進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-1008201519321300
論文名稱(中文) 空間概念下供應鏈通路最佳合作模式
論文名稱(英文) An optimal cooperation model in supply chain channel under spatial concept
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 交通管理科學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Transportation & Communication Management Science
學年度 103
學期 2
出版年 104
研究生(中文) 徐孟筠
研究生(英文) Meng-Yun Hsu
學號 R56034044
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 93頁
口試委員 指導教授-林正章
口試委員-張瀞之
口試委員-陳秀華
口試委員-張宗勝
中文關鍵字 供應鏈通路合作  空間均衡  數量折扣  侵略通路 
英文關鍵字 Supply chain channel cooperation  Spatial equilibrium  Quantity discount  Invasive channel 
學科別分類
中文摘要 隨著全球經貿環境的日益變更,企業間單打獨鬥的情況已儼然消失,取而代之的是供應鏈間的競爭,在傳統供應鏈中上下游廠商往往透過契約的簽訂使彼此資訊透明化並互相合作,但在現今的市場互不侵犯的穩定通路型態不一定會長久維持,有可能發生侵略其他供應鏈通路以增加本身利潤的情形。為了吸引更多的市場利潤,企業往往竭盡全力滿足顧客的需求,由於以往的研究通常假設消費者處於一個靜態環境中,但其實消費者是有能力透過其本身的行為與選擇改變零售商的網絡與服務範圍,若能將消費者的選擇與否應用在通路上下游不同合作結構中,可使整體研究更貼近實務。因此本篇研究將以零售產業中兩供應鏈不同通路合作型態為主體,加入空間之概念,由消費者效益高低決定零售商服務範圍,並進而影響市場中兩零售產品的均衡價格,以及各成員利潤。研究提出兩種不同的上下游通路合作型態,其一為數量折扣契約,其二則為供應商2叛逃的侵略通路合作模式,在供應商2與零售商2簽訂數量折扣契約的情況下,折扣係數0.7時能增加零售商2的服務範圍,並增加供應鏈上下游合作成員的利潤;而在侵略通路的合作模式下也能均衡整體供應鏈,並各自彌補虧損的原上下游通路成員,因此可知當上下游通路成員具有供應鏈合作關係時皆能有效增加合作雙方的利潤。研究最後比較所有通路合作策略,發現供應商2侵略零售商1的侵略通路策略為所有成員的最佳選擇,並且消費者對產品價格敏感度高於產品多樣性,供應鏈各成員在上下游有無契約合作下有不同的通路結構偏好。本研究希望能透過研究內容與數值分析結果提供具體上的建議,以供學術界與業界未來發展使用。
英文摘要 In this research, we add the spatial concept in supply chain and develop a two- echelon model which contains two suppliers, two retailers and four consumer groups. The distance between retailers and consumer groups is a linear function, and the demand of retailers is determined by consumer utility function. The research model can be divided into five spatial situations, and each situation can derive different price range of retail product. By game theory, we can get the equilibrium price of two products, and we construct two cooperation models between the upstream and downstream. One is a quantity-discount contract between supplier and retailer, the other is invasive channel cooperation model. Through the quantity-discount contract, it can not only get the equilibrium price of the two products, but also enhance the scope of retailer's market when the discount factor is 0.7. And it also can increase the total profit of supplier 2 and retailer 2. In the invasive channel which supplier 2 betrayed and cooperate with retailer 1, the cooperation model is a stable solution. Finally, we can conclude that in the spatial supply chain, consumers are more sensitive to product price than product diversity. And the cooperation strategy which supplier 2 invades retailer 1 is the best strategy of each supply chain member. No matter the upstream and downstream cooperate each other by supply chain contract, the supplier and retailer will prefer different channel structures.
論文目次 誌謝 II
摘要 III
目錄 VIII
表目錄 XI
圖目錄 XIII
第一章、緒論 1
1.1研究背景與研究動機 1
1.2研究目的 4
1.3研究流程 5
第二章、文獻回顧 9
2.1供應鏈與供應鏈管理 9
2.2供應鏈合作契約 10
2.2.1供應商與零售商合作契約 12
2.3供應鏈通路合作關係 15
2.3.1通路合作之優點 15
2.3.2不同通路合作結構 16
2.4競爭與侵略性行為 18
2.5區域科學與空間經濟 21
2.5.1線性市場 22
2.5.2非線性市場 23
2.5.3零售選址模型與消費者行為 24
2.6賽局理論 27
2.7小結 28
第三章、數學模式建構 30
3.1模式說明 30
3.2研究範圍與假設 32
3.3數學符號設定 33
3.4數學模式 35
3.4.1消費者效用與需求函數 35
3.4.2零售商與供應商之利潤函數 38
3.4.3情境一 (0,4)、所有消費者群體皆前往零售商2購買 40
3.4.4情境二 (1,3)、除消費者群體1其餘消費者皆前往零售商2購買 41
3.4.5情境三 (2,2)、兩零售商各自擁有兩個消費者群體 43
3.4.6情境四 (3,1)、除消費者群體4其餘消費者皆前往零售商1購買 44
3.4.7情境五 (4,0)、所有消費者群體皆前往零售商1購買 46
3.5求解非零和賽局均衡價格 47
3.6上下游簽訂數量折扣契約 48
3.6.1最佳化契約參數推導 51
3.7上下游侵略通路 52
3.8分享區間 57
3.9小結 58
第四章、數值分析 60
4.1參數設定 60
4.2模式求解 61
4.2.1產品均衡價格 61
4.2.2數量折扣契約之分析 64
4.3單邊侵略通路合作模式 75
4.4分享後之折扣契約 76
4.5雙邊侵略模式與通路策略比較 77
4.6研究結果與文獻差異 81
4.7小結 83
第五章、結論與建議 85
5.1結論 85
5.2未來建議 87
參考文獻 88
附錄一、零售商利潤函數之KKT檢定 92
參考文獻 1. Aboolian, R., Berman, O., &Krass, D. (2007). Competitive facility location and design problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 182(1), 40-62.
