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系統識別號 U0026-0812200915102462
論文名稱(中文) 利益輸送及公司治理機制對中國集團購併溢價之影響
論文名稱(英文) The Effect of Tunneling and Corporate Governance on Acquisition Premiums in Chinese Business Grorp's Merger and Acquisition
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 97
學期 2
出版年 98
研究生(中文) 謝斐如
研究生(英文) Fei-Ru Xie
電子信箱 r1696116@mail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 R1696116
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 29頁
口試委員 口試委員-陳政芳
口試委員-楊朝旭
指導教授-邱正仁
中文關鍵字 公司治理  購併溢價  購併  利益輸送  集團 
英文關鍵字 Mergers and Acquisitions  Acquisition Premiums  Tunneling  Corporate Governance  Business Group 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本篇研究使用62筆發生在中國1999-2008年的購併交易,探討是否發生在集圑內的購併交易容易支付較高的購併溢價以及公司治理機制對購併溢價的影響。研究發現發生在集圑內的購併交易具有利益輸送的動機,並且會透過給付過高的購併溢價進行。此外,本研究發現購併溢價與有發行H股的公司呈現顯著正相關,與控制股東佔董事會席次呈現顯著負相關;具有利益輸送的動機。
英文摘要 In this paper, we discuss the mergers and acquisitions transactions happened in China and examine whether mergers and acquisitions happened in the same business group have paid higher premiums. We use 62 acquisitions during 1999-2008 and find higher acquisition premiums are paid in mergers and acquisitions happened in the same group, indicate such transactions have tunneling motive. In addition, we also examine whether corporate governance mechanism of the acquiring firms affect acquisition premiums. We find acquisition premiums are positively correlated with firms issuing H-shares but negatively correlated with proportion of controlling shareholders of board.
論文目次 I. Introduction - 1 -

II. Literature review and hypothesis - 4 -

1. Mergers and acquisitions - 4 -

2. Agency theory - 5 -

3. Tunneling - 6 -

4. Acquisition premiums - 8 -

5. Corporate governance - 10 -

III. Data and methodology - 12 -

1. Data - 12 -

2. Research design - 13 -

2.1 Dependent variable - 13 -

2.2 Independent variables - 14 -

2.3 Control variables - 14 -

3. Descriptive statistics - 17 -

IV. Empirical result - 21 -

Regression analyses - 21 -

V. Conclusions - 26 -

Reference - 27 -
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