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系統識別號 U0026-1008201616145900
論文名稱(中文) 董監事社會網絡對公司舉債成本及經營績效之影響:台灣上市櫃及興櫃公司之研究
論文名稱(英文) The Effect of Boardroom Centrality on Cost of Debt and Firm Performance: Evidence from Listed Companies in Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 104
學期 2
出版年 105
研究生(中文) 王登彥
研究生(英文) Deng-Yan Wang
學號 r16031048
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 72頁
口試委員 共同指導教授-黃華瑋
口試委員-劉啟群
口試委員-蔡彥卿
指導教授-吳清在
中文關鍵字 社會網絡分析 (SNA)  舉債成本  公司績效 
英文關鍵字 social network analysis  cost of debt  firm performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 管理階層的社會網絡雖然無法在財務報表上認列,但是俗話說人脈即錢脈,因此有時會發揮比有形資產更大的效用。有鑑於此,本研究以社會網絡分析法 (SNA) 檢驗董事會成員的社會網絡是否會對其公司的舉債成本以及公司績效造成顯著的影響。根據迴歸分析結果,本文發現董事會的社會網絡的確可以協助公司獲得較低的銀行借款成本,以及較佳的信用評等;但是對公司績效卻有負面的顯著影響。因此推論董事會可以藉由其社會網絡替公司帶來營運用的資金,但是無法保證公司能將這些資金發揮其應有的效用。
英文摘要 Although interpersonal relationships are invisible and do not need to be recognized in the financial statement, sometimes they will bring a company more benefits than the assets presented in the balance sheet. For this reason, this study uses social network analysis (SNA) to investigate whether the boardroom network will affect cost of debt and firm performance. The results find that boardroom centrality can help companies lower their borrowing rate from banks and get a higher credit rating. However, it will have a negative effect on firm performance. Based on the results, we infer that the boardroom network can help companies get funds through their social network, but network can not guarantee these resources will be used in an effective way.
論文目次 第壹章、緒論.............................................1
第一節、研究背景、動機與介紹.............................. 1
第二節、研究架構........................................ 3
第三節、研究流程.........................................4
第貳章、文獻回顧與假說建立.................................5
第一節、社會網絡分析.....................................6
第二節、董監事個人層級網絡所造成之經濟結果.................16
第三節、公司董事會層級網絡所造成之經濟結果.................18
第參章、舉債成本模型之研究方法............................23
第一節、舉債成本模型之研究期間及樣本選取..................23
第二節、舉債成本模型之變數定義與實證模式..................26
第肆章、舉債成本模型之實證結果與分析 .......................32
第一節、舉債成本模型之樣本敘述性統計及相關性分析表.........32
第二節、舉債成本模型之迴歸分析結果........................37
第伍章、經營績效模型之測試...............................41
第一節、經營績效模型之研究期間及樣本選取..................42
第二節、經營績效模型之變數定義及迴歸模型..................43
第三節、經營績效模型之實證結果與分析......................49
第四節、額外測試........................................60
第陸章、結論與建議 .......................................65
第柒章、參考文獻.........................................66
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