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系統識別號 U0026-0812200915151094
論文名稱(中文) 資訊揭露評鑑系統之效益分析:股票報酬及經濟附加價值
論文名稱(英文) The Effects of the Information Disclosure and Transparency Rankings System on Stock Returns and Economic Value Added
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 97
學期 2
出版年 98
研究生(中文) 曾玉琦
研究生(英文) Yee-Chy Tseng
電子信箱 r1890101@mail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r1890101
學位類別 博士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 105頁
口試委員 口試委員-許崇源
口試委員-潘浙楠
口試委員-蔡彥卿
口試委員-林嬋娟
口試委員-林世銘
指導教授-吳清在
中文關鍵字 自願性揭露  股票報酬  經濟附加價值  資訊揭露評鑑系統 
英文關鍵字 Economic value added (EVA)  Stock returns  Voluntary disclosure  Information disclosure and transparency rankings 
學科別分類
中文摘要 設置資訊揭露評鑑系統的目的,主要是減少資訊不對稱現象,以強化投資者對資本市場的信心。此制度的施行是否能夠達到預期目標,有賴於評鑑系統能否帶來效益而定。倘若資訊揭露評鑑結果能與企業績效或價值相關,則投資者將有意願來研讀評鑑結果,並善加利用相關資訊,進而督促企業配合評鑑系統的實施。本研究探討資訊揭露評鑑系統的施行,是否會影響公司的股票報酬及經濟附加價值(EVA),以及不同評鑑結果公司之間的股票報酬和EVA是否也有不同?

以時間縱向觀點來看,資訊揭露評鑑系統實施五年來,企業的EVA確實較實施前提高,但股票報酬則沒有增加。資訊揭露評鑑結果較透明公司的EVA顯著高於較不透明公司;然而,較透明公司的股票報酬卻沒有相對較高。研究結果也指出,自第三屆開始公布的「自願性揭露資訊較透明」公司,有較高的EVA,代表投資者可以信賴提供超過法規規定資訊的公司,該項資訊的提供對健全證券市場的建立是有助益的。

證券暨期貨市場發展基金會礙於權限,其所公布的評鑑結果無法保證資訊的品質,僅能顯示受評公司所揭露的資訊在評鑑系統尺度下的相對透明度。本研究也試圖了解與管理階層相關的公司治理機制是否能提供投資者評估資訊品質的參考,但發現只有經理人持股率具有增加資訊透明度與EVA正向相關的調節效果。後續研究需探討影響資訊品質的因素,以供投資者取得企業資訊揭露質與量並重的資訊,如此才能真正保障投資者的權益,健全證券市場的發展。
英文摘要 The main goal of the information disclosure and transparency rankings system (IDTRS) is to reduce information asymmetry and to strengthen investors’ confidence in the capital market. Whether the implementation of this system can reach the expected goal depends on the benefits generated from the system. If the evaluation results of this system are correlated with corporate performance or value, then investors will be more willing to read the results, make use of information revealed in the system, and advise companies to follow the regulations of the system. Thus, the purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of the IDTRS on stock returns and economic value added (EVA) and to test whether companies with different evaluation results have differences in stock returns or EVA.

The IDTRS has been implemented for over five years. The empirical results indicate that the EVA of companies has indeed increased, but the stock returns have not. Companies with more transparent ranking results have higher value of EVA, but companies with more transparent ranking results don’t have higher stock returns. The empirical results also indicate that companies with “more transparent of voluntary disclosure” have higher EVA. This means that investors can trust the companies that provide more information than required regulations. The provision of voluntary information is good for building a healthy stock market.

The Securities & Futures Institute, due to its limited authority, can not guarantee the quality of information provided by evaluated companies. The ranking results only show the relative transparency under the systematic yardstick of the IDTRS. This study has also tried to understand whether the corporate governance mechanisms can help investors to evaluate the quality of information, but found that only shareholdings of managers have a moderating effect on the positive relationship between higher ranking results and EVA. Further research may examine other factors that have an ability to influence information quality, so investors can access information with good quality and quantity of corporate disclosure. By doing so, investors’ rights can be properly protected, and a healthy stock market can be developed.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………… 4
第三節 研究貢獻……………………………………………… 6
第四節 研究架構……………………………………………… 7
第貳章 資訊揭露評鑑系統…………………………………… 9
第一節 資訊揭露評鑑系統的建立與介紹…………………… 9
第二節 資訊揭露評鑑系統的特色與限制…………………… 12
第章 文獻探討與假說發展………………………………… 13
第一節 公司治理與資訊透明度……………………………… 13
第二節 資訊揭露與股票報酬………………………………… 14
第三節 資訊揭露與公司價值………………………………… 20
第四節 自願性揭露…………………………………………… 24
第五節 研究假說彙總………………………………………… 26
第肆章 研究設計……………………………………………… 27
第一節 資訊揭露與股票報酬關係之驗證…………………… 27
第二節 資訊揭露與公司價值關係之驗證…………………… 29
第三節 樣本與資料來源……………………………………… 38
第伍章 實證結果……………………………………………… 41
第一節 各變數統計量及相關分析…………………………… 41
第二節 導入資訊揭露評鑑系統之實證影響………………… 44
第三節 資訊揭露評鑑公布結果之實證影響………………… 54
第四節 資訊揭露品質之實證影響…………………………… 74
第五節 自願性揭露資訊較透明之實證結果………………… 84
第陸章 結論與建議…………………………………………… 94
第一節 研究結果……………………………………………… 94
第二節 研究限制及建議……………………………………… 95
參考文獻…………………………………………………………… 98
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