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系統識別號 U0026-1506201401532100
論文名稱(中文) 什麼影響董監事質押的行為?
論文名稱(英文) What determine share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors?
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 102
學期 2
出版年 103
研究生(中文) 賴怡璇
研究生(英文) I-Hsuan Lai
學號 R16014046
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 43頁
口試委員 指導教授-王澤世
口試委員-陳嬿如
口試委員-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 董監事質押行為  公司特性  股價  公司治理  代理問題 
英文關鍵字 share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors  firm characteristics  stock price  corporate governance  agency problem 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文的研究目的是想了解什麼因素驅動臺灣上市公司董監事股票質押的行為。有些董監事至始不會進行股票質押,但有些會,而且有的持續高質押,他們行為的不同是因為什麼呢?而且在現今的環境裡,高質押比率已被視為掏空公司的警訊,為何有些董監事還持續高質押比率呢?以前的文獻都著重研究董監事質押比率的結果,而本文著重於探討可能的因素影響董監事股票質押的行為。
我們以2000到2012年在台灣上市公司的年資料為實證研究樣本,資料皆從台灣經濟新報財經資料庫中獲取。我們先把樣本挑出董監事持續13年末都有質押與沒有的公司的兩組子樣本進行比較,使用logit模型,之後再利用tobit模型對總樣本進行三方面因素的探討,皆分別從公司特性、股價與公司治理角度解釋衡量,而使用兩種模型能強化結果,排除統計上的問題。
主要實證結果顯示,公司特性、股價與公司治理的確與董監事的質押持股行為有關,另外還發現到身為公司債權人的銀行,具有監督效果,能降低董監事的質押持股行為所產生的代理問題,此外藉由TEJ資料庫對集團控制型態的分類,發現到家族控制型態比起專業經理人控制型態更會進行質押持股行為。
最後本論文的實證結果支持在有董監事持股質押行為的公司,其公司治理要素較沒有此行為的公司容易產生控制股東與小股東之間的代理問題,使控制股東更有能力利用質押持股行為達到剝削小股東以利己的目標。
英文摘要 In this paper, we investigate what determine share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors. What give them incentives to do different behavior, some directors and supervisors never do share collateral, others continue doing and still others pledge high shares? Nowadays, the high share pledge ratio which has been considered as a warning that tells us that someone is hollowing out company's assets, is still done by the directors and supervisors. Why is that? Most of previous studies focus on the consequences of shares pledging behavior rather than the causes of shares pledging behavior. This paper attempts to provide the factors of directors and supervisors’ share collateralization.
This paper uses the data of Taiwanese publicly listed companies from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database from 2000 to 2012. Firstly, we use logit model to assess whether independent variables are suitable with subsample which are pledging shares for 13 year-end and non-pledging shares for 13 year-end. Then, we use tobit model to assess with full sample. Both are used to measure and explain variables from three perspective: firm characteristics, stock price and corporate governance. And it can stronger the results and remove the error of the results which are caused by incorrect statistical method by using two different models.
Our empirical results indicate that shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors has connections with firm characteristics, stock price and corporate governance. The research findings also indicate that the existence of supervision of creditors of the firms helps with reducing agency problem. In addition, we use the types of control of business groups data constructed by TEJ and find that the family control type which compared with the professional manager control is more likely to do shares pledging behavior.
Finally, our empirical results support corporate governance in the firms which have shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors is easier causing agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders than in the firms which have no shares pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors. Controlling shareholders could have more power to gain the interests from exploiting minority shareholders by pledging shares.
論文目次 摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 III
Content IV
List of Tables VI
List of Figures VII
Chapter1. Introduction 1
Chapter2. Literature Review 5
2.1 The agency problem 5
2.2 Expropriation of minority shareholders 6
2.3 Shareholders and creditors 9
2.4 The effect of shares pledging behavior on company 10
2.5 The causes of shares pledging behavior 11
Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 13
3.1 Data measurement 13
3.2 Models and estimation 20
3.2.1 Logit model 21
3.2.2 Tobit model 21
3.3 Develop of hypotheses 21
3.3.1 Connection to firm characteristics 23
3.3.2 Connection to stock price 25
3.3.3 Connection to corporate governance 26
3.4 Empirical methodology 27
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 32
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 32
4.2 Pearson correlation coefficient 34
4.3 Results of logit models 35
4.4 Additional Tests : Tobit models 37
Chapter 5 Conclusions 39
5.1 Findings and contributions 39
5.2 Limitations and directions for future research 39
Reference 41
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