進階搜尋


 
系統識別號 U0026-0812200914103794
論文名稱(中文) 高階管理團隊的多樣性對組織績效的影響
論文名稱(英文) Top Management Team Diversity and Firm Performance
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration
學年度 96
學期 2
出版年 97
研究生(中文) 謝振良
研究生(英文) Cheng-Liang Hsieh
電子信箱 isapapa@hotmail.com
學號 r4694145
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 53頁
口試委員 口試委員-陳淑惠
口試委員-吳志正
指導教授-張淑昭
中文關鍵字 組織績效  高階管理團隊  代理人成本理論  高階管理團隊理論 
英文關鍵字 Top management team  Firm performance  Agency cost theory  Upper echelon theory 
學科別分類
中文摘要 實際的商業環境之中,何種因素對於組織績效會造成直接或間接的影響,一直是個受人注意且廣泛受到討論的問題。為了解答此問題,眾多學者們試著各種不同的理論及觀點來進行研究。其中,高階管理團隊處於公司的核心地位,對公司的績效扮演著關鍵的角色,因此而受到熱烈的討論與研究。一方面,部分學者藉由組織理論與行為的觀點來討論此問題。另一方面,部分學者則藉著代理人成本的觀點來進行解釋。藉由高階管理團隊成員們本身具有的獨特能力及專門知識,高階管理團隊建構各公司的管理機制及社會網路,進而決定其所屬公司在動態競爭環境中的能力發展。根據高階團隊理論,團隊成員的組成特性以內外部兩個面向對組織績效造成程度不同的影響。高階管理團隊成員根據其過往的工作經驗、生活經歷、及本質學能,對於組織的策略形成及發展有著顯著的影響。因此,在於外部管理機制上,此研究藉由團隊教育背景的多樣性來討論團隊組成特性影響組織的對外發展可能性。在於內部管理機制上,此研究藉由團隊的任期多樣性來探討團隊組成特性則影響著社會網路有效性。此外,根據代理人成本理論,藉由對外舉債的方式,外部監督機制可協助公司引進外部的專業資源來審視投資計畫的可行性並降低多餘現金流可能產生的問題。藉由管理人員持有股份的增加,內部監督機制可降低資訊不對稱並將委託人與代理人的利益緊密結合。本研究欲結合此二理論,研究高階管理階層的多樣性對於組織績效的影響及監督制度所帶來的權變影響。利用研究發展支出的比例,從台灣上市上櫃公司篩選出207間公司,其中實際的有效樣本數為75間台灣的電子上市上櫃公司,大多數的樣本公司從事電子專業代工。本研究結果發現高階管理團隊在任期及教育背景的單一性對組織績效有著顯著的影響外,舉債程度及管理人的持有股份比例也對組織績效產生權變的影響。
英文摘要 What factors affect firm performance is an interesting problem in business world and is broadly discussed. To answer this question, scholars investigate issues with different perspectives. Amid all possible factors, top management team in the core of organization appeals to many researchers. Some argue that the organization theory and behavior matter, whereas others argue the agency cost theory does. Top management team with specific expertise and capability not only constructs goals and strategies which determine firms’ future competences in a dynamic environment but also set up the social network to accelerate communication between different subgroups. According to upper echelon theory, the characters of top management team form the different beliefs and behaviors in firms in two aspects. Executives as the powerful actors influence organizations’ strategies and act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of the strategic situations they face. Internal governance mechanism helps lower social conflicts in a firm, whereas external one helps find out the possible investment opportunities. Besides, monitoring mechanisms of agency cost theory also play critical roles in organization performance. On the one hand, internal monitoring mechanism decreases the information asymmetry and aligns the benefits of principals with clients. On the other hand, external monitoring mechanism forces the management to adopt practical investment and avoids potential free cash flow problems. This paper investigates the relationship between top management diversity and firm performance with a contingency approach. We use research and development ratio to pick up the examples and got 207 firms at beginning but only 75 Taiwanese electronic firms are effective for this study. Most of them are the EMS companies. Our results show that the top management homogeneity in tenure and educational background improve firm performance. Moreover, managerial equity ownership diversity and leverage level moderate the relationship between characters of top management team and firm performance.
