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系統識別號 U0026-0812200912045085
論文名稱(中文) 投資大陸與投資人保護 -以美國國際型基金為實證
論文名稱(英文) Investment in China and Investor Protection: The evidence of US International Fund
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生(中文) 徐崇智
研究生(英文) Chung-Chih Hsu
電子信箱 s489790519@yahoo.com.tw
學號 R8693119
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 55頁
口試委員 口試委員-王澤世
口試委員-邱正仁
口試委員-陳俊男
指導教授-陳嬿如
中文關鍵字 投資人保護  公司治理  共同基金偏好 
英文關鍵字 Corporate Governance  Mutual Fund Preference  Investor Protection 
學科別分類
中文摘要   本篇研究的目的在於探討美國國際型共同基金經理人在積極想從大中華地區投資獲利時,會如何進行資產分配並探討公司治理是否會影響基金經理人的選股。本研究定義大中華地區為兩岸三地大陸、香港及台灣。調查後發現美國基金經理人主要偏好是美國本土的股票而且他們並不會直接投資在大中華地區的股票市場。完善的投資人保護與家鄉偏誤可用來解釋這個現象 

  由於缺乏對大中華地區股票市場直接投資,主要研究重心放在美國本土股票並將其區分為美國亞洲概念股與美國非亞洲概念股來探討基金經理人是否有傾向藉由投資美國亞洲概念股來間接式投資大中華地區。平均機構人持股(AIH)與總合機構人持股(AIO)是用來代表共同基金持股的代理變數。

  平均機構人持股(AIH)結果顯示基金經理人偏好美國亞洲概念股並且偏好有高效率董事會、較少獨立董事及較低內部人持股的公司。此外,在總合機構人持股(AIO)與平均機構人持股(AIH)結果皆顯示基金經理人偏好公司具有良好的財務績效、較低的財務槓桿、較大的公司規模及較高額風險性投資活動。就股利政策而言,基金經理人更偏好高殖利率的公司。然而,總合機構人持股(AIO)結果顯示公司治理並沒有顯著的解釋能力



英文摘要   The aim of this study is to survey how US international mutual fund managers allocate their assets when they strive to profit from investing in Great China Economic Entity (GCEE) and investigate whether corporate governance influences the managers’ selection of stocks. We define GCEE regions as China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The survey shows that their major preference is US local stocks and they are unwilling to invest directly in GCEE stock market. Better investor protection and home bias can explain this phenomenon.  

  As the result of the rarity of investment in GCEE stock market, we concentrate on US domestic stocks and classify them as US Asia-concept stocks and other US non-Asia -concept stocks to examine whether mutual fund managers will tend to indirectly invest in GCEE by means of US Asia-concept stocks. Average Institutional Holdings (AIH) and Aggregated Institutional Ownership (AIO) are used to proxy mutual fund holdings. 

  The AIH evidence shows US Asia-concept stocks are the managers’ preference and they overweigh firms with higher efficient board, less independent directors and less insider ownership. Furthermore, better performance, lower leverage, larger size of firm and higher risky investment are positively related to AIH and AIO. In terms of dividend policy, high dividend yield stocks are their liking. However, the AIO results manifest corporate governance has no significantly explanatory power.



論文目次 Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 Objectives 3
1.3 Major findings 4
1.4 Contributions 5

Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Mutual Fund Managers’ Preference 6
2.2 Home Bias 8
2.3 Corporate governance, Investor Protection and Mutual Fund Managers’
Preference…………………………………………………………………………….10
2.4 The development of Hypotheses 13

Chapter 3 Data and Sample Selection 16
3.1 Data and Sample Description 16
3.2 Investment Method Introduction 17
3.3 Survey Results 21

Chapter 4 Empirical Model and Methodology 23
4.1 Methodology 23
4.2 Model 24
4.2 Variable Definition 26
4.2.1 Definition of Dependent Variables 26
4.2.2 Definition of Governance Variables 27
4.2.3 Definition of Control Variables 29
4.4 Statistics Description 31

Chapter 5 Empirical Results 33
5.1 The Tobit Regression of Average Institutional Holdings (AIH) 33
5.2 The Tobit Regression of Aggregated Institutional Ownership (AIO) 35
5.3 The Tobit Regression of Average Institutional Holdings (AIH) and Aggregated Institutional Ownership (AIO) with interactive variables 36

Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions 39
Footnote 41

Reference…………………………………………………………………………………..42
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