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系統識別號 U0026-0812200914175206
論文名稱(中文) 公司治理與多角化價值
論文名稱(英文) Corporate Governance and Diversification Discount:Evidence from Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生(中文) 林楠慶
研究生(英文) Nan-ching Lin
電子信箱 r8695109@mail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r8695109
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 39頁
口試委員 指導教授-邱正仁
口試委員-楊朝旭
口試委員-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 公司治理  多角化 
英文關鍵字 Diversification  Corporate Governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究探討多角化策略與公司治理機制如何影響公司價值,在取得1995年至2006年共12年之台灣上市公司的產業別財務資訊,並且以中華民國行業標準分類系統(CSIC)的四碼做為分類準則而建制成所需要的資料庫,並透過樣本篩選的原則獲得研究過程中所需要的樣本。因此以代理理論為基礎,試圖分析這12年間多角化活動、公司治理機制與公司價值三者間的連動關係。
本研究使用敘述性統計、平均數t檢定、Wilcoxon中位數檢定與複迴歸分析,探討多角化活動、公司治理機制與公司價值的關係,主要實證發現有:
1. 多角化程度越大,公司價值越高。
本研究經由實證結果得知,單一部門公司存在價值減損,而多部門公司存在價值溢價,亦即當公司多角化程度增加時,將會增加公司價值。
2. 有效落實公司治理機制,可有效降低代理問題增加公司價值與績效。
由實證結果可知,單一部門公司有價值減損的現象,當盈餘分配權(CFR)上升時,可以降低減損的程度;但股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離(DEV)上升時,將會加重其減損的程度。而多部門公司有價值溢價的現象,當盈餘分配權(CFR)上升時,可以增加價值溢價的程度;但股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離(DEV)上升時,將會降低其價值溢價的程度。
英文摘要 This study investigates how diversification strategies and corporate governance mechanism affect firm value. After collecting the industrial and financial information of listed companies in Taiwan, we obtain a totally 12-year data over the period during 1995 to 2006. With the help of Standard Industrial Classification System of the Republic of China (CSIC) and our sample selection rules, we complete the necessary database. Therefore, we base on the fundamental of agency cost, trying to analyze the relationship among diversification strategies, corporate governance and firm value during the period over 12 years.
This study applies descriptive statistics, t tests for mean, Wilcoxon tests for median and multiple regression analysis when we investigates the re-lationship among diversification strategies, corporate governance and the firm value. The mainly empirical evidences are as follows:
1.The more diversified the firm is, the higher value the firm is.
We find that single-segment firms are always discount on firm value but multi-segment firms are always premium on firm value. This means diver-sification has value-enhancing effect.
2.Carrying out corporate governance effectively, it will reduce the cost caused by the agency problem and increase firm value.
After empirical study, single-segment firms have the phenomenon of value discount. When the cash flow rights increases the discount will decrease; but when the separation of voting right and cash flow rights increases the discount will aggravate. In contrast with multi-segment firms, multi-segment firms have value premium. When the cash flow rights increases the premium will also increase; but when the separation of voting right and cash flow rights increases the premium will decrease.
論文目次 摘要----------------------------------------------I
誌謝----------------------------------------------III
目錄----------------------------------------------IV
表目錄--------------------------------------------V
第壹章、 緒論-------------------------------------1
第一節、 研究背景---------------------------------1
第二節、 研究動機與目的---------------------------2
第貳章、 文獻探討---------------------------------5
第一節、 代理問題、公司治理與公司經營績效---------5
第二節、 多角化與公司價值-------------------------8
第參章、 研究設計---------------------------------12
第一節、 資料來源與樣本選取-----------------------12
第二節、 研究變數操作性定義-----------------------13
第三節、 實證模型設定-----------------------------18
第肆章、 實證結果分析-----------------------------20
第一節、 樣本資料敘述統計分析--------------------20
第二節、 迴歸分析--------------------------------27
第伍章、 結論與建議-------------------------------32
參考文獻------------------------------------------34
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