論文目次 Abstract I
摘要 II
誌謝 III
Table of Contents IV
List of Tables VII
List of Figures VIII
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Research Background and Research Motive 1
1.2 Research Objectives 1
1.3 Research Procedures 2
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 4
2.1 Theoretical Background 4
2.1.1 Upper echelon theory 4
2.1.1.1 Social-identified View 5
2.1.1.2 Top Management Team Diversity 7
2.1.1.2.1 Tenure diversity 8
2.1.1.2.2 Educational diversity 9
2.1.2 Agency Cost Theory 10
2.1.2.1 Internal monitoring mechanism 12
2.1.2.2 External Monitoring Mechanism 13
2.1.3 Contingency Theory 14
2.2 Theoretical Development 15
2.2.1 TMT Diversity and Firm Performance 15
2.2.2 The Moderating Effect of Internal Monitoring Mechanism on TMT Diversity and Firm Performance 17
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 20
3.1 Research Framework 20
3.2 Research Hypotheses 21
3.3 Operationalization of Variables 21
3.3.1 Data 21
3.3.2 Variables 22
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 22
3.3.2.1.1 Performance 22
3.3.2.2 Independent Variables 22
3.3.2.2.1 Internal governance mechanism - Tenure diversity 22
3.3.2.2.2 External governance mechanism - Educational diversity 22
3.3.2.2.3 Internal monitoring mechanism - Equity Ownership 23
3.3.2.2.4 External monitoring mechanism - Leverage level 23
3.3.2.3 Control Variable 23
3.3.2.3.1 TMT size 23
3.3.2.3.2 Firm size 24
3.4 Statistic Method 24
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 24
3.4.1.1 Measure of Location: Mean 24
3.4.1.2 Measures of Variability: Variance, and Standard Deviation 24
3.4.1.3 Measures of Distribution shape: Skewness and Kurtosis 24
3.4.1.4 Measures of Association between Two Variables: Covariance and Correlation 25
3.4.2 Linear Regression Analysis 25
3.4.2.1 Variables 25
3.4.2.2 Least Squares Method 25
3.4.2.3 The Goodness of Fit 25
3.4.2.4 Model Assumption 26
3.4.2.5 Significance Testing 26
3.4.2.5.1 F test 26
3.4.2.5.2 t test 27
3.4.2.5.3 Multicollinearity 27
3.4.2.6 Residual Analysis 27
3.4.2.6.1 Residual Plots 28
3.4.2.6.2 Durbin-Watson test 28
Chapter Four Research Analysis and Results 29
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 29
4.1.1 Measures of Distribution Location, Variability, and Shape 29
4.1.2 Measures of Distribution Association 30
4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 31
4.2.1 Results 31
4.3 Residual Analysis 32
4.3.1 Residual Plot 32
4.3.1.1 Normal Probability Plot 32
4.3.1.1.1 Histogram plot 32
4.3.1.1.2 P-P plot 32
4.3.1.1.3 Plot of Residuals against the Independent Variables 32
4.3.2 Durbin-Watson Analysis 32
4.4 Hypotheses Testing 33
4.4.1 Top Management Team Tenure Diversity and Firm Performance 33
4.4.2 Top Management Team Educational Diversity and Firm Performance 33
4.4.3 The Moderating Effect of Internal Monitoring Mechanism to TMT Tenure Diversity and Firm Performance 34
4.4.4 The Moderating Effect of External Monitoring Mechanism to TMT Educational Diversity and Firm Performance 34
CHAPTER FIVE RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 36
5.1 Research Conclusions and Implications 36
5.2 Research Limitations and Recommendations 39
Reference 42
Appendix 47
A.1 Residual figures 47
A.2 Firm list 51
參考文獻 Ambos, B. & Schlegelmilch, B. B. Innovation and control in the multinational firm: A comparison of political and contingency approaches. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 473-486. (2007).
