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系統識別號 U0026-0908201313270100
論文名稱(中文) 台灣上市公司董監事質押比率與經營績效之探討:從產業面出發
論文名稱(英文) Examining The Relationship between Directors’Collateralized Shares and Firms' Performances in Taiwan: From the Industrial Perspective
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 高階管理碩士在職專班(EMBA)
系所名稱(英) Executive Master of Business Administration (EMBA)
學年度 101
學期 2
出版年 102
研究生(中文) 邱重豪
研究生(英文) Chung-Hao Chiu
學號 R07004296
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 58頁
口試委員 指導教授-林軒竹
口試委員-陳嬿如
口試委員-王澤世
口試委員-陳俊男
中文關鍵字 董監質押  董監質押比率  公司績效 
英文關鍵字 directors’ collateralized shares  pledged ratio  corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 董監質押是台灣公司治理的熱門議題。董監質押原本是股東個人的理財行為,應與公司的經營績效無關。但過去學術上這方面研究的結果並不一致,可能的原因是未考慮產業特性的因素。
本研究擬探討各產業董監質押比率與公司績效的關係,以2009~2011年台灣上市公司為研究標的。進行回歸分析後結果如下:
(1)科技產與傳統產業董監質押比率與公司績效並無顯著相關
(2)塑膠工業董監質押比率與公司績效呈現正相關,原因可能與塑膠工業是景氣的領先指標,董監願面臨投資機會時願意承擔更多的風險。其他單一產業董監質押比率與公司績效經實證顯示兩者並未呈現顯著相關。
英文摘要 Shares collateralization is one of popular issues in terms of corporate governance in Taiwan. The board members’ shareholding pledges are originally considered as individual acts and have no obvious relationship with the operating achievement of the company. The academic research in the past did not provide consistent implications and conclusions about the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and corporate performance. One of the reasons for this inconclusive result may due to the different industrial attributes.
The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between the percentage of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged (pledged shares ratio) and firms’ performances. The sample includes firms that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the years 2009-2011. Multivariate regression results indicate that:
(1)There is no evidence that the pledged shares ratio of High-tech industries and Traditional industries is associated with firms’ performance
(2) The board members’ shareholding pledges of plastics industry is significantly positively related to the operating achievement of the company, but those of others industries are not. Due to the plastics industry is one of leading macroeconomic indicator in Taiwan, board members are willing to take more risk when the firms face more investment opportunities
論文目次 第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 章節架構與研究流程 5
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 代理問題與公司治理 7
第二節 所有權結構與公司績效 13
第三節 董監事結構與公司績效 16
第四節 董監事持股、質押與經營績效 20
第五節 我國法律對董監事股票質押之規範 22
第參章 研究方法 27
第一節 研究假說 27
第二節 研究模型 28
第三節 變數定義 30
第四節 樣本選取與資料來源 32
第肆章 實證結果與分析 33
第一節 敘述統計 33
第二節 董監持股質比率押對公司績效的影響 35
第伍章 結論與建議 45
第一節 結論 45
第二節 建議與政策意涵 46
第三節 研究範圍限制 46
第四節 研究建議 47
參考文獻 48
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