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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911254745
論文名稱(中文) 員工分紅配股與上市公司績效關聯性之探討 -適應性預期模型之運用
論文名稱(英文) A Study on the Relation between Employee Stock Bonus and Firm’s Performance -the Application of Adaptive Expectation Model
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 93
學期 1
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 柯鼎杰
研究生(英文) Ting-Chieh Ko
電子信箱 fanwingke@yahoo.com.tw
學號 r8691110
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 82頁
口試委員 指導教授-王明隆
口試委員-簡金成
口試委員-陳嬿如
中文關鍵字 誘因因子  公司績效  員工分紅配股  稀釋比率 
英文關鍵字 Dilution Effect  Incentive Ratio  Firms’ Performances  Employee Stock Bonus  Agency Cost 
學科別分類
中文摘要   員工分紅制度為我國企業普遍用以獎酬員工之方式,我國現行制度將員工分紅視為公司盈餘分配,導致公司盈餘虛增,財報資訊透明度不佳,影響股東權益至鉅,未來勢必將順應國際趨勢,將員工分紅以市價認列為公司費用,以保障股東之權益,並維護國內資本市場之健全發展。
  本文分別就員工分紅未費用化與費用化兩個觀點,以1994年至2002年間之台灣上市公司為樣本進行實證研究,探討實施員工分紅配股是否有利於公司績效與價值之提昇。實證結果發現,當員工分紅未認列為公司費用時,分紅配股獎勵員工之公司其績效優於以現金紅利獎酬員工之公司;當以市價認列為費用後,兩者之績效並無差異。此外,隨著分紅配股之誘因因子與稀釋比率增加,對公司後續之股價報酬率產生負面影響。



英文摘要  Employee stock bonus (ESB) has been widely used by corporations in Taiwan to reward their employees. Under the current practice, ESB is not recognized as expense which would cause overstated earnings and less-transparent accounting reports. To protect the interests of stockholders and set up a sound capital market, it is essential to follow the international tendency to recognize ESB as corporations’ expense.
 The study based on the viewpoints of expensing and non-expensing ESB. The research data collected from TEJ’s Taiwan Stock Exchange Listing Company data set spans the years 1994 to 2001. In this paper, we examine the effects of ESB on firms’ performance. The empirical results show that when ESB is recognized as expense, there is no significant difference on firms’ performance no matter they reward their employees with stock or with cash. While companies rewarding their employees with stock bonus have better performance than those with cash bonus under the condition of non-expense. Besides, incentive ratio and dilution ratio is negatively associated with subsequent stock performance.



論文目次 第壹章緒論........................................................1
第一節研究背景與動機..........................................1
第二節研究目的................................................3
第三節章節架構................................................4
第貳章相關文獻探討................................................6
第一節國內員工分紅制度........................................6
第二節國內外相關文獻之探討...................................12
第參章研究方法與設計.............................................22
第一節資料來源與樣本選取標準.................................22
第二節研究假說...............................................23
第三節績效之衡量方法.........................................28
第四節實證設計與研究方法.....................................30
第肆章實證分析...................................................40
第一節敘述統計分析...........................................40
第二節員工分紅政策對公司績效之影響...........................47
第三節激勵誘因對公司績效之影響...............................58
第伍章結論與建議.................................................72
第一節結論...................................................72
第二節政策意涵與研究方向.....................................74
參考文獻.....................................................76
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