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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911300148
論文名稱(中文) 台灣上市銀行公司治理結構與風險之關係研究
論文名稱(英文) The Relationship between Corporate Governance Structure and Risk of Taiwan Listed Banks
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 陳佳敏
研究生(英文) Chia-Min Chen
學號 r4692403
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 87頁
口試委員 指導教授-莊雙喜
口試委員-蔡明田
口試委員-康信鴻
中文關鍵字 銀行風險  特許價值  固定效果模式  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 franchise value  bank risk  fixed effect model  corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要   台灣從1995年起爆發一連串國內金融風暴到1997年亞洲地區的金融危機,所帶來的其中一個教訓即是公司治理結構的不健全可能導致整個金融體系的崩潰,因此,除了金融風險管理之外,金融機構的公司治理也應受到重視。本文擬探討銀行風險承擔之影響因素,透過銀行之財務及特許價值了解對於風險之影響,此外,制定風險管理策略的董事會是否會影響銀行風險,亦是本文欲探討的課題。

  本研究以國內31家銀行作為樣本,研究期間為1995年至2005年,以市場模式下的總風險、非系統風險及系統風險作為應變數,並加進以逾放比率作為代理變數的信用風險,利用固定效果模式探討公司控制、公司財務及公司價值構面與銀行風險間的關係。實證結果如下:

1. 公司控制構面中,經理人持股比率的提高及獨立董監事的設立,會使銀行經營與股東利益相結合,進而使銀行承擔較高的風險。

2. 公司財務構面中,財務槓桿越高的銀行,其逾放比率也越高,違約風險也越高。而資產規模較大及資本適足率高的銀行,能有效降低信用風險與非系統風險。

3. 公司價值構面中,特許價值越高的銀行,其信用風險、總風險、非系統風險及系統風險越小。

4. 台灣銀行業經理人持股比率與銀行風險承擔間並不具有非線性關係。而在高特許價值下,經理人持股越高,越會去保護銀行商譽,故會使得銀行風險越小。
英文摘要   The series of financial crises happened in Taiwan and Asia received the attention not only risk management but corporate governance. The main purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of governance structure, bank finance and value on banks’ risk.

  The sample of this study consists of thirty-one listed banks in Taiwan from 1995 to 2005. The measures of risk include credit risk, total risk, non-system risk and system risk to investigate the relationship with corporate governance, corporate finance and corporate value perspectives. The results are as follows:

1. Managers’ share holdings and independent directors and supervisors have significant positive relationship with banks’ risks.

2. Financial leverage and bank risk have significant negative relationship; however, banks with bigger sizes and higher capital adequacy can significantly lower down the credit risk and non-system risk.

3. Franchise value is significantly negatively related to banks’ risks.

4. Managers’ share holdings and banks’ risk do not have non-linear relationship, but high managers’ share holdings with high franchise value can significantly lower down banks’ risk.
論文目次 摘要 I
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究範圍與限制 5
第四節 研究流程 6
第五節 論文結構 8
第貳章 文獻探討 9
第一節 公司治理 9
第二節 風險 21
第三節 公司治理結構與銀行風險 31
第四節 文獻綜合評論 40
第參章 研究設計與方法 42
第一節 研究架構 42
第二節 研究方法 43
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 50
第四節 研究變數之操作性定義 52
第五節 模型設立說明與變數定義 53
第六節 研究假設 57
第肆章 實證分析 64
第一節 敘述性統計 65
第二節 適當模型選取分析 66
第三節 迴歸實證結果分析 68
第四節 整體實證結果評析 74
第伍章 結論與建議 78
第一節 結論 78
第二節 研究建議 80
參考文獻 82
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