/accounting expertise) are most likely to manage earnings, but there is no significant association with earnings quality when they have director interlocking or independent director interlocking. Furthermore, the result shows that the strength of director interlocking, the strength of independent director interlocking, and the strength of audit committee interlocking impair earnings quality. Finally, we investigate whether earnings management spreads between firms via audit committee interlocking, and the result shows that “information accepted firm” is less likely to manage earnings when it’s audit committee members got a high score from “information sending firm” which had high quality of earnings in previous period.
  Our findings support the view that audit committee is the most important position in monitoring firms’ financial reports. We provide evidence to prove that the direction of the reform of Taiwan’s corporate governance is correct. We also show the reason why Financial Supervisory Commission ask no independent director of a public company may concurrently serve as an independent director of more than three other public companies.
論文目次 第一章 前言 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 5
第一節 審計委員會與盈餘品質 5
第二節 董事連結性與盈餘品質 8
第三節 審計委員會連結性與盈餘品質 9
第四節 連結性對盈餘品質的傳遞效果 12
第三章 研究設計 13
第一節 樣本選取 13
第二節 盈餘品質的衡量 13
第三節 主要變數的衡量 15
第四節 控制變數 18
第五節 模型建立 18
第四章 實證結果與分析 22
第一節 敘述性統計 22
第二節 相關性分析 24
第三節 迴歸分析結果 28
第四節 額外測試 35
第五章 結論與建議 36
第一節 結論 36
第二節 研究限制與建議 37
參考文獻 39
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