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系統識別號 U0026-0812200914005546
論文名稱(中文) 董監事結構特性與公司盈餘管理行為之關聯性研究
論文名稱(英文) An Empirical Study of the Association Between Earnings Management and the Characters of Board and Supervisor
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生(中文) 高睿鴻
研究生(英文) Jul-hung Kao
電子信箱 r1694127@mail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r1694127
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 107頁
口試委員 口試委員-顏盟峯
口試委員-黎明淵
指導教授-林軒竹
中文關鍵字 公司治理  董事會  監察人  裁決性應計項目  盈餘管理 
英文關鍵字 earnings management  discretionary accruals  corporate governance  supervisor  board of directors 
學科別分類
中文摘要 由於國際間近年來重大的公司財務報導不實與財務舞弊案件頻傳,造成投資人對公司財務報表的可靠性產生嚴重質疑,為了重拾市場對企業財務報表可信度之信心,各界皆致力於公司治理機制的改善與落實,而公司治理與盈餘管理之相關議題也成了近幾年來最熱門的話題。
本研究旨在探討公司治理機制中之董監事會結構特性與盈餘管理間之關聯性,以1998~2006 年間發生財務危機的113 家上市公司及其對應之113 家財務正常公司共計226 家公司為樣本,檢視六項董監事會特性如何影響其監督功能的發揮,以抑制公司盈餘管理的程度。此外,本研究更進一步探討其中的三項特性(即董事會規模、監察人規模及獨立董監事席次比例)與盈餘管理間之關聯性是否會受到公司財務結構健全與否的影響。
本研究實證結果顯示:
1. 財務危機公司在危機發生前的三個年度中每年的盈餘管理程度都顯著高於財務正常公司的盈餘管理程度;此外,財務危機公司在危機發生前第一年的盈餘管理程度顯著大於危機發生前第二年的盈餘管理程度。
2. 就全體樣本而言,董事會規模、董監事持股質押比例、董事長是否兼任總經理此三項董監事特性與公司盈餘管理程度呈顯著之負相關;監察人規模、董監事持股比例此二項董監事特性與公司盈餘管理程度呈顯著之正相關;而獨立董監事席次比例與公司盈餘管理程度呈現負相關,但未達顯著水準。
3. 董事會規模與管理當局盈餘管理程度之關聯性在財務危機公司中比在財務正常公司中來的顯著。
英文摘要 A number of accounting scandals and financial distresses emerged in several Taiwanese public firms in recent years. This fact shows the importance of building corporate governance mechanisms. Generally speaking, the board of directors and the supervisors always play extremely important roles in corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between earnings management and the characteristics of the directors and the supervisors. Moreover, I attempt to examine whether these relationships are different between the firms with financial distress problems and those without financial distress problems.
In this paper, I select 113 Taiwanese public firms which experienced serious financial distress during the period of 1998 to 2006. For comparing purposes, I choose another similar-sized 113 Taiwanese public firms without financial stress problems in the same industry as matching samples.
According to the empirical results, this study draws the following conclusions:
(1) The degree of earnings management in the distressed firms is significant larger than that in the normal firms. Besides, for the sample of distressed firms, the degree of earnings management in the first year before the occurrence of financial distress is significantly larger than that in the second year before occurrence of financial distress.
(2) For the whole sample, earnings management is positively impacted by the size of board, the ratio of pledged shares by the board and supervisors, and CEO duality. Besides, it is negatively impacted by the numbers of supervisors and the ratio of the shares owned by the board and supervisors.
(3) The relationship between the earnings management and the size of board in the distressed firms is stronger than that in the normal firms.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論.............................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的.................................1
第二節 研究貢獻.......................................4
第三節 研究架構.......................................5
第貳章 文獻探討.........................................7
第一節 代理理論與公司治理.............................7
第二節 董監事機制....................................15
第三節 盈餘管理......................................20
第四節 董監事特性與盈餘管理..........................37
第參章 研究設計與方法..................................42
第一節 研究假說......................................42
第二節 實證模式及變數衡量............................52
第三節 樣本篩選及資料來源............................60
第肆章 實證結果與分析..................................64
第一節 敘述性統計分析................................64
第二節 實證結果分析..................................69
第伍章 結論與建議......................................79
第一節 研究結果......................................79
第二節 研究限制......................................84
參考文獻...............................................85
附錄一.................................................96
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