2. Arsenyan, J., Büyüközkan, G., &Feyzioğlu, O. (2015). Modeling collaboration formation with a game theory approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(4), 2073-2085.
3. Biscaia, R., &Mota, I. (2013). Models of spatial competition: A critical review*.Papers in Regional Science, 92(4), 851-871.
4. Braid, R. M. (2014). Search costs decrease prices in a model of spatial competition. Papers in Regional Science, 93(1), 125-139.
5. Cachon, G. P. (2003). Supply chain coordination with contracts. Handbooks in operations research and management science, 11, 227-339.
6. Cachon, G. P., &Lariviere, M. A. (2005). Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations. Management science, 51(1), 30-44.
7. Cai, G. G. (2010). Channel selection and coordination in dual-channel supply chains. Journal of Retailing, 86(1), 22-36.
8. Chen, J. (2011). Returns with wholesale-price-discount contract in a newsvendor problem. International Journal of Production Economics, 130(1), 104-111.
9. Cai, G., Dai, Y., & Zhou, S. X. (2012). Exclusive channels and revenue sharing in a complementary goods market. Marketing Science, 31(1), 172-187.
10. Chung, W., Talluri, S., &Narasimhan, R. (2014). Quantity Flexibility Contract in the Presence of Discount Incentive. Decision Sciences, 45(1), 49-79.
11. Dumrongsiri, A., Fan, M., Jain, A., &Moinzadeh, K. (2008). A supply chain model with direct and retail channels. European Journal of Operational Research, 187(3), 691-718.
12. Farahani, R. Z., Rezapour, S., Drezner, T., &Fallah, S. (2014). Competitive supply chain network design: An overview of classifications, models, solution techniques and applications. Omega, 45, 92-118.
13. Giannoccaro, I., &Pontrandolfo, P. (2004). Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts. International journal of production economics, 89(2), 131-139.
14. He, Z., Wang, S., & Cheng, T. C. E. (2013). Competition and evolution in multi-product supply chains: An agent-based retailer model. International Journal of Production Economics, 146(1), 325-336.
15. Ingene, C. A., & Parry, M. E. (1995). Channel coordination when retailers compete. Marketing Science, 14(4), 360-377.
16. Ingene, C. A., & Parry, M. E. (2004). Mathematical models of distribution channels (Vol. 17). Springer.
17. Ingene, C. A., & Parry, M. E. (2007). Bilateral monopoly, identical distributors, and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 35(4), 586-602.
18. Jeuland, A., &Shugan, S. M. (2008). Managing channel profits. Marketing Science, 27(1), 52-69.
19. Jayaram, J., & Tan, K. C. (2010). Supply chain integration with third-party logistics providers. International Journal of Production Economics, 125(2), 262-271.
20. Kjenstad, E., & Su, X. (2012). Product Market Predatory Threats and the Use of Performance-sensitive Debt.
21. Konur, D., &Geunes, J. (2012). Competitive multi-facility location games with non-identical firms and convex traffic congestion costs. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 48(1), 373-385.
22. Lee, C. Y., & Yang, R. (2013). Supply chain contracting with competing suppliers under asymmetric information. IIE Transactions, 45(1), 25-52.
23. Mantrala, M. K., & Raman, K. (1999). Demand uncertainty and supplier's returns policies for a multi-store style-good retailer. European Journal of Operational Research, 115(2), 270-284.
24. Matsumura, T., & Matsushima, N. (2012). Spatial Cournot competition and transportation costs in a circular city. The Annals of Regional Science, 48(1), 33-44.
25. McGuire, T. W., &Staelin, R. (2008). An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing Science, 27(1), 115-130.
26. Melo, M. T., Nickel, S., &Saldanha-da-Gama, F. (2009). Facility location and supply chain management–A review. European Journal of Operational Research, 196(2), 401-412.
27. Nagarajan, M., &Sošić, G. (2008). Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research, 187(3), 719-745.
28. Nagurney, A., &Nagurney, L. S. (2012). Dynamics and equilibria of ecological predator–prey networks as nature’s supply chains. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 48(1), 89-99.
29. Rajagopalan, S., & Xia, N. (2012). Product variety, pricing and differentiation in a supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 217(1), 84-93.
30. Shen, C., & Zhang, X. (2012). Supply Chain Coordination Based on Buy-Back Contract under Price-Sensitive and Time-Sensitive Demand. In Soft Computing in Information Communication Technology (pp. 345-353). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
31. Taylor, T. A. (2002). Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects. Management science, 48(8), 992-1007.
32. Wong, W. K., Qi, J., & Leung, S. Y. S. (2009). Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory. International Journal of Production Economics, 120(1), 151-161.
33. Yao, Z., Leung, S. C., & Lai, K. K. (2008). Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition. European Journal of Operational Research, 186(2), 637-651.
34. Yan, R. (2011). Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer–retailer supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(4), 636-642.
35. Zhang, W. G., Fu, J., Li, H., & Xu, W. (2012). Coordination of supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract under demand disruptions when retailers compete. International Journal of Production Economics, 138(1), 68-75.
36. Zentes, J., Morschett, D., & Schramm-Klein, H. (2012). Store Location–Trading Area Analysis and Site Selection. In Strategic Retail Management (pp. 203-225). GablerVerlag.
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2018-08-14起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw