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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911501038
論文名稱(中文) The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value: The Case of SARS Event in Taiwan
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value: The Case of SARS Event in Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際管理碩士在職進修專班(IMBA)
系所名稱(英) International Master of Business Administration(IMBA)
學年度 94
學期 1
出版年 95
研究生(中文) 黃婉玲
研究生(英文) Sunny-Wan-Ling Huang
電子信箱 sunny@genmont.com.tw
學號 ra792122
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 70頁
口試委員 口試委員-康信鴻
口試委員-莊雙喜
指導教授-張紹基
中文關鍵字 none 
英文關鍵字 Corporate governance  agency cost  SARS event 
學科別分類
中文摘要 none
英文摘要  Corporate governance differs in different capitalistic countries and has very impor-tant significances for a company management. It is said that corporation always aspires to maximize its value. The issue, however, is that structural conflicts inherent inside the large-scale corporations bring about many difficult corporate governance problems.
 Many foreign studies showed that corporate governance has created a great deal of attention on many empirical financial crises over the whole world, such as the bankruptcy of Enron. Corporation, WorldCom and AOL. Besides, a research with sample of 398 firms from East Asia in 1997, the firm-level difference in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance during the East Asian financial cri-sis of 1997-1998. However, there are few studies about corporate governance while the unexpected crisis happened, especially in Taiwan.
 In this paper, we examine if difference in corporate governance at the firm level can explain difference in firm performance during the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-drome) crisis. We use stock return over the crisis period as a signal for measuring firm performance in Taiwan’s listed companies. In this study, we make many variables, such as monitoring from international institution shareholder, ownership structure and so on, to control for factors that could affect firm performance.
 Significantly, better stock price performance of Taiwan’s listed companies is associ-ated with firms that had indicators that firms have outside ownership concentration, and with firms that were monitored by institutional shareholders. The results suggest that individual firms have some power to predict expropriation of minority shareholder if le-gal protection is inadequate.
論文目次 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………….I
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………… III
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………...V
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………...VII
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………..................... IX
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION…………………………………......................1
1.1 Research Background..........................................................................................1
1.2 Research Motivations...........................................................................................3
1.3 Research Objectives.............................................................................................7
1.4 Research Flow......................................................................................................7
1.4 Research Contributions........................................................................................8
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW………………………….......................9
2.1 Agency Theory.....................................................................................................9
2.1.1 Agency Cost..........................................................................................10
2.1.2 The Convergence-of-Interests Hypothesis............................................11
2.2.3 Policy for Solving Agency Problem......................................................13
2.2 Corporate Governance.......................................................................................15
2.2.1 Internal Governance.............................................................................16
2.2.2 External Governance............................................................................20
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY…………24
3.1 The Research Sample.........................................................................................24
3.1.1 Data and Period for Research..............................................................24
3.1.2 Data Sources.........................................................................................28
3.2 Variables Description.........................................................................................28
3.2.1 Monitoring of International Institutional Shareholders.......................30
3.2.2 Composition of Board...........................................................................32
3.2.3 Ownership Structure.............................................................................34
3.2.4 Control Variables..................................................................................36
3.2.5 Some Limitations...................................................................................38
3.3 Model.................................................................................................................39
CHAPTER FOUR EMPIRICAL RESULTS……………………………………….40
4.1 Descriptive Statistics..........................................................................................40
4.2 Two-Tailed T-Test Analysis................................................................................46
4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis............................................................................56
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS………………………62
5.1 Research Conclusions................................................................................. .62
5.2 Research Suggestions and Discussions………………………………………..64
REFERENCES………………………………………………………… ……………66
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