進階搜尋


   電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
(※如查詢不到或館藏狀況顯示「閉架不公開」,表示該本論文不在書庫,無法取用。)
系統識別號 U0026-0812200914230792
論文名稱(中文) 自願設置審計委員會決定因素之研究
論文名稱(英文) The Desision Factors in Voluntary Establishment of Audit Committee
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生(中文) 林慧真
研究生(英文) Huei-juen Lin
電子信箱 r1695104@mail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r1695104
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 140頁
口試委員 口試委員-陳政芳
指導教授-楊朝旭
口試委員-林松宏
中文關鍵字 決定因素  審計委員會  自願設置  獨立董事 
英文關鍵字 Voluntary establishment  Determinants  Audit committee  Indepemndent director 
學科別分類
中文摘要 臺灣證券交易所於民國91年2月修正上市(櫃)審查規章,以宣導方式輔導國內上市(櫃)公司建立獨立董事及審計委員會制度。自此之後,國內開始有企業設置審計委員會;但因政府並未積極推動,導致國內確實有設置審計委員會之企業仍屬少數。直至民國95年1月11日證交法新增第14條之4,要求公開發行公司應擇一設置審計委員會或監察人,且主管機關亦得視實務需要,命令設置審計委員會替代監察人,此時審計委員會的發展才逐漸明朗化。由於我國至今在審計委員會的設置上皆屬自願性,故本研究係以民國92年至96年間有設置審計委員會之上市(櫃)公司為對象,探討其設置審計委員會之主要因素為何,並將公司設置審計委員會之決定因素區分為其他治理機制、代理成本及CEO權力等三大類因素。本研究以Logit模型進行迴歸分析之結果顯示,在其他治理機制因素中,當董事會愈具獨立性或董事席次愈多之公司,愈傾向自願設置審計委員會。在代理成本因素部分,若財務槓桿愈低、未來成長性愈高、公開發行年數愈長及傾向多角化經營之公司,愈會自願設置審計委員會。而關於CEO權力因素的部分,當公司之董事長兼任總經理時,愈不傾向設置審計委員會。此外,若僅以電子產業之樣本進行分析,所得結果與原實證結果比較後發現:在其他治理機制因素方面,與原實證結果並無差異。代理成本因素中,則是規模愈小、公開發行年數愈長及傾向多角化經營之公司,愈有動機自願設置審計委員會。CEO權力因素方面,則是當公司之超額董監席次控制權愈大,則愈傾向設置審計委員會。
最後,本研究針對有設置審計委員會之公司,分析相關績效變數(如財務績效、市場績效及財務報表品質)在設置前、後是否存在顯著差異。實證分析之結果顯示,審計委員會的設置,對公司短期及長期之財務績效並無顯著的影響效果,但會改善長期的市場績效,且不論就短期或長期來看,均明顯提升了財務報表的品質。
英文摘要 In February 2002, by modification of the relevant auditing regulations applicable to publicly traded firms, Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) aimed to provide guidance on the establishment of audit committees, and promote the appointment of independent directors. Ever since then, local business enterprises began to have audit committees within their organization, although there was no active encouragement from the government, until the addition (2006 Jan 11) of Article 14-4 under the Stock Exchange Act, which required an publicly traded firms to employ either an audit committee or a supervisor, and, if it is deemed necessary, the regulatory authority can order the supervisor to be replaced by an audit committee. As establishment of audit committees was not made compulsory, this study chose publicly traded firms with audit committees our research sample, to investigate what are the determinants (categorized into other mechanisms of governance, agency costs and authority of CEO) for the voluntary establishment of audit committees. With a logistic regression model, our empirical evidence indicates that: under “other mechanisms of governance”, when the board of directors has a higher level of independence, firms have more tendency to voluntarily establish audit committee. With regard to “agency costs”, voluntary establishment occurs in firms with low financial leverage, high expected future growth, a long history of public trading and a tendency to diversification. Finally, for “authority of CEO”, when a firm’s chairman is also the general manager, voluntary establishment of an audit committee is not significant.
In addition, when we reduced our sample to the electronic industry only, empirical evidence shows that: the results are consistent under “other mechanism of governance”. With regard to “agency costs”, voluntary establishment occurs with firms that are small, have a long history of public trading and tendency to diversification. Finally, for “authority of CEO”, when a firm’s number of excess board superior seats is high, the voluntary establishment of audit committee is significant.
Lastly, we investigated whether relevant performance variables (financial performance, market performance and quality of financial statements) are significantly different before-and-after establishment of an audit committee. We fund that the establishment has no significant impact on short and long term financial performance, although, it does improve long term market performance, and, in general, the short and long term quality of financial statements.
