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系統識別號 U0026-0907201901140300
論文名稱(中文) 家族企業之代理問題與審計公費及資訊揭露之關聯
論文名稱(英文) The Association between Agency Problem of Family Firms, Audit Fee and Information Transparency.
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 107
學期 2
出版年 108
研究生(中文) 陳姿妏
研究生(英文) Tz-Wen Chen
學號 R16064172
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 35頁
口試委員 指導教授-謝喻婷
口試委員-黃華瑋
口試委員-周庭楷
中文關鍵字 代理問題  家族企業  審計公費  資訊揭露 
英文關鍵字 agency problems  family firms  audit fees  information disclosure 
學科別分類
中文摘要 家族企業在世界的經濟發展中占有重要的一席之位(Anderson & Reeb, 2003b),而在台灣的上市櫃公司中,家族企業也佔多數,因此本研究主要探討家族企業的代理問題對於審計公費及資訊透明度的影響,實證結果指出,在審計公費部分,家族企業比非家族企業支付較低之審計公費,而進一步探討家族內部代理問題的影響,結果顯示不論是哪一種代理問題影響,家族企業皆支付較低的審計公費,在資訊透明度方面,與非家族企業相比,家族企業揭露較少資訊,但是當型二代理問題的影響越大時,家族企業會增加揭露資訊。
英文摘要 Family firms are an important part of the economic development of the world. Since family firms are the majority in Taiwan’s companies, our research investigates the impact of agency problems in family firms on audit fee and information transparency. In the aspect of audit fees, we take Taiwanese listed companies which disclose the amount of audit fees from 2009 to 2017 as our sample. For information transparency, we choose Taiwanese listed companies from 2005 to 2014 and take information transparency score as the proxy variable for detecting the correlation between family firms and information transparency.

The results reveal that family firms incur lower audit fees than non-family firms, and regardless of the type of agency problem in family firms, family firms always incur lower audit fees. In addition, family firms provide less disclosure than non-family firms. However, family firms may provide more information when they face the more severe Type Ⅱ agency problems.
論文目次 壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻探討與假說發展 4
一、代理問題 4
二、家族企業之代理問題與審計公費 4
三、家族企業之代理問題與資訊透明度 7
參、研究方法 9
一、樣本與資料 9
二、研究設計 10
(一)、家族企業之代理問題與審計公費之模型 10
1.主要變數 11
2.控制變數 12
3.變數衡量 13
(二)、家族企業之代理問題與資訊揭露之模型 14
1.控制變數 15
2.變數衡量 16
肆、實證結果與分析 17
一、敘述性統計 17
二、Pearson相關係數 19
三、假說一之迴歸分析 23
四、假說二之迴歸分析 24
伍、結論 27
陸、參考文獻 30
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