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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911280776
論文名稱(中文) 探討高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素
論文名稱(英文) The determinants of executives’ compensation
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 93
學期 2
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 王建仁
研究生(英文) Chien-Jen Wang
學號 r1692125
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 113頁
口試委員 指導教授-王萬成
口試委員-陳耀宗
口試委員-賴秀卿
中文關鍵字 高階經理人薪酬  資訊不對稱  權益代理問題  內部公司治理績效 
英文關鍵字 None 
學科別分類
中文摘要   由於企業財務危機與地雷股的一一引爆,令投資者不禁納悶的是如此發生財務困難公司的高階經理人究竟是否盡責地履行其義務?到底憑藉著那一方面的因素而使得他們坐領高薪?公司管理階層為追求更高水準的薪酬,是否會藉由窗飾財務報表以突顯完善的經營績效,而成為一種高明隱蔽的斂財方法?

  本研究利用財務報表附註揭露中的高階經理人薪酬水準來進行探討,蒐集民國八十四年至九十二年的財務性資料,取得有效樣本為49 家公司與 426 個樣本數,來自於十二個產業別。因此,分別對存在股東與管理階層之間的資訊不對稱與其所衍生的權益代理問題、企業經營績效、公司特性、CEO個人因素、公司監控機制與高階經理人薪酬水準之間的關係進行實證分析,以決定經理人是否物超所值。

  研究結果顯示:高階經理人薪酬水準會受到市場模式殘差的標準差、會計基礎的績效衡量指標、市場價值、流動比率、研發密度、兼任董事或董事長職務、董監事持股比率與董事會規模的影響。但由於資訊揭露不足與代理變數衡量方式受限,使得高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素的原貌仍有待開發。

  Milgrom and Roberts(1992)提出設計誘因契約的決定原則:資訊性原則、誘因強度原則與監督強度原則。獎酬計畫應以是否可滿足此三設計的條件,使得高階經理人能追求公司價值最大化為目標。為了健全監控高階經理人行為與績效表現的管理控制系統,除了以資訊揭露及市場的外部力量外,也可由提昇內部公司治理績效著手。公司的董事會組成以及股權結構的機能是否稱職地扮演好監督經理人的角色將是相當關鍵的部份。


英文摘要 None

論文目次 第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究動機1
第二節 研究目的5
第三節 研究架構與流程6
第二章 文獻探討8
第一節 資訊不對稱8
第二節 代理理論12
第三節 監控機制─股權結構與董事會21
第四節 獎酬契約與高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素32
第三章 研究設計48
第一節 理論架構48
第二節 研究假說49
第三節 研究樣本59
第四節 變數定義與研究模型61
第五節 研究方法67
第四章 實證結果69
第一節 敘述性統計與相關性分析69
第二節 迴歸分析78
第三節 敏感性分析88
第五章 結論92
第一節 研究發現92
第二節 研究限制96
第三節 未來研究建議與管理意涵98
參考文獻100

表目錄
表2-1 代理理論概觀13
表2-2 國內高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素的相關實證研究40
表2-3 國外高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素的相關實證研究45
表3-1 樣本公司各產業的彙總整理60
表3-2 股權分散級距分類表62
表4-1 各產業別的樣本公司之高階經理人薪酬水準70
表4-2 變數基本統計資料73
表4-3 高階經理人薪酬水準與各自變數的相關係數矩陣76 & 77
表4-4 高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素79
表4-5 會計基礎績效衡量指標之敏感性分析90 & 91
表5-1 假說驗證結果彙總表95

圖目錄
圖1-1 公司治理的結構3
圖1-2 研究流程圖7
圖2-1 世界銀行公司治理架構圖23
圖2-2 薪酬分類圖32
圖3-1 理論架構圖48
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