論文目次 目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究貢獻 5
第貳章 審計委員會之制度背景與推行近況 7
第參章 文獻探討與假說發展 14
第肆章 研究方法 32
第一節 本研究之觀念性架構 32
第二節 實證模型與變數衡量 33
第四節 樣本描述與資料來源 52
第伍章 實證結果與分析 59
第一節 敘述性統計分析 59
第二節 設置審計委員會決定因素之實證結果與分析 67
第陸章 敏感性分析與增額分析 85
第一節 以股份控制權取代董監席次控制權之敏感性測試 86
第二節 以電子產業為研究樣本之敏感性測試 94
第三節 增額分析 102
第七章 結論及建議 117
第一節 研究結論 117
第二節 研究限制與建議 124
第三節 對實務界之建議 126
參考文獻 127
附錄一 有設置審計委員會之公司篩選過程 135
參考文獻 王濟川與郭志剛,2004,Logistic 迴歸模型-方法及應用,台北,五南書局,二版。
古佳禾,2004,銀行往來關係、監督機制與道德危險之實証研究,私立中原大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
吳清華,2007,公司盈餘質量:董事會微觀治理績效之考察─來自我國獨立董事制度強制性變遷的經驗證據,數理統計與管理,第26卷第1期,頁30-40。
吳蕙雯,2002,公司治理對IPOs承銷價與上市後股價表現影響之研究,私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
李永全與馬黛,2006,台灣家族公司負債融資成本之研究,管理評論,第二十五卷第三期,頁69-91。
李禮仲,2004,從美國經驗論台灣建構「審計委員會」應有之思維,經濟日報(2004/10/09)。
林正坤,2005,我國上市櫃公司自願設置審計委員因素之研究,私立中原大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
林明謙,2001,股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究,私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
柯承恩,2000,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上),會計研究月刊,第173期,頁75-81。
柯承恩,2000,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(下),會計研究月刊,第174期,頁79-83。
翁淑育,2000,台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究,私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
張文瀞、周玲台與林修葳,2003,內部人持股連續變動公司之盈餘管理行為特性,會計評論,第37期,頁53-83。
許婉琦,2003,亞洲國家短期股市反應之研究,國立雲林科技大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙,2003,控制權與盈餘分配權之衡量(上),貨幣觀測與信用評等42,頁15-31。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙,2003,控制權與盈餘分配權之衡量(下),貨幣觀測與信用評等43,頁11-26。
郭學平,2003,台灣上市櫃公司自願性設置獨立董監事因素之研究,國立政治大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智,2005,應用Ohlson 會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性─以台灣上市公司電子業為例,臺大管理論叢,第15卷第2期,頁123-142。
陳業寧、邱顯比與洪雲萍,2004,獨立董事與公司治理:政府應該要求所有上市上櫃公司聘任獨立董事嗎?證券市場發展季刊,第16卷第4期,頁1-34。
陳碧滋,2001,我國上市公司股價行為與董監因素關連性之探討,臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
陳曉蓉與陳儀娟,2007,獨立董監事制度與特性對於公司治理與公司績效之影響─以台灣上市公司為例,第八屆管理學域學術研討會論文集,頁147-174。
陳錦村與黃佩玲,2001,從股權結構與核心代理觀點評析公營銀行民營化的實際成效,公營事業評論第2卷第3期,頁69-89。
陳纘華,2003,股份有限公司內部監控制度之研究─以監察人制度為中心,私立東吳大學法律研究所博士論文。
彭筱倩,2004,盈餘管理與公司治理關聯性之研究─以我國財務危機公司為例,國立政治大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
曾素花,2005,我國現階段公司治理之問題研討,私立中原大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
黃惠雯,2006,談證券交易法引進獨立董事及審計委員會等制度之緣起及重點,證券暨期貨月刊,第24卷第3期,頁4-14。
黃齡慧,2005,我國上櫃公司設置審計委員會決定因素之探討,私立淡江大學會計學研究所在職專班碩士論文。
楊燿禎,2000,管理者持股、風險與財務決策關聯性之研究,國立東華大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文。
葉淑玲,2004,我國上市公司自願性聘任獨立董監事動機之研究,國立台北大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
葉銀華,1999,家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究─台灣與香港證券市場之比較,管理評論,第18卷第2期,頁57-90。
葉銀華,2002,台灣公司治理的問題與改革之道,證券暨期貨管理,第20卷第11期,頁1-16。
劉連煜,2006,公開發行公司董事會、監察人之重大變革─證交法新修規範引進獨立董事及審計委員會之介紹與評論,證券櫃檯,第116期,頁12-21。
鄭誌偉,2006,企業創新投資機會與管理者薪酬結構,私立銘傳大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
顏淑慧,2005,論最低稅賦制對企業的影響,國立高雄第一科技大學金融營運研究所碩士論文。
鐘承垠與李竟成,2006,董事會監督動力與內部治理機制間的替代效應,鄭州輕工業學院學報(社會科學版),第7卷第4期,頁42-45。
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2002. Audit committee characteristics and financial misstatement: A study of the efficacy of certain blue ribbon committee recommendations. Working Paper, University of Memphis.
