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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911514937
論文名稱(中文) 以經濟附加價值及市場附加價值決定企業高階經理人薪酬和員工薪酬之實證研究
論文名稱(英文) Economic Value Added and Market Value Added as Determinants of Executive Compensation and Reward
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 94
學期 2
出版年 95
研究生(中文) 邱健偉
研究生(英文) Chien-Wei Chiu
學號 r1693114
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 104頁
口試委員 指導教授-王萬成
口試委員-陳耀宗
口試委員-陳俊男
中文關鍵字 績效  員工薪酬  高階經理人薪酬  市場附加價值變動數  經濟附加價值 
英文關鍵字 Economic value added  Market value added  Performance evaluation  Compensatione  reward 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究主要是針對台灣上市公司所有產業高階經理人和員工薪資及紅利與績效之間的實證研究,本研究所採用的自變數-績效衡量指標包含經濟附加價值(EVA)、市場附加價值變動數(△MVA)、總資產報酬率(ROA)及股東權益報酬率(ROE),而本研究採用的應變數-董監酬勞、高階經理人薪資、員工薪資及員工紅利,相較於傳統績效衡量指標應變總資產報酬率(ROA)及股東權益報酬率(ROE)新型績效衡量指標經濟附加價值(EVA)和市場附加價值(MVA)被認為是解釋高階經理人薪酬和員工薪酬較佳的績效指標,而本研究也考慮企業國際化的因素,隨著全球化的風潮,國內企業國際化的程度越來越高,高階經理人所面臨的經營環境越來越複雜,所承擔的企業經營風險也越來越高,而本研究主要也是探討經濟附加價值(EVA)和市場附加價值(MVA)是否能有效的衡量國際化企業之高階經理人之績效表現,而不同產業別高階經理人所面臨的經營環境也不全然相同,本研究也探討有關上市公司高科技和非高科技產業高階經理人薪資薪報酬及員工薪酬和績效指標的關聯性,因為高科技產業具有高風險和不確定性,所以當以經濟附加價值(EVA)做為績效衡量指標來決定高階經理人薪酬是否因不同產業而產生不同結果。
研究結果顯示:當企業經營績效越好,則高階經理人的薪酬及員工薪酬越高,而企業國際化的程度越高,高階經理人的薪酬和員工薪酬也會越高,而控制ROA後,經濟附加價值(EVA)仍然是決定高階經理人薪酬之較佳指標也是較重要的解釋變數,而實證結果也顯示高階經理人的薪資和當期的和次期的市場附加價值變動數(△MVA)成正向且顯著,代表其薪資酬勞合約的設計可能是根據高階經理人過去及當期績效表現所給予的獎勵,並包含激勵之誘因在內,希望可激勵高階經理人能於未來有更好的表現,當考慮高科技和非高科技產業時,結果證實高科技產業相較於非高科技產業其績效指標的關聯性應相對較低。



英文摘要 The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between managerial payment and firm performance in domestic and global firms using EVA, MVA, ROA and ROE to assess wealth creation. The data are obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal. The sample of the study includes all firms listed in Taiwan. The study suggests that managers pay attention to firms that are not only incentive to increase ROA and ROE, but also rewarded for past additions to EVA and MVA. Managerial payment is related to highly globalized firms, and EVA is an important determinant of the compensation for global firms. The company belongs to the high-technological industry, and the relative sensitivity of accounting measure to managerial payment would be decreasing. As a result, while contracting the managers pay, the board of the firm needs to consider those significant factors, so as to improve the efficiencies of the governance roles of firm performance measures in managerial payment.


論文目次 目錄
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………01
第一節 研究動機目的………………………………………………………………01
第二節 研究貢獻……………………………………………………………………04
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………………………………05
第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………………06
第一節 我國高階經理人薪酬分紅制度的相關法令規章…………………………06
第二節 代理問題和激勵效果理論…………………………………………………07
第三節 企業經營績效的衡量方法…………………………………………………15
第四節 經濟附加價值………………………………………………………………21
第五節 市場附加價值………………………………………………………………30
第六節 高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效之關連…………………………………33
第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………………………34
第一節 理論架構……………………………………………………………………34
第二節 研究假說……………………………………………………………………35
第三節 實證模型……………………………………………………………………38
第四節 研究變數之定義……………………………………………………………43
第五節 資料來源與樣本選取………………………………………………………54
第六節 資料分析方式………………………………………………………………56
第四章 實証結果……………………………………………………………………57
第一節 樣本資料分佈………………………………………………………………57
第二節 相關分析……………………………………………………………………59
第三節 假說檢定……………………………………………………………………61
第四節 敏感性分析…………………………………………………………………85
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………92
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………………………92
第二節 研究限制……………………………………………………………………95
第三節 對未來研究建議……………………………………………………………96
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………………97
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