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系統識別號 U0026-1602201600115500
論文名稱(中文) 懲罰性損害賠償制度之嚇阻效果─以公害實驗為例
論文名稱(英文) The Deterrence of Punitive Damages─A Study of Public Bad Experiments
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 法律學系
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Legal Sciences
學年度 104
學期 1
出版年 105
研究生(中文) 楊喬閔
研究生(英文) Chiao-MIin Yang
學號 U26011522
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 106頁
口試委員 指導教授-邵靖惠
口試委員-陳思廷
口試委員-翁明宏
中文關鍵字 懲罰性損害賠償制度  損害賠償制度  公共財實驗  公害實驗  嚇阻效力 
英文關鍵字 punitive damages  deterrence  public good experiments  public bad experiments 
學科別分類
中文摘要 懲罰性損害賠償制度之主要目的之一,在於達成嚇阻侵權行為之功能,惟該制度於適用上,存有不少爭議,最為重要者為:一、為達到嚇阻效用,懲罰性賠償制度之適用範圍應否僅限於故意侵權行為; 二、懲罰性損害賠償金額應如何計算,始能發揮其嚇阻效用,對此,本文即以嚇阻功能為研究焦點,對上述之問題以法律經濟學領域所提出之相關見解,透過實驗之方式進行驗證。
在實驗模型之設計上,本文採取學界常用於研究相關法律議題之公害實驗作為模型,並配合本文之實驗目的,與法律經濟學者所提出,兩種用於計算懲罰性損害賠償金額之計算方式,設計出:1.無處罰制度實驗情境;2.損害賠償制度實驗情境;3.成本內化法實驗情境;4.利益消除法實驗情境,並且,在每個實驗情境中,再分成故意侵權行為與過失侵權行為兩個實驗階段,藉此探討懲罰性損害賠償制度,應否適用於過失侵權行為之問題,以及在故意、過失侵權行為下,何一處罰制度所發揮之嚇阻效用最佳。
依據本實驗之結果,首先,對於過失侵權行為事件而言,儘管損害賠償制度能發揮嚇阻效果,但仍以利益消除法之懲罰性損害賠償制度,所發揮之嚇阻效果尤佳,因此,本文認為懲罰性損害賠償制度,仍有適用於過失侵權行為事件之必要性,並且,在過失侵權行為類型下,以利益消除法為懲罰性損害賠償金額之最適當計算方式。而就故意侵權行為事件而言,損害賠償制度雖然不具有嚇阻效用,但卻能顯著降低侵權行為之嚴重程度,而成本內化法與利益消除法此兩種懲罰性損害賠償制度,皆能有效發揮嚇阻效用,並降低侵權行為之嚴重程度,而其中以利益消除法之懲罰性損害賠償制度,所發揮之效果尤佳,因此,本文認為,在故意侵權行為之類型下,以利益消除法為懲罰性損害賠償金額之最適當計算方式。
英文摘要 The main disputes which punitive damages includes: 1. What kind of torts should the punitive damages impose, intentional or negligence tort? 2. How punitive damages should be computed? Given those debates, this paper put the deterrence of punitive damages as the main research topic, and probes into the related theories which the economics of law scholars put forward, and utitlizes the empirical approach to examine these issues.
In our research methods, we use the public bad experiment as our experiment model which coordinate with our research purpose by including two types of punitive damages as two of our experimental treatments─1. Damages equal to the harm that tortfeasor has caused. 2. Damages equal to the gain that tortfeasor has obtained. In each treatment, we also design two stages which are: (1) negligent tort stage and (2) intentional tort stage to address the questions about whether the punitive should be imposed on the negligent tort and what kind of compensation regimes served the best deterrent effect in intentional torts and negligent tort respectively.
According to our results, we concluded that punitive damages should be imposed on the negligent torts and the Damages equal to the gain that tortfeasor has obtained serves as the optimal computation for compensation in negligent torts and the intentional torts.
論文目次 目錄
第壹章、前言 1
第一節、研究動機與目的 1
第二節、研究範圍 3
第三節、研究架構 4
第貳章、文獻探討 6
第一節、懲罰性損害賠償制度之嚇阻效用 6
第一項、以法律經濟學之視野進行觀察 6
第一款、損害賠償制度之嚇阻效用─損害賠償額等於行為所生實際損害 7
第二款、損害賠償制度之嚇阻漏洞與填補─懲罰性損害賠償制度 8
第二項、以實證研究之角度進行觀察 11
第一款、相關實證研究之觀察 11
第二款、相關實驗研究─公共財實驗研究之探討 14
第三項、小結 21
第二節、懲罰性賠償制度適用於故意或過失侵權行為事件─法律經濟學視野之探討 23
第一項、懲罰性賠償制度僅適用於故意、重大過失之侵權行為事件 23
第一款、以行為之供給彈性與交易成本為出發點之探討 24
第二款、門檻效果理論之提出 25
第二項、懲罰性賠償制度適用於故意與過失之侵權行為事件 27
第三項、小結─懲罰性賠償制度適用範圍之再思考 28
第三節、懲罰性損害賠償金額之衡量─法律經濟學之思考模式 29
第一項、成本內化法之計算方式與理論基礎 31
第二項、利益消除法之計算方式與理論基礎 33
第三項、利益消除法與成本內化法之平衡─視侵權行為之類型而採取不同之計算方式 33
第四項、小結 35
第一款、懲罰性賠償制度之目的釐清與制度之定位 35
第二款、懲罰性賠償金額計算方式之評析 36
第參章、實驗架構、方法與假說推論 39
第一節、實驗架構 39
第二節、實驗方法 43
第一項、實驗模型之確立─ 公共負面外部性實驗 43
第二項、實驗設計 44
第一款、故意、過失無處罰制度情境之設計─S1N與S1I之設計 46
第二款、損害賠償制度之實驗設計─S2N與S2I之設計 50
第三款、懲罰性損害賠償實驗情境之設計─S3N、S4N與S3I、S4I之設計53
第四款、賠償制度下之受試者投資決定之預測─S2、S3、S4之預測57
第三節、假說推論 58
第一項、無處罰制度下受試者行為之推論 59
第一款、故意實驗階段下之完全嚇阻效果推論─S1I~S4I實驗之假說 59
第二款、過失實驗階段下之完全嚇阻效果推論─S1N~S4N實驗之假說 62
第二項、基於最適嚇阻目的下各賠償制度嚇阻效果之推論 63
第肆章、實驗結果分析 65
第一節、描述性統計分析 66
第二節、實驗變數檢驗分析 68
第一項、故意實驗階段下之分析─S1I~S4I之分析 68
第一款、基於完全嚇阻目的之各賠償制度嚇阻效果之檢視 69
第二款、基於最適嚇阻目的之各賠償制度嚇阻效果之檢視 74
第二項、過失實驗階段下之分析─S1N~S4N之分析 77
第一款、基於完全嚇阻目的之各賠償制度嚇阻效果之檢視 78
第二款、基於最適嚇阻目下各賠償制度嚇阻效果之檢視 83
第伍章、結論與建議 86
參考文獻 89
附錄1、無賠償制度與各賠償制度之實驗畫面 97
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