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. Agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Finance, 1, 81-106. (2000).
Barkema, H. G., & Shvyrkov, O. Does top management team diversity promotes or hampers foreign expansion? Strategic Management Journal, 28, 663-680. (2007).
Barker, V. L., & Mueller, G. C. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. Management Science, 48, 782-801. (2002).
Barrick, M., Bradley, B., & Colbert, A. The moderating role of top management team interdependence: Implication for real team and working groups. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 544-557. (2007).
Beersma, B., Hollenbeck, J., Humphrey, S., Moon, H., Conlon, D., & Ilgen, D. Cooperation, competition, and team performance: Toward a contingency approach. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 572-590. (2003).
Brief, A., Umphress, E., Dietz, J., Butz, R., Burrows, J., & Scholten, L. Community matters: Realistic group conflict theory and the impact of diversity. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 830-844. (2005).
Carpenter, M. A. The implication of strategy and social context for the relationship between top management team heterogeneity and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 275-284. (2002).
Carpenter, M. A., & Fredrickson, J. W. Top management teams, global strategic posture, and the moderating role of uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 533–545. (2001).
Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. Upper Echelons Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition. Journal of Management, 30, 749-778. (2004).
Carpenter, M. A., Pollock, T., Leary, M. Testing a model of reasoned risk-taking: governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high-technology IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 803-820. (2003).
Certo, S. T., Lester, R. H., Dalton, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. Top management teams, strategy and financial performance: A meta-analytic examination. Journal of Management Studies, 43, 813–839. (2006).
Chatterjee, S. & Hadi, A. S. Regression Analysis by Example. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New Jersey. (2006).
Chen, X., & Yur-Austin, J. Re-measuring agency costs: The effectiveness of blockholders. The quarterly review of economics and finance, 47, 588-601. (2007).
Conyon, M. & Murphy K. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 110, 640-671. (2000).
Crossland, C., & Hambrick, D. How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate executives: A study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 767-789. (2007).
Datta, D., & Rajagopalan, N. Industry Structure and CEO Characteristics: An Empirical Study of Succession Events. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 833-852. (1998).
Dielman, T. E. Applied Regression Analysis: A second course in business and economic statistics. Brooks Cole Thomson Learning, Australia. (2005).
Drach-Zahavy, A. & Freund, A. Team effectiveness under stress: A structural contingency approach. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28, 423-450. (2006).
Easton, S. & Howard, P. Agency costs at Telstra: A case study. The Australian Economic Review, 38, 229-232. (2005).
Eisenhardt, K. M. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review, 14, 57-74. (1989).
Gelman, A. & Hill, J. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel Hierarchical Models. Cambridge University Press, New York. (2007).
Ghosh, S. Bank Monitoring, Managerial Ownership and Tobin’s Q: An Empirical Analysis for India. Managerial and decision economics, 28, 129-143. (2007).
George, D. & Mallery, P. SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A simple guide and reference 11.0 update. Pearson Education Inc., Boston. (2003).
Goranova, M., Alessandrit, T. M., Brandes, P., & Dharwadkar, R. Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: A longitudinal view. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 211-225. (2007)
Hayward, M., Rindova, V., & Pollock, T. Believing one’s own press: the causes and consequences of CEO celebrity. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 637-653. (2004).
Hambrick, D. C. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review, 32, 334–343. (2007).
Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. CEOs who have COOs: Contiengency Analysis of an unexplored structural form. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 959-979. (2004).
Hambrick, D. C. & Mason, P. A. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. The Academy of Management Review, 9, 193-206. (1984).
Jackson, S. E., & Joshi, A. Diversity in social context: A multi-attribute, multi-level analysis of team diversity and performance in a sales organization. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 25, 675-702. (2004).
Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., & Erhardt, N. L. Recent research on team and organizational diversity: SWOT analysis and implications. Journal of Management, 29, 801-830. (2003).
Jiraporn, P. & Gleason, K. C. Capital structure, shareholder rights, and corporate governance. The Journal of Financial Research, 30, 21-33. (2007).
