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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911285390
論文名稱(中文) 公司治理、企業改造與其後續效益之權變觀點—以我國公營事業為例
論文名稱(英文) Contingency view on the relationship among corporate governance, corporate restructuring and performance consequences—empirical evidences of Taiwan’s SOEs
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 吳瀚智
研究生(英文) Hang-Chih Wu
學號 r4692107
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 62頁
口試委員 口試委員-葉桂珍
口試委員-陳忠仁
指導教授-吳學良
口試委員-史習安
中文關鍵字 董事會  自由現金流量  企業改造  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 Board of Directors  Free Cash Flow  Corporate Restructuring  Corporate Governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要   我國自民國78年開始推動公營事業民營化,迄目前為止,已成功推動31家事業完成此任務。在此過程中,部分事業或可逕予移轉民營,然多數事業因體質欠佳,須於民營化前進行企業改造,以改善體質,增進企業價值及民營化條件。

  本研究擬在此前提下,整理以往相關文獻,以發展諸點研究假設,並進行後續實證分析。目的在於探討「公司治理-企業改造範圍-改造後續效益」的關連性,此外,本研究也將進一步探討環境不確定性、公司自由現金流量以及企業主動性的調和效果。爰此,本研究在2004年11月,針對16家公營事業與其所有董事會成員進行問卷調查,經過兩週時間之問卷填寫,與多次電話催收後,共回收80份有效問卷。研究結果顯示:

1.董事平均任期越久,或是責任感越高,則企業進行全面性改造的可能性也隨之提高。且相對於經理人經營條件,董事會監督能力對於企業改造範圍的影響程度較高。

2.當企業處於高度不確定的環境時,若經理人的經營條件越佳,則企業越傾向進行部分規模的改造。而當企業擁有豐裕的資源時,若董事會的監督能力越強,則企業越傾向進行全面性的改造。

3.由董事會主導的企業改造,較有助於提高企業績效的表現。然而,若此改造是由企業主動進行,則董事會的主導將反而有礙其改造之後續效益。

4.當企業主動進行全面性的改造時,其後續效益將可較明顯提高。




英文摘要  There have been 31 SOEs transferred to the private sector since the Taiwanese government revitalized its efforts on privatization in 1989. In the face of increasingly competitive environment, SOEs gradually lose their competitiveness and desperately need reform so as to regain the corporate health in the run up to privatization. Thus this study based on a survey on the board members of 16 SOEs and attempts to link the relationship among the board supervision, managerial conditions, types of reform chosen and performance consequences. The results of this research including:

1.The universal effect of the tenure of the board members and their sense of responsibility on the scope of the corporate restructuring is significant. Moreover, to compare with the managerial conditions, board members’ supervision has greater influence on the scope of the corporate restructuring.

2.The managerial condition is negatively associated with the scope of the corporate restructuring under the moderation of high uncertainty environments. However, the board members’ supervision is positively associated with the scope of the corporate restructuring under the moderation of internal abundant resources.

3.The corporate restructuring will benefit the performance if the restructuring is leaded by the board of directors. However, the relation will be negative if the restructuring is conducted by the company actively.

4.The restructuring will benefit the performance if the overall restructuring is conduct by the company actively.
論文目次 第一章、緒論-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
第一節、研究背景與動機------------------------------------------------------------1
第二節、研究目的----------------------------------------------------------------------3
第三節、章節安排----------------------------------------------------------------------4

第二章、文獻回顧-------------------------------------------------------------------------------5
第一節、企業改造之意義與其重要性--------------------------------------------5
第二節、公司治理、企業改造與其後續績效-----------------------------------9

第三章、研究架構與研究方法---------------------------------------------------------------17
第一節、觀念性架構-----------------------------------------------------------------17
第二節、研究樣本--------------------------------------------------------------------20
第三節、研究變數--------------------------------------------------------------------22
第四節、研究方法--------------------------------------------------------------------28

第四章、實證結果-----------------------------------------------------------------------------30
第一節、因素分析與信度分析----------------------------------------------------30
第二節、相關性測試-----------------------------------------------------------------32
第三節、公司治理與企業改造間之關係----------------------------------------34
第四節、企業改造與公司績效間之關係----------------------------------------38

第五章、結論與建議---------------------------------------------------------------------------41
第一節、研究結論與管理意涵-----------------------------------------------------41
第二節、研究貢獻---------------------------------------------------------------------48
第三節、研究限制與對後續研究之建議-----------------------------------------50

參考文獻-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------52

附錄、研究問卷---------------------------------------------------------------------------------57
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