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系統識別號 U0026-0812200914182758
論文名稱(中文) 台灣上市公司股權結構、自由現金流量與過度投資關聯性之研究
論文名稱(英文) The Association among Ownership Structures, Free Cash Flows, and Over-investment in Taiwanese Listed Companies
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生(中文) 孫悅瑄
研究生(英文) Yueh-Hsuan Sun
學號 r1694406
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 67頁
口試委員 口試委員-顏盟峯
口試委員-黎明淵
指導教授-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 盈餘分配權  自由現金流量  股份控制權  公司治理  過度投資  股權結構 
英文關鍵字 control rights  cash-flow ownership  over-investment  governance structures  ownership structure  free cash flow 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究主要係探討股權結構、自由現金流量與過度投資之關聯性,並探討公司監理機制與自由現金流量之過度投資的關係。以2001年至2005年264家台灣上市公司為研究對象。實證結果顯示,自由現金流量與過度投資之間呈現顯著正相關,且當公司存在正自由現金流量時,對過度投資的影響將愈嚴重;而當控制股東之股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離時,負面的掠奪效果將使公司因自由現金流量所衍生之過度投資的問題惡化。另外,實證結果顯示,公司監理機制,如機構投資人的監督能有效減緩公司過度投資的問題。
英文摘要 The purpose of this study is to examine the association among ownership structure, free cash flows and over-investment. Base on a sample of 264 TSE firms over the period 2001-2005, the empirical study in this paper examines whether the governance structures are associated with over-investment of free cash flow. The empirical results suggest that over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow. Moreover, when the largest shareholders’ control rights exceed their cash-flow ownership to the firms, the entrenchment effect worsens the over-investment of free cash flow. In addition, the result suggests that certain governance structures, such as the institutional investors’ ownership, effectively mitigate the degree of over-investment.
論文目次 第一章 緒論......................................................................................1
第一節 研究背景與動機........................................................1
第二節 研究目的....................................................................4
第三節  研究架構....................................................................5
第四節  研究流程....................................................................6
第二章 文獻回顧................................................................................7
第一節 股權分散假設與權益代理問題................................7
第二節 各國股權結構之實證研究........................................8
第三節 台灣股權結構之實證研究........................................9
第四節 控制股東所引發的核心代理問題..........................11
第五節 控制股東之正面的誘因效果與負面的掠奪效果..12
第六節 自由現金流量理論..................................................15
第七節 自由現金流量與過度投資......................................16
第八節 公司監理機制..........................................................18
第三章 研究設計..............................................................................23
第一節 研究假說..................................................................23
第二節 控制權與盈餘分配權之定義與衡量......................28
第三節 控制股東之衡量......................................................33
第四節 變數定義與衡量......................................................35
第五節 研究樣本..................................................................39
第四章 實證結果與分析................................................................41
第一節 敘述性統計分析.......................................................41
第二節 實證結果與分析.......................................................49
第五章 結論與建議.........................................................................54
第一節 結論...........................................................................54
第二節 研究限制與建議.......................................................56
參考文獻..............................................................................................58
附錄........................................................................................................63
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