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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911251978
論文名稱(中文) 董事會組成特性、股權結構與經營績效之研究-以台灣上市電子公司為實証
論文名稱(英文) The Corporate Board Members and Shareholders’ Structure versus Operating Performance -Empirical Study for High-tech Companies Listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 高階管理碩士在職專班(EMBA)
系所名稱(英) Executive Master of Business Administration (EMBA)
學年度 93
學期 1
出版年 94
研究生(中文) 吳國明
研究生(英文) Kuo-Ming Wu
學號 r0791120
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 83頁
口試委員 召集委員-林清河
口試委員-余光華
口試委員-姜傳益
指導教授-吳萬益
指導教授-譚伯群
中文關鍵字 公司治理  董事會組成  經營績效  股權結構 
英文關鍵字 the members of the board  Corporate governance  Shareholder structure  Operating performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要   自亞洲風暴後,台灣大型企業接二連三出現財務問題,這些財務危機事件的發生,除了肇因於公司營運體質不健全外,主要是公司缺乏健全的監理體系,以規範公司大股東(兼管理者)、董事會及高階經理人的行為才是真正問題的根源。因此,公司治理重點在於董事會能否發揮應有功能,來為資金提供者監督經營管理階層行為,以使得公司能永續經營發展。因此,本研究將針對上市電子企業去探討董監事組成特性及股權結構對公司經營績效之關聯性。
  本研究乃以2003年之269家上市電子業作為研究對象。而資料的來源從台灣經濟新報社資料庫取得。所取得資料透過SPSS軟體來完成各項資料統計分析工作,主要運用方法有敘述統計、變異數分析、Duncan檢定、Levene`s 檢定、Welch’s 檢定、Mann-Whitney U 檢定及迴歸分析。
  本研究結果發現:1.董事會組成方面:董事會的規模和董事長兼任總經理成負相關;亦即董事會規模越大則董事長兼任總經理的情況較不會發生。而法人機構持股比例也成顯著正相關;代表董事會規模越大其中法人機構持股比例就越大。2.股權結構方面:董監事持股比例與法人機構持股比例則呈顯著正相關,亦即法人機構認為董事會掌握大部分股權將會是一個有效的監督者。另管理者持股比例也與法人機構持股比例呈現顯著正相關,亦即表示管理者持股較多情況下,其法人機構則相對有較高意願去投資。3.公司員工人數多及資本額較大,其董事會組成的規模就較大,而其法人機構持股比例也較高。另在公司成立年數方面則法人機構傾向較願意投資較無歷史包袱的公司。4.董事會組成及股權結構對經營績效之影響,除了法人機構投資比例提高相對增強對公司監督功能,其公司經營績效就越好。因此,在此研究樣本下,僅法人機構持股比例對企業經營績效有影響。


英文摘要   Large scale enterprises in Taiwan have frequently brought about financial crises since the outbreak of Asia Economic Crises. The roots of those financial crises were because of not only its weakness in financial structure but also the lack of feasible auditing system for binding large shareholders (also acts as administrative).
  Therefore, the study focuses on high-tech companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange to explore the causal