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系統識別號 U0026-0812200913465385
論文名稱(中文) 公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則之修訂對委託書徵求之影響
論文名稱(英文) The impacts of the amendments of the "proxy rule" on the proxy solicitation
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生(中文) 徐綱廷
研究生(英文) Kang-ting Hsu
電子信箱 r1693125@ncku.edu.tw
學號 R1693125
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 108頁
口試委員 口試委員-劉啟群
指導教授-吳清在
口試委員-蔡彥卿
中文關鍵字 委託書爭奪  公司治理  委託書徵求  反對派  董事會特性  經營績效  公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則 
英文關鍵字 Proxy Contest  proxy solicitation  Dissidents  regulations governing the use of proxies for att  Corporate Governance  Operating Performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 委託書徵求制度在公司治理之外部監理中,扮演相當重要的角色。如何有效提升其功能,實為當務之急。委託書徵求之程序及要件影響其功能,而其徵求程序及要件複受法律規範,故法規內容與委託書徵求實有密不可分之關係。然中外文獻多集中於委託書徵求事件之成因,對於股東財富、公司經營績效之影響,甚少探討法律規範與委託書徵求之關聯。為釐清法規內容與委託書使用之關聯,本文觀察《公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則》(我國委託書使用之主要規範,以下簡稱「本法」)之修訂與委託書使用變動之情形,以探究法規內容與委託書徵求、公司治理及經營績效之關聯,進而檢驗立法當局關於本法內容之修訂之方向是否合理,修訂實施後其目的是否達成,以確立本法修訂之適切性,俾提供往修正之參考。

本研究以2003年1月1日至2006年12月31日為研究期間,於研究期間內發生委託書徵求事件之上市上櫃之公司為研究樣本,首先檢驗反對派佔董事會比例與董事會特性、經營績效間之關聯,以確立反對派在委託書徵求事件中所造成之影響;複檢驗本法修訂與反對派投入委託書徵求、反對派佔董事會席次比例之關聯,觀察本法修訂對委託書使用之影響;並綜合上述檢驗結果,確立本法修訂之適切性。

本文透過相關分析、回歸分析、羅吉斯分析及獨立樣本t檢定,對假說進行驗證,並得出以下結論:
1. 反對派比例越高,公司董事會特性越優良,顯見董事由反對派擔任較原任董事得以促進公司治理。
2. 反對派得促進公司治理及經營績效,發生委託書爭奪之公司確得藉反對派進入其董事會改善其公司治理及經營績效。
3. 法規修正後,反對派藉委託書徵求進入標的公司之比例上升,亦即,法規修正確可使更多的反對派進入公司董事會中、撤換不適任之現任董事。
綜合上述三點,可得出以下結論:
1. 本法藉對關於委託書徵求人得代理股權數、徵求人資格及發生委託書徵求公司資訊揭露義務之修訂,使更多的反對派進入公司董事會中、撤換不適任之現任董事,以改善其公司治理及經營績效,故本法在修訂後的確改善公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書之情形。
2. 本法在修訂後,確實提升委託書公司治理外部監理之效能。
英文摘要 The proxy solicitation plays an important role in the corporate governance. Therefore, finding the way to improve its efficiency is a great task. Many studies focus on the origins and the effects of the proxy solicitation, however, rare is for the regulations. In order to detect the relationship between the regulations and the proxy solicitation in Taiwan, we study the impacts of the amendments of Taiwan’s “ Regulations Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies”(the proxy rule) on proxy solicitation, board characteristics and operating performance. We intend to examine whether the amendments made by the legislature is in right direction, and to determine whether the purpose of the amendments has been achieved. The results of this study can provide empirical evidence for legistators in later amendment for the proxy rule.

Based on the companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange in the period starting from January 2003 to December 2006, we get the following empirical results:
1. The board characters could be improved when there are at least one dissident in the board.
2. The dissidents can improve the corporate governance and the operating performance.
3. The amendments of the “proxy rule” can induct more dissidents into the boards to replace the current poor-performed directors.
論文目次 第一章 序論............................................1
第一節 研究動機........................................1
第二節 研究目的........................................2
第三節 論文架構........................................3
第二章 文獻探討........................................5
第一節 公司治理........................................5
第二節 委託書徵求事件與公司經營績效...................10
第三節 法規修正對反對派取得公司經營權的影響...........11
第四節 董事會之特性對公司治理及公司經營績效之影響.....14
第五節 反對派取得董事席次對經營權變動之影.............17
第三章 委託書及其規範、問題...........................18
第一節 委託書之意義、規範及其種.......................18
第二節 委託書之功能發揮之要...........................20
第三節 期間選取說明...................................23
第四節 法律規範對委託書徵求之影響及其因應之...........25
第五節 委託書使用規則修正沿...........................29
第四章 研究方法.......................................33
第一節 研究假.........................................33
第二節 實證模型與分析方...............................39
第三節 變數定.........................................43
第四節 樣本選取與資料來...............................50
第五章 實證結果分析...................................52
第一節 樣本數量分.....................................52
第二節 研究變數間的相關性分...........................55
第三節 反對派佔董事席次比例與公司治理關連之分.........61
第四節 反對派、公司治理與經營績效關聯之分.............78
第五節 法規修正對反對派投入委託書徵求及公司經營權之影.88
第六節 本次法規修正對委託書公司治理外部監理功能之影響.91
第六章 結論與建議.....................................94
第一節 研究結.........................................94
第二節 研究限.........................................98
第三節 建議...........................................99
參考文獻.............................................101
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