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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911283855
論文名稱(中文) Employee’s Stock Bonus and the Cost of Equity: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan
論文名稱(英文) Employee’s Stock Bonus and the Cost of Equity: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 戴志豪
研究生(英文) Chi-Hou Dai
電子信箱 r8692110@ccmail.ncku.edu.tw
學號 r8692110
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 57頁
口試委員 指導教授-王明隆
口試委員-邱正仁
口試委員-陳嬿如
中文關鍵字 none 
英文關鍵字 Cost of equity  Employee’s stock bonus  Corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 none



英文摘要  Employee’s stock bonus is the prevalent mechanism to reward employees in Taiwan, specifically in high-tech industries. High-tech industries take advantage of employee’s stock bonuses to enhance the attraction and retention of crucial employees and provide superior incentives for employees to enhance the shareholder value. Nevertheless, broad-based use of employee’s stock bonuses can promote job-hopping within the high-tech industries and heavily dilute shareholder wealth.

 In this study we select non-financial TESC listed companies which distributed stock bonus from 1996 to 2003 to examine whether the firms which grant employee’s stock bonus can reduce the agency problem and lower firms’ cost of equity. Our empirical results indicate employee’s stock bonus have a positive effect on the cost of equity when we regard historical stock returns as a proxy for the cost of equity. However, we can not get consistent results with above when we use the estimates from the Ohlson-Juettner Model and Modified PEG Ratio Model.

Additionally, the results show that employee’s stock bonus provides more incentive effect to the firms with more agency problems when we divide our sample based on information transparency, and shareholding of institutional investor. Because Taiwanese listed companies are typical of family-controlled companies, the empirical results may result the bias when we test how the agency cost of shareholding of directors and supervisors affect the relation between employees’ stock bonus and the cost of equity.



論文目次 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION...........................1
1.1 Motivation and Background ...................1
1.2 Objective ...................................2
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW......................4
2.1 Agency Theory and Corporate Governance.......4
2.1.1 Introduction of Agency Theory ............4
2.1.2 Introduction of Corporate Governance .....4
2.2 The Mechanisms of Corporate Governance ......6
2.2.1 Incentive Pay ............................6
2.2.2 Information Transparency and Disclosure .14
2.2.3 Shareholding of Directors and Supervisors17
2.2.4 Institutional Investor Ownership ........18
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY...........................20
3.1 Sample .....................................20
3.2 Research Hypotheses.........................20
3.2.1 The Impact of Employee’s Stock Bonus on
the Cost of Equity.......................20
3.2.2 Firm Characteristics ....................23
3.3 Estimation of the Cost of Equity............25
3.3.1 Historical Stock Returns.................25
3.3.2 The Ohlson-Juettner Model................26
3.3.3 Modified PEG Ratio Model ................27
3.4 Research Design.............................27
3.5 Variable Definitions and Regression Model...28
3.5.1 Variable Definitions.....................28
3.5.2 Regression Model.........................30
CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ....................32
4.1 Descriptive Statistics .....................32
4.2 Regression Analysis.........................32
4.2.1 The Impact of Employee's Stock Bonus on
the Cost of Equity.......................33
4.2.2 Agency Cost and the Relation between
Employee' s Stock Bonus and the Cost of
Equity...................................34
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION.............38
5.1 Conclusion .................................38
5.2 Suggestion of Further Research .............39
Reference ......................................40
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