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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911295637
論文名稱(中文) 家族控制對公司治理與公司政策之間關係的影響
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Family Control on the Relation between Corporate Governance and Corporate Policies
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 何珍瑩
研究生(英文) Chen-Yin Ho
學號 r8692104
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 74頁
口試委員 口試委員-邱正仁
口試委員-張永和
指導教授-陳嬿如
中文關鍵字 薪酬政策  投資政策  融資政策  家族控制  公司治理  股利政策 
英文關鍵字 Family Control  Corporate Governance  Compensation Policy  Debt Policy  Investment Policy  Dividend Policy 
學科別分類
中文摘要   過去有關公司治理的文獻假設公司的所有權分散,因而導致股東和經理人之間的代理問題。然而台灣公司的所有權結構較過去學者所發現的更為集中,其中家族控制占台灣公司大多數。家族控制公司擁有集中度高的控制權,家族成員同時也身兼管理要職,因而產生控制股東和外部小股東之間的代理問題。由於在台灣,家族控制是不能忽視的重要議題,因此我們進一步探討家族控制如何影響公司治理和公司政策之間的關係。結果發現公司治理在不同控制型態的公司確實對政策方向有不同的影響。這可能和公司控制型態以及其衍生出來不同的公司治理問題有關。另一方面,如果家族控制公司能透過公司治理的改革,任用獨立董監,提高董事會的獨立性,以解決存在於家族控制公司中董事會為家族內部人所控制所產生的剝削外部小股東的代理問題,則可能進一步增加公司價值。

英文摘要   Prior studies about corporate governance assume firms have dispersed ownership and separation of ownership and control results in agency conflict between managers and shareholders. However, firms in Taiwan have more concentrate ownership structure than documented, and a large proportion of Taiwanese firms are family controlled. The controlling family is not only a blockholder but also take managerial positions. The agency conflicts between the controlling family and outside minority shareholders thus aroused. Since family control is an important character in Taiwanese firms, we are interested in the impact of family control on the relation between corporate governance and corporate policies such as dividend, debt, investment, and compensation policy. Our results suggest that governance variables have different influence on corporate policies in family and non-family controlled firms. This might result from different ownership structures and different types of agency conflicts in family and non-family controlled firms. We find family controlled firms perform worse than non-family controlled firms. However, family control firms can improve firm value by employing more independent directors to improve board independency.

論文目次 Table of Contents iv

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Objectives of Research and Major Findings 3
1.3 Importance of This Research 5
1.4 Structure of This Study 5

Chapter 2 Literatures Review 7
2.1 Concentration of Ownership 7
2.2 Family Control and Corporate Governance 7
2.3 Family Control and Board of Directors 10
2.4 Family Control and Corporate Policies 11
2.4.1 Dividend policy 11
2.4.2 Financing Policy 12
2.4.3 Investment Policy 12
2.4.4 Compensation Policy 13
2.5 Endogenous Relation Driven from Corporate Dividend, Debt, Compensation, and Investment Policy 13

Chapter 3 Development of Hypotheses 15
3.1 Family Control and Corporate Policies 15
3.1.1 Dividend Policy 15
3.1.2 Financing Policy 16
3.1.3 Investment Policy: 16
3.1.4 Compensation Policy: 17
3.2 Endogenous relation driven from corporate dividend, debt, compensation, and investment policy 18
3.2.1 Investment & Compensation Policy 18
3.2.2 Investment and Debt Policy 19
3.2.3 Debt and Compensation Policy 19
3.2.4 Compensation and Dividend Policy 20
3.2.5 Dividend and Investment Policy 20
3.2.6 Dividend and Debt Policy 20
3.3 Governance effect on corporate policies in family and non-family controlled firms 21
3.3.1 Debt policy 21
3.3.2 Debt policy 23
3.3.3 Compensation Policy 24
3.3.4 Investment Policy 25

Chapter 4 Empirical Methodology and Data Selection 27
4.1 Methodology 27
4.1.1 Category Analysis 27
4.1.2 Hausman’s Specification Test 28
4.1.3 OLS model 28
4.1.4 2SLS: Two-stage Simultaneous Equation 29
4.2 Variable Definition 31
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 31
4.2.2 Independent Variables 33
4.2.3 Control Variables 37
4.3 Data and Sample Selection 38
4.3.1 Finding Family Controlled Firms 39
4.3.2 Measure critical control level (P*) 40
4.4 Statistics Description 40

Chapter 5 Empirical Results 42
5.1 Wilcoxon Tests Result 42
5.2 Hausman’s Specification Test 42
5.3 OLS model 43
5.4 Two-Stage and Three-Stage Simultaneous Equation 44
5.5 Comparison between Family and Non-family controlled firms (Two Stage Model) 44
5.5.1 Governance Variables 45
5.5.2 Policy Variables 46
5.5.3 Instrumental Variables 46
5.5.4 Control Variables 47
5.6 Performance Equation 48

Chapter 6 Conclusions 50
6.1 Corporate Policy and Family Control 50
6.2 The impact of Family Control to Corporate Governance and firm Performance 51

Reference 53
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