Jensen, M. C. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management, 34, 5-19. (2005).
Lau, D. C., & Murnighan, J. K. Interactions within groups and subgroups: the effects of demographic faultlines. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 645-659. (2005).
Li, J., & Hambrick, D. C. Factional groups: a newvantage on demographic faultlines, conflict, and disintegration in work teams. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 794-813. (2005).
Lester, S. W., Meglino, B. M., & Korsgaard, M. A. The antecedents and consequences of group potency: A longitudinal investigation of newly formed work groups. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 352–368. (2002).
Mohammed, S. & Angell, L. Surface- and deep-level diversity in workgroups: examining the moderating effects of team orientation and team process on relationship conflict. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 25, 1015-1039. (2004).
Montgomery, D. C., Peck, E. A., & Vining, G. G. Introduction to Linear Regression Analysis 4th ed. John Wiley and Sons Inc., New Jersey. (2006).
Molleman, E. Diversity in demographic characteristics, abilities and personality traits: Do faultlines affect team functioning? Group Decision and Negotiation, 14, 173-193. (2005).
Molleman, E. & Slomp, J. The Impact of Team and Work Characteristics on Team Functioning. Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, 16, 1–15. (2006).
Pavkov, T. W., & Pierce, K. A. Ready, Set, Go! A student guide to SPSS 13.0 and 14.0 for Windows. 2ed. McGraw-Hill Inc., Boston. (2006).
Reuera, J. J. & Tong, T. W. Corporate investments and growth options. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28, 863-877. (2007).
Richard, O. C., Murthi, B. P., & Ismail K. The impact of racial diversity on intermediate and long-term performance: The moderating role of environmental context. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 1213-1233. (2007).
Robert, M. H. A capital structure model. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 4, 8-24. (2007).
Schulzea, W. S., Lubatkinb, M. H. & Dino, R. N. Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 3, 247-259. (2002).
Sheu, H. J. & Yang, C. Y. Insider Ownership and Firm Performance in Taiwan’s Electronics Industry: A Technical Efficiency Perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 26, 307-318. (2005).
Simely, R. L. & Li, M. F. Environmental dynamism, capital structure and performance: A theoretical integration and an empirical test. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 31-49. (2000).
Simsek Z. CEO Tenure and Organizational Performance: An intervening Model. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 653-662. (2007).
Simsek, Z., Veiga, J. F., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. Modeling the multilevel determinants of top management team behavioral integration. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 69-84. (2005).
Stewart, G. L. A meta-analytic review of the relationships between team design features and team performance. Journal of Management, 32, 29-54. (2006).
Thatcher, S. M., Jehn, K. A., & Zanutto, E. Cracks in diversity research: The effects of faultlines on conflict and performance. Group Decision and Negotiation, 12, 217-241. (2003).
Tse, C. B. & Jia, J. Y. The impacts of corporate ownership structure on the incentive of using capital structure to signal. Studies in Economics and Finance, 24, 156-181. (2007).
Wagner W. E. Using SPSS for social statistics and research methods. Pine Forge Press, California. (2006).
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 35, 91-121. (1992).
Williams, T. A., Sweeney, D. J., & Anderson, D. R. Essentials of contemporary business statistics. Thomson South-Western, Ohio. (2007).
Wright, P., Kroll, M., & Elenkov, D. Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation: the moderating role of monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 599-608. (2002).
Wu, S., Levitas, E., & Priem, R. L. CEO tenure and company invention under differing levels of technological dynamism. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 859-873. (2005).
Zeitun, R., & Tian, G.. G. Does ownership affect a firm’s performance and default risk in Jordan? Corporate governance, 7, 66-82. (2007).
論文全文使用權限
  • 同意授權校內瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2018-06-24起公開。
  • 同意授權校外瀏覽/列印電子全文服務,於2018-06-24起公開。


  • 如您有疑問,請聯絡圖書館
    聯絡電話:(06)2757575#65773
    聯絡E-mail:etds@email.ncku.edu.tw