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系統識別號 U0026-0812200913503950
論文名稱(中文) 公司治理機制對分析師預測之影響:以台灣上市公司為例
論文名稱(英文) The Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Analysts' Forecast:Empirical Evidence on Taiwanese Listed Firms
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系專班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration (on the job class)
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生(中文) 王景嫻
研究生(英文) Ching-hsien Wang
學號 r4794125
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 62頁
口試委員 口試委員-林靖中
口試委員-康信鴻
口試委員-張紹基
指導教授-江明憲
中文關鍵字 公司治理  分析師預測  家族企業 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  analysts' forecast  family-controlled firms 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究以民國91年至95年的台灣上市公司為研究對象,共計有1,225個觀察值。分類為家族企業與非家族企業、電子產業與非電子產業,自其公司治理內部的股權結構、董事會組成與財務透明度等機制,探討對外部分析師預測誤差的影響,利用迴歸模式進行實證分析。
由實證結果知:(一)台灣上市公司之公司治理機制內部因素中之董監事持股質押比率及股票報酬變異性與分析師預測誤差呈顯著正相關,董事長兼任總經理、經營績效、現金股利之發放、公司規模及分析師跟隨人數與分析師預測誤差在截距項呈顯著負差距或呈顯著負相關。(二)家族企業之公司治理機制內部因素中之董監事持股質押比率及股票報酬變異性與分析師預測誤差呈顯著正相關,董事長兼任總經理、現金股利之發放、公司規模及分析師跟隨人數與分析師預測誤差在截距項呈顯著負差距或呈顯著負相關。(三)非家族企業之公司治理機制內部因素中之公司規模與分析師預測誤差呈顯著負相關。(四)電子產業之公司治理機制內部因素中之董監事持股質押比率、董事會規模及股票報酬變異性與分析師預測誤差呈顯著正相關,現金股利之發放、公司規模及分析師跟隨人數與分析師預測誤差呈顯著負相關。(五)非電子產業之公司治理機制內部因素中之股票報酬變異性與分析師預測誤差呈顯著正相關,董事長兼任總經理、現金股利之發放、公司規模及分析師跟隨人數與分析師預測誤差在截距項呈顯著負差距或呈顯著負相關。
英文摘要 The math objective of this study is to provide a empirical study of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and analysts' forecast. The sample includes firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2006 and contains 1,225 observations. Using regression analysis, the results of this study are listed as follows:
1. As to the whole firms, the pledge ratio of the directors and supervisor and standard deviation of daily stock return over five years before the current fiscal year have the significant positive relationship with analysts' forecast, but duality of chairman and CEO, corporation performance, cash dividends, firm size, and the number of the analysts' forecast are significant negative impact on analysts' forecast.
2. As to the family-controlled firms, the pledge ratio of the directors and supervisor and standard deviation of daily stock return over five years before the current fiscal year have the significant positive relationship with analysts' forecast, but duality of chairman and CEO, cash dividends, firm size, and the number of the analysts' forecast are significant negative impact on analysts' forecast.
3. As to the non family-controlled firms, there is a significant negative relationship between firm size and analysts' forecast.
4. As to the electronics industry firms, the pledge ratio of the directors and supervisor, board size, and standard deviation of daily stock return over five years before the current fiscal year have the significant positive relationship with analysts' forecast, but cash dividends, firm size, and the number of the analysts' forecast are significant negative relationship with analysts' forecast.
5. As to the non-electronics industry firms, there is a significant negative relationship between standard deviation of daily stock return over five years before the current fiscal year and analysts' forecast, but duality of chairman and CEO, cash dividends, firm size, and the number of the analysts' forecast are significant negative impact on analysts' forecast.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第貳章 相關文獻探討
第一節 公司治理機制 6
第二節 分析師盈餘預測 13
第叁章 研究方法
第一節 研究架構 16
第二節 研究假說之建立 17
第三節 變項及其操作性定義與衡量 22
第四節 資料收集 30
第五節 分析方法 31
第肆章 資料分析
第一節 基本敘述統計分析 34
第二節 差異性分析 36
第三節 相關分析 40
第四節 迴歸分析 42
第伍章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論 48
第二節 研究限制 50
第三節 研究建議 50
參考文獻 53
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