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系統識別號 U0026-0812200915075230
論文名稱(中文) 從股權結構觀點探討中國上市公司的治理問題
論文名稱(英文) Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Market: The Perspective of Ownership Structure
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 97
學期 2
出版年 98
研究生(中文) 鄭莉
研究生(英文) Li Cheng
學號 r1891105
學位類別 博士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 87頁
口試委員 指導教授-邱正仁
指導教授-陳嬿如
口試委員-吳志正
口試委員-黃一祥
口試委員-陳政芳
口試委員-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 none 
英文關鍵字 state policy  market reaction  consideration  split-share structure reform  Corporate governance  firm performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 none
英文摘要 The two essays in my dissertation are about the ownership structure in Chinese stock markets. The first essay investigates ownership structure and firm performance. Although previous studies have examined the relationship between ownership and firm performance of privatized firms in China, the results are inconclusive. This paper argues that the inconsistent empirical evidence is because these studies ignore the influence of state policies that simultaneously impact firm value and ownership. The Hausman test confirms the existence of an endogenous relationship between firm value and ownership concentration. After controlling for the effects of state policies and economic factors, it concludes that ownership concentration has a negative effect on firm performance.
The second essay uses Chinese listed firms which conduct Split-share Structure Reform (Share Reform hereafter) to investigate market reactions around several event days during the reform processes. It is found that investors in China perceive that the Share Reform has a positive impact on stock price, both when the reform prospectus is disclosed and when the consideration is paid. However, investors feel the reform will have a negative impact on stock price on the days that the date of the lockup expirations is announced, because Share Reform deals with the liquidity problem of non-tradable shares, and thus supply will increase when these shares can be traded. Moreover, it is found that payment of a consideration, the proportion of restricted shares after Share Reform, and a time gap between suspension and resumption days are the factors that affect market reaction. Furthermore, firm liquidity before the reform, price pressure, and the type of ultimate shareholder affect the consideration paid.
論文目次 ABSTRACT …………………………………………………… I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT …………………………………………… II
TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………… III
LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………. V
LIST OF FIGURE…………………………………………………. VI
ESSAY I:
STATE POLICIES, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE EVIDENCE OF THE STATE-CONTROLLED PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN CHINA
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY MARKETS IN CHINA 4
3. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE OF CHINESE LISTED FIRMS 6
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 9
4.1 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 9
4.2 DATA AND SAMPLE 12
4.3 HAUSMAN TEST TO EXAMINE THE EXISTENCE OF AN ENDOGENOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 13
4.4 THE EFFECTS OF STATE POLICIES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 14
4.5 THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17
5. ADDITIONAL TESTS 18
5.1 THE RESULTS FOR THE TWO SUB-SAMPLES COVERING THE PERIODS BEFORE AND AFTER 2001 18
5.2 THE EFFECTS OF STATE POLICIES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION ESTIMATED BY YEAR 19
5.3 CONSIDERATION OF THE NONLINEAR IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION ON FIRM VALUE 20
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 21
REFERENCE 23

ESSAY II:
THE DETERMINANTS OF SPLIT-SHARE REFORM CONSIDERATION AND ITS IMPACT ON MARKET REACTION: THE EVIDENCE OF CHINESE LISTED FIRMS
1. INTRODUCTION 37
2. THE BACKGROUND AND THE PROCESSES OF SHARE REFORM IN CHINA 40
2.1 THE BACKGROUND OF SPLIT-SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM IN THE CHINESE MARKET 40
2.2 THE PROCEDURES OF SPLIT-SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM 41
3. THE MARKET REACTION AROUND THE SHARE REFORM 43
3.1 THE MARKET REACTIONS AROUND THE REFORM PROSPECTUS IS DISCLOSED 44
3.2 THE MARKET REACTION AROUND THE CONSIDERATION IS PAID 45
4. THE DETERMINANTS OF CONSIDERATION IN SPLIT SHARE REFORM 48
4.1 THE LIQUIDITY OF TRADABLE SHARES BEFORE SHARE REFORM 48
4.2 PRICE PRESSURE OF A FIRM 49
4.3 THE TYPE OF ULTIMATE SHAREHOLDER 50
4.4 LOCKUP AGREEMENT 51
5. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 51
5.1 THE SAMPLE 51
5.2 METHODOLOGY 52
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 59
6.1 THE MARKET REACTIONS TO DISCLOSURE OF THE REFORM PROSPECTUS 59
6.2 THE MARKET REACTIONS AROUND THE CONSIDERATION IS PAID 60
6.3 THE MARKET REACTION AROUND THE LOCKUP EXPIRATION 61
6.4 THE RESULT OF THE DETERMINANTS OF MARKET REACTION 65
6.5 THE DETERMINANTS OF THE CONSIDERATION 67
7. CONCLUSIONS 68
REFERENCES 70
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