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論文名稱(中文) 敵意併購與併購防禦之比較研究一以美國法、台灣法與俄羅斯法為中心
論文名稱(英文) The Comparative Analysis of Hostile Takeovers and Antitakeover Tactics from the Perspective of the Laws of Russia, Taiwan and the USA
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 法律學系
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Legal Sciences
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生(中文) 謝娜
研究生(英文) Dalbakova Sayana
學號 u26987016
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 88頁
口試委員 指導教授-陳俊仁
口試委員-王志誠
口試委員-何曜琛
中文關鍵字 敵意併購  併購防禦策略  公司控制權  併購要約  公司法  證券交易法  董事會  少數股東 
英文關鍵字 hostile takeover  antitakeover tactic  corporate control  tender offer  Company Act  Securities Exchange Act  Board of Directors  minority shareholders 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文就美國、台灣與俄羅斯在敵意併購與併購防禦策略上進行一比較研究。為因應現今全球化與密切國際合作的時代,建立可供世人遵循的機制即為重要,因此,在考量全球企業數量成長的情況之下,且其中的大多數皆為國際化活動的份子,本研究之必要性亦不言可喻。眾所周知的,美國德拉瓦州在公司相關法律規範上具有備受肯定的法律及司法制度,因此,本文之研究重點在於德拉瓦法院之判決實施以提供台灣與俄羅斯一法律制度之發展方向。
本研究含括敵意併購之經濟理由與公司治理之防禦方法的理論探討,從現有之學理觀點與實務結果為基礎,本文作者傾於敵意併購為公司發展之手段及經理人之管理方法上具有企業控制權交易之市場價值。
此外,本文亦探討併購防禦策略之問題,其探討之方向如下:採取併購防禦策略之正面與負面衝擊、公司治理之下有哪些防禦方法、以及對企業而言,何種防禦組合較為適妥;因此,本研究亦包含併購防禦之分類、基本防禦措施之定義與說明。本文作者同時作出交錯董事會與毒藥丸策略的啟用是作為併購防禦最有效方法之結論,此類防禦組合同時亦限制公司與董事會重組之可能性。
本研究針對美國,台灣和俄羅斯,敵意併購的法律及法規進行實務分析,分析的主要目的在評析俄羅斯在公司治理法律可供改善空間,因此,將台灣和俄羅斯的法律制度與美國的法律制度進行比較,即可說明,美國之判例法制度為一大優勢。 台灣及俄羅斯,因為大陸法系之成文法律系統,失去改變其公司法規的行動力;然而,這並非台灣與俄羅斯唯一需要改善的,過去俄羅斯的公司相關法規極不完善 ,從而「民營化政策」導致後來國內的腐化情形、刑事紛爭、以及經濟上各面向的紛擾。
英文摘要 This paper provides a comparative analysis of hostile takeovers and antitakeover tactics in USA, Taiwan and Russia. At the present time of globalization and close international cooperation, it is important to define the basic directions of activity the world should follow. Thus, taking in consideration that the number of corporations in the world has been increasing over the years, and most of them are becoming international actors, the necessity of this research is out of the discussion. As we know, the Delaware state has one of the most reputable legal and judicial systems of corporate regulation. Therefore, the author of the research pays a lot of attention to the best practices of Delaware Court to develop the basic directions that Taiwan and Russia should follow.
The research contains theoretical discussion on economic rationale of hostile takeovers and defensive measures in corporate governance. Basing on existing scientific views and practical conclusions of outstanding researches, the author assesses positive and negative aspects of hostile takeovers. In the process, the author inclines that hostile takeovers, being an instrument for corporate growth and a functioning method for manager’s incentive, are valuable for market of corporate control.
Further, the discussion concerns the question of defenses against hostile takeovers. In this respect, the main outlined directions of the discussion are as follows: what negative and positive impacts in adopting antitakeover tactics are; what kind of concessions corporations should make to carry on the defense; what kind of defenses there are in corporate governance and what kind of defenses or combinations thereof are more suitable for corporations. Thus, the research contains the classification of takeover defenses, definition and description of the most common tactics. The author concludes that the combination of staggered board and poison pill is an effective tool against hostile takeover. At the same time, the combination restrains the possibility of mobile restructuring of Company and the Board of the Directors in particular.
The practical part of the research contains the analysis of legal regulations concerning hostile takeovers in USA, Taiwan and Russia. The main objective of the analysis is to detect possible ways of improvement for Russian law in corporate governance. Thus, comparing the USA legal system with the systems of Taiwan and Russia, we can say that the big advantage of the US system is the precedent law. Taiwan and Russia, being adherent to Continental model of legal system, lose their mobility to smoothly change legal regulations on corporate governance. However, it is not the single disadvantage that Taiwan and Russia should work on. Accordingly, the other problems of imperfect system of corporate governance in Russia lie in its history, namely the process of privatization, which led to criminal wars, corruption and further by the State into all sectors of the economy.
論文目次 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III
TABLE OF CONTENTS IV
CHAPTER 1. Introduction 1
1.1. Purpose, methodology and scope of the research 1
1.2. Structure of the research 3
CHAPTER 2. Literature review 8
CHAPTER 3. Theoretical Analysis of Hostile Takeover 12
3.1. Definition and the Nature of Hostile Takeover 12
3.2. Takeover Defense: Strategies and Classification 16
CHPATER 4. Hostile Takeovers in USA 28
4.1. Introduction to Anglo-American system of corporate law 28
4.2. Legal regulations 30
4.3. Defensive Measures 33
CHAPTER 5. Legislative Review of Hostile Takeovers in Taiwan 41
5.1. Legal Regulation 41
5.2. Takeover tactics 45
5.3. Takeover defenses 50
CHAPTER 6. Hostile Takeovers in the Russian Corporate Sector 57
6.1 Historical backgrounds 57
6.2. Legal Regulation 62
6.3. Takeover tactics 65
6.4. Defensive Measures 69
CHAPTER 7. Conclusion 76
BIBLIOGRAPHY 80
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