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系統識別號 U0026-0812200913385755
論文名稱(中文) 探討公司多角化與公司治理的關係-代理成本觀點
論文名稱(英文) Corporate Governance and Diversification: The Agency Theory
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際企業研究所碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Institute of International Business
學年度 95
學期 2
出版年 96
研究生(中文) 姬亭竹
研究生(英文) Ting-chu Chi
學號 r6694106
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 36頁
口試委員 口試委員-康信鴻
口試委員-張紹基
指導教授-莊雙喜
中文關鍵字 公司治理  多角化程度  代理理論 
英文關鍵字 corporate diversification  corporate governance  agency theory 
學科別分類
中文摘要 多角化在公司策略中扮演著越來越重要的角色。本研究之目的在於探討公司多角化對績效及與公司治理間之關連,以美國S&P所載的公司為研究樣本,蒐集2001年至2005年之次級資料進行研究。
研究結果除證實公司多角化對績效具有負面顯著影響外,進一步探討何種型態公司治理結構會增加公司多角化策略的進行,研究發現管理者的持股比率及外部董事比例若減少,多角化的程度有顯著增加的現象,呈現負向的顯著關係;此外,本文也發現總經理與董事長的雙元制度對公司多角化的決策並無顯著影響。最後,我們探討多角化程度對經理人薪酬的影響,發現多角化策略後,由於經理人自身能力提升及其自利行為將導致薪酬的增加,多角化策略與經理人薪酬呈現正向的顯著關係。
英文摘要 Diversification is becoming a trend these days. Investigating the relationship between diversification and firm’s performance over 2001-2005, this paper indicates that diversification impairs firm value. We would like to know why management pursues this value reduction strategy, especially focusing on the agency cost theory. From the empirical evidence, we find the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the proportion of outside directors. Besides, there exists no relationship between CEO duality and the magnitude of corporate diversification. Holding double positions of board of directors and CEO has no significant influence on firm’s diversification strategy. In conclusion, these findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining diversification. Finally, the study reveals that CEO’s compensation will increase as the level of diversification increases because of CEO entrenchment and ability matching.
論文目次 Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 4
2.1 Diversification and firm value 4
2.2 Diversification and corporate governance 6
2.3 Diversification and compensation 9
Chapter 3. Sample and Descriptive Statistic 11
3.1 Independent and Dependent Variable 11
3.2 Control Variables 13
3.3 Analysis 14
3.4 Sample collection 16
3.5 Statistic of Variable 16
Chapter 4. Empirical Results 19
4.1 Diversification and firm value 19
4.2 Diversification and corporate governance 22
4.3 Diversification and compensation 27
Chapter 5. Conclusion 30
References 33
List of Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 18
Table 2 Regression result of diversification on ROA of Firm 20
Table 3 Regression result of diversification on ROE of Firm 21
Table 4 Regression result of corporate governance on 1-HHI 23
Table 5 Regression result of corporate governance on E 24
Table 6 Regression result of corporate governance on DD 25
Table 7 Regression result of diversification on CEO compensation 28
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