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系統識別號 U0026-0812200914143086
論文名稱(中文) 高階經理人薪酬計畫與公司績效、盈餘管理之關係
論文名稱(英文) Chief Executive Compensation, Corporate Financial Performance and Earnings Management
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生(中文) 紀文惠
研究生(英文) Wen-Hui Chi
電子信箱 r1695111@ccmail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r1695111
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 56頁
口試委員 口試委員-黎明淵
口試委員-顏盟峯
指導教授-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 高階經理人薪酬計畫  盈餘管理  公司績效  裁決性應計項目 
英文關鍵字 Discretionary accruals  Chief executive compensation  Earnings management  Corporate financial performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究之目的是探討高階經理人的薪酬計畫與盈餘管理、公司績效間的關係。實證結果發現,固定薪資與盈餘管理之間呈負相關,代表高階經理人的固定薪資在去年度已經決定,所以今年度沒有盈餘管理的誘因存在;激勵性薪資與盈餘管理之間呈正相關,代表公司發放的激勵性薪資會誘使高階經理人從事盈餘管理之行為。同時本研究也探討高階經理人身兼董事長的雙重身分、持股比例與盈餘管理之關係。實證結果發現,雙重身分及持股比例與盈餘管理呈正相關,代表當高階經理人身兼公司董事長,即持有較多股份時,則其更有進行盈餘管理的誘因與動機。本研究更進一步探討公司績效與高階經理人薪酬之關聯性,實證結果顯示兩者間存在正相關,代表國內上市公司仍普遍以公司前一年度的績效表現,做為下一年度高階經理人薪酬水準的決定要素。
英文摘要 This paper empirically investigates the relationship among the chief executive compensation, corporate financial performance,and earnings management.The result shows that the fixed pay (salary) and earnings management are negatively correlated,meaning that managers have less motivation to manipulate earnings since this part of compensation has been decided and fixed.I also find that the incentive pay (bonus) to managers has positive and significant influences on earnings management, which means that the incentive pay would encourage managers to manipulate earnings.This study further investigates the association between double identity (i.e.,the managers who are also the chairman of the company) and earnings management, and my finding shows that the double identity has a positive relationship with earnings management.In addition,the empirical evidence of this paper shows that the more shares managers hold the severer earnings management becomes.Finally, my finding exhibits that the chief executive compensation (based on incentive pay system) has a positive impact on corporate financial performance.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論 ...................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ........................ 1
第二節 研究架構 ...............................3
第貳章 文獻探討 ...............................4
第一節 代理問題 ...............................4
第二節 高階經理人薪酬計畫 .....................5
第三節 盈餘管理 ...............................9
第參章 研究方法 ...............................13
第一節 研究假說 ...............................13
第二節 變數衡量及實證模型 .....................15
第三節 研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源 ...........20
第肆章 實證結果與分析 .........................21
第一節 敘述性統計分析 .........................21
第二節 實證結果分析 ...........................24
第伍章 結論與建議 .............................28
第一節 研究發現 ...............................28
第二節 研究限制與貢獻 .........................30
第三節 未來研究建議與管理意涵 .................32
參考文獻 .......................................34
附錄 1. 樣本公司資料(共 239 家) ................43
附錄 2. 樣本依產業別分類之敘述性統計 ...........47
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