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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911522407
論文名稱(中文) 控制股東股權結構與現金增資長期績效關聯性之研究
論文名稱(英文) Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure and Long-run Underperformance of SEOs
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生(中文) 陳明宏
研究生(英文) Ming-Hung Chen
學號 r1693105
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 58頁
口試委員 口試委員-黎明淵
指導教授-邱正仁
口試委員-陳嬿如
口試委員-簡金成
中文關鍵字 控制股東  現金增資  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 SEO  Corporate Governance  Controlling shareholder 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文旨在探討增資新股長期績效與最終控制股東股權結構間的關係,特別是著眼於現金流量權與控制權偏離造成的影響。根據1996-2002年間辦理現金增資的公司樣本,實證發現現金增資公司的三年長期績效顯著劣於配對公司組合報酬。值得注意的是,若將樣本區隔為高科技產業公司與非高科技業公司後,可發現增資新股長期績效衰退的現象僅出現在非高科技產業公司,反觀高科技業的增資公司則未有此現象。接著,本研究證實大多數的國內上市公司存在控制股東(家族),其往往透過金字塔結構與交叉持股的方式,只需持有少量的持股即可擁有相對較高的控制權力。本研究預期此現金流量權與控制權的偏離,提供了控制股東侵害少數股東財富的誘因與機會,進而擴大了代理成本。本文據此聯結公司最終股權結構與增資後的長期績效表現,研究結果顯示當所有權與控制權偏離程度愈大,將導致現金增資後的長期績效較差,符合代理成本假說的論點。此外,實證證據也指出控制股東擁有的現金流量權愈高,以及公司存在次大股東將有助於提高公司在增資後長期股價表現。就本研究所知,學術界截至目前仍欠缺此議題的實證證據。


英文摘要 This study investigates the relationship between post-SEO long run performance and the ultimate corporate ownership structure, particularly the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. Based on a sample of 265 Taiwan SEO firms over the period 1996-2002, we find that SEO issuers underperform common benchmarks for up to three years from the offering date. Further, our results indicate that the bad long-run performance of SEOs is mainly driven by traditional industry corporations, and high-tech SEO firms even exhibit positive abnormal performance. Then, we show that a large proportion of sample companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of cash flow rights. We expect that this separation of ownership from control rights may exacerbate agency costs as it provides incentives and opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders of firms. When associating ultimate ownership structure with SEO performance, our evidences support the agency conflict argument that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights is negatively related to issuers’ long run performance. At last, the results suggest that not only the controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights but the existences of second largest shareholder have a positive improvement on SEO issuers’ long run performance. To our knowledge this result has not been previously documented.


論文目次 目 錄
摘 要I
目 錄IV
表 目 錄V
圖 目 錄VI
第壹章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景 1
第二節、研究動機與目的 3
第三節、論文研究架構 4
第貳章、台灣籌資市場分析與文獻探討 6
第一節、台灣上市公司的股權融資偏好 6
第二節、控制股東股權結構對公司融資決策的影響 7
第三節、控制股東與外部股東的代理衝突 8
第四節、現金增資長期績效衰退之實證研究 10
第参章、研究設計 12
第一節、研究假說 12
第二節、樣本選取與資料來源 14
第三節、控制權與現金流量權定義 17
第四節、變數衡量 20
第肆章、實證結果分析 26
第一節、增資新股之長期股價報酬 26
第二節、控制股東之控制結構分析 30
第三節、最終股權結構與現金增資公司長期股價績效之關連 36
第伍章、結論與建議 48
參考文獻 51



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