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系統識別號 U0026-0812200915113774
論文名稱(中文) 經濟自由度,公司治理和風險承擔行為之探討: 以歐洲壽險業為例
論文名稱(英文) Economic Freedom, Corporate Governance, and Risk Taking Behavior: Evidence from the European Life Insurance Industry
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際企業研究所碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Institute of International Business
學年度 97
學期 2
出版年 98
研究生(中文) 陳筱筑
研究生(英文) Shiao-chu Chen
電子信箱 yolychu@gmail.com
學號 r6696105
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 68頁
口試委員 指導教授-許永明
口試委員-張紹基
口試委員-許秀麗
召集委員-黃鴻禧
中文關鍵字 董事會  風險性行為  經濟自由度  股東持股比例  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 shareholder ownership  risk-taking behavior  economic freedom  corporate governance  the board 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本篇研究試圖以歐洲壽險業為例,探討公司治理對公司採取風險性行為的影響。公司經理人決定公司的投資方案,但經理人的意見往往會被其他公司利害關係人所影響,像是董事會和股東。本篇研究即以公司經理人、董事會、股東三方的角度衡量公司治理的優劣,評估優良的公司治理是否提高公司的風險性行為。此外,本篇研究試圖探討經濟自由度是否會增加或降低公司治理對公司採取風險性行為的影響。也就是說,若一家擁有良好公司治理的公司,公司採取較高風險的行為,在經濟自由度比較高的國家中,是否會更加明顯,或反而抵消而減低。
雖然公司治理的變數對公司層面的風險並無顯著影響,但對國家層面的風險有正向影響。股東持股比例愈高和公司經理人有介入董事會會使得公司採取較低的風險性行為,然而董事會的大小對風險性行為有正向關係。若將樣本依照經濟自由度分成高經濟自由度國家和低經濟自由度國家,可以發現在高經濟自由度國家中,股東持股比例高的對公司採取風險性行為的影響更加顯著。然而,公司經理人介入董事會在不同經濟自由程度的國家中卻沒有顯著差異。特別的是,董事會的大小在不同經濟自由程度的國家對公司採取風險性行為有著截然不同的影響。在高經濟自由度的國家中,董事會愈大,公司愈會採取風險性行為,但在低經濟自由度的國家中,董事會愈大,公司愈不會採取風險行為。
英文摘要 This study intends to examine two issues related to corporate governance and risk taking behavior in the life insurance industry. The corporate investment decision is made by CEO, but also influenced by shareholders and the board. The corporate governance is gauged by shareholder ownership concentration, CEO power (CEO’s ability to influence board decision), and the board size. Using a sample of 552 EU life insurers over 1995–2006 periods, consistent with the expectation, the results support that insurer’s risk taking behavior increases with firm-level corporate governance. High shareholder ownership concentration and CEO power negatively relate to country-level risk-taking. On the contrary, Board size has a positive relationship between country-level risk-taking.
Furthermore, this paper also provides some evidence that firms in high economic freedom countries have significant negatively relationship between country-level risk-taking behavior and shareholder ownership concentration. CEO power has no obvious difference in high or low economic freedom countries. With regard to board size, large board size would lead managers to undertake risky behaviors in high economic freedom countries, while smaller boards lead to a negative relationship between country-level risk-taking and board size in low economic freedom countries. Given that better corporate governance is instrumental to insurance risk-taking, firms in high economic freedom countries have more opportunities to take risk.
論文目次 INTRODUCTION 1
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 7
Insurance Environment in EU 7
The Insurance Guaranty Fund System 9
THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 10
Risk-taking Behavior 10
Corporate Governance and Risk-taking Behavior 16
Economic Freedom, Corporate Governance and Risk-taking Behavior 20
THE DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODOLOGY 25
Data Description and Diagnostics 25
Modal and Methodology 26
Measures of Risk-taking 27
Measures of Explanatory Variables 28
Measures of Economic Freedom 31
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 35
Descriptive Statistic and Correlation 35
Correlation Matrix 37
Firm-level Risk-taking Behavior and Corporate Governance 39
Country-level Risk-taking Behavior and Corporate Governance 42
The Effect of Economic Freedom on the Relationship between Firm-level Risk-taking Behavior and Corporate Governance 46
The Effect of Economic Freedom on the Relationship between Country-level Risk-taking Behavior and Corporate Governance 47
CONCLUSIONS 56
REFERENCES 59
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