Abbott, L. J., Y. Park, and S. Parker. 2000. The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26: 55-67.
Adams, M. 1997. Determinants of audit committee formation in the life insurance industry: New Zealand evidence. Journal of Business Research 38 (2): 123-129.
Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 3: 377-397.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 263-285.
Barnhart, S. W., and S. Rosenstein. 1998. Board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance: An empirical analysis. The Financial Review 33: 1-16.
Bartvo, E., F. A. Gul, and J. S. L. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30: 421-452.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71: 443-465.
Bebchuk, L. A., R. Kraakman, and G. Triantis. 2000. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual-class equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights. University of Chicago Press: 295-315.
Becker, C. L., M. L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 1-24.
Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law 27 (2): 231-273.
Birkett, B. S. 1986. The recent history of corporate audit committees. The Accounting Historians Journal 13 (Fall): 109-124.
Boone, A. L., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff, and C. G. Raheja. 2007. The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 85: 66-101.
Bradbury, M. E. 1990. The incentives for voluntary audit committee formation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 9 (1): 19-36.
Brickley, J., J. Coles, and G. Jarrell. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance 4: 189-220.
Bushee, B. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Review 73 (July): 305-333.
Byrd, J. W., and K. A. Hickman. 1992. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 195-221.
Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting . The Accounting Review 75: 453-467.
Changanti, R. S., V. Mahajan, and S. Sharma. 1985. Corporate board size, composition, and corporate failures in the retailing industry. Journal of Management Studies 22: 400-417.
Chen, C. R., and T. L. Steiner. 1999. Managerial ownership and agency conflicts: A nonlinear simultaneous equation analysis of managerial ownership, risk taking, debt policy, and dividend policy. The Financial Review 34: 119-136.
Chen, S., X. Chen, and Q. Cheng. 2008. Do family firms provide moreor less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3): 499-536.
Cho, M. H. 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 47 (1): 103-121.
Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt. 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin’s q. Financial Management 23: 70-74.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112.
Collier, P. 1993. Factors affecting the formation of audit committees in major UK listed companies. Accounting and Business Research 23 (91A): 421-430.
Collier, P., and A. Gregory. 1999. Audit committee activity and agency costs. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 18: 311-332.
Crawford, J. G. 1987. An empirical investigation of the characteristics of companies with audit committees. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Alabama.
Crutchley, C. E., M. R. H. Jensen, J. S. Jahera, Jr., and J. E. Raymond. 1999. Agency problems and the simultaneity of decision making: The role of institutional ownership. International Review of Financial Analysis 8: 177-197.
Daily, C. M., and D. R. Dalton. 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure. Academy of Management 37: 1603-1617.
Davidson III, W. N., B. Xie, and W. Xu. 2004. Market reaction to voluntary announcements of audit committee appointments: The effect of financial expertise. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (4): 279-293.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review 70: 193-226.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13: 1-36.
Defond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17: 145-176.
Defond, M. L., and C. W. Park. 1997. Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (July): 115-139.
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155-1177.
Denis, D. J., and A. Sarin. 1999. Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 52: 187-223.
Eichenseher, J. W., and D. Shields. 1985. Corporate Director Liability and Monitoring Preferences. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4 (1): 13-31.
Eisenberg, M. A. 1975. Legal model of management structure in the modern corporation, officers, directors, and accountants. California Law Review 63: 375.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M. 1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics 48 (1): 35-54.
El-Gazzar, S. M. 1998. Predisclosure information and institutional ownership: Cross-sectional examination of market revaluations during earnings announcement periods. The Accounting Review 73 (1): 119-129.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.
Fischer P. E., and R. E. Verrecchia. 2000. Reporting bias. The Accounting Review 75: 229-245.
Francis, J., J. D. Hanna, and L. Vincent. 1996. Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs. Journal of Accounting Research 34: 117-134.
Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and D. J. Skinner. 1999. An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research (spring): 133-150.
Gul, F. A., C. J. P. Chen, and J. S. L. Tsui. 2003. Discretionary accounting accruals, managers’ incentives and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (3): 441-464.
Hanushek, E. A., and J. E. Jackson. 1977. Statistical methods for social scientists. New York: Academic Press, Inc.
Harrison, R. J., D. L. Torres, and S. Kukalis. 1988. The changing of the guard: Turnover and structural change in the top management positions. Administrative Science Quarterly 33: 211-232.
Healy, P., and J. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13: 365-383.
Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 1988. The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics 19 (4): 589-606.
Hirshleifer, D., and A. V. Thakor. 1994. Managerial performance, board of directors and takeover bidding. Journal of Corporate Finance 1: 63-90.
Holthausen, R. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1990. The effect of informativeness and consensus of price volume behavior. The Accounting Review 65: 191-208.
Hosmer, D. W., S. Taber, and S. Lemeshow. 1989. Applied Logistic Regression. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Jensen, M. C., and M. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior-agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
Jensen. M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831-880.
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29: 193-228.
Kesner, I. F. 1987. Directors’ stock ownership and organizational performance: An investigation of fortune 500 companies. Journal of Management 13 (Fall): 499-507.
Kesner, I. F., and D. R. Dalton. 1987. Composition and CEO duality in boards of directors: An international perspective. Journal of International Business Studies 18: 33-42.
Klein, A. 2002. Economic determinants of audit committee independence. The Accounting Review 77: 435-453.
Kothari, S. P. 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 105-231.
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accruals. Journal of accounting and Economics 39: 163-197.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54 (2): 471-517.
Lee, T., and M. Stone. 1997. Economic agency and audit committees: Responsibilities and membership composition. International Journal of Auditing 1 (2): 97-116.
Li, Chun-An. 1999. A model of hindsight, and security market underreaction / overreaction. Journal of Financial Studies 7 (1): 17-58.
Linderberg, E., and S. Ross. 1981. Tobin's q ratio and industrial organization. Journal of Business 54: 1-32.
Mautz, R. K., and F. L. Neumann. 1970. Corporate Audit Committees. Illinois: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois.
Mautz, R. K., and F. L. Neumann. 1977. Corporate Audit Committees: Policies and Practices. Cleveland: Ernst & Ernst.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 595-612.
McDaniel, L., R. Martin, and L. Maines. 2002. Evaluating financial reporting quality: The effects of financial expertise vs. financial literacy. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 139-167.
Menard, S. 1995. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Pubilcations, Inc.
Menon, K., and J. D. Williams. 1994. The use of audit committees for monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 13: 121-139.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation. Journal of Financial Economics 9: 19-46.
O’Reilly, V. M., P. J. McDonnell, B. N. Winograd, J. S. Gerson, and H. R. Jaenicke. 1998. Montgomery’s Auditing (12th editing). New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
Patton, A., and J. C. Baker. 1987. Why do not directors rock the boat? Harvard Business Review 65: 10-18.
Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young. 2005. Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accrual? Journal of Business Financial and Accounting 32 (September): 1311-1342.
Pincus, K., M. Rusbarsky, and W. J. Winter. 1989. Voluntary formation of corporate audit committees among NASDAQ firms. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 8 (4): 239-265.
Pound, J. 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 237-265
Rechner, P. L., and D. R. Dalton. 1989. The impact of CEO as board chairperson on corporate performance. Academy of Management Executive 2: 141-143.
Reynolds, J. K., and J. R. Francis. 2001. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30: 375-400.
Rosenstein, S., and J. G. Wyatt. 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 26: 175-191.
Sankar, M. R. 1999. The impact of alternative forms of earnings management on the return-earnings relation. Working Paper, University of Southern California.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783.
Smith, C. W., Jr., and J. B. Warner. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics (June): 117-161.
Tobin, James. 1969. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1: 15-29.
Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild. 1995. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 61-91.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice-Hall Inc.
Weisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.
Willekens, M., H. V. Bauwhede, and A. Gaeremynck. 2004. Voluntary audit committee formation and practices among Belgian listed companies. International Journal of Auditing 8 (3): 207-222.
Xie, B., W. N. Davidson III, and P. J. DaDalt. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9 (3): 295-316.
Yeh, Y. H., and T. S. Lee. 2000. Corporate governance and performance: The case of Taiwan. The Seventh Asia Pacific Finance Association Annual Conference, Shanghai.
Yeh, Y. H., and T. Woidtke. 2005. Commitment or entrenchment? Controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of banking and finance 29 (7): 1857-1885.
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2018-07-30起公開。
  • 同意授權校外瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2028-07-30起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw