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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911500935
論文名稱(中文) The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value: The Case of Procomp Informatics Limited Event in Taiwan
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Value: The Case of Procomp Informatics Limited Event in Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 國際管理碩士在職進修專班(IMBA)
系所名稱(英) International Master of Business Administration(IMBA)
學年度 94
學期 1
出版年 95
研究生(中文) 程士禎
研究生(英文) Julian-Shih-Chen Cheng
電子信箱 julian678@yahoo.com.tw
學號 ra792107
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 49頁
口試委員 指導教授-張紹基
口試委員-康信鴻
口試委員-莊雙喜
中文關鍵字 none 
英文關鍵字 Corporate governance  Agency cost  Crisis  PIL event 
學科別分類
中文摘要 none
英文摘要  Greenspan (1999), Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in his address to the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund points out that weak corporate governance is one of the causes of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. We examine the period return of all the listed companies except for those belong to financial industry in Taiwan during the domestic crisis (PIL event) to find how corporate governance affects a firm’s value, especially in such a crisis. Besides, we also examine whether there is a difference in the effectiveness of corporate governance between Taiwan and East Asian countries. The report released by McKinsey & Com-pany (2000) points out that investors are willing to pay for the shares of well-governed companies a premium of 18% to 28%. In our study, the evidence we find also strongly supports the viewpoint that firms with good corporate governance would have higher per-formance in cumulative stock returns than those without it during a crisis. Nowadays corporate governance is getting more attention than ever. Also we deeply believe its value would highlight much more over time, especially when firms confront the impact of crisis.
論文目次 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................I
ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................II
TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................III
LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................V
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................VI
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION............................................................1
1.1 Research Background..............................................................1
1.2 Research Motivations.............................................................4
1.3 Research Objectives..............................................................7
1.4 Research Contributions...........................................................8
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW..................................................................9
2.1 Agency Cost....................................................................9
2.2 Corporate Governance..............................................................11
2.2.1 Internal Governance..............................................................12
2.2.2 External Governance..............................................................15
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY...........................18
3.1 The Research Sample..................................................................18
3.1.1 Data and Period for Research................................................................18
3.1.2 Data Sources.................................................................19
III
3.2 Variables Description.............................................................20
3.2.1 Monitoring of International Institutional Shareholders............................................................20
3.2.2 Composition of Board...................................................................21
3.2.3 Ownership Structure...............................................................23
3.2.4 Control Variables...............................................................25
3.2.5 Some Limitations.............................................................26
3.3 Model...............................................................26
CHAPTER FOUR EMPIRICAL RESULTS.................................................................29
4.1 Descriptive Statistics..............................................................29
4.2 Two-Tailed T-Test Analysis................................................................33
4.3 Simple and Multiple Regression Analysis................................................................37
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.............................................................45
5.1 Research Conclusions.............................................................45
5.2 Research Suggestions and Discussions.............................................................47
REFERENCES..............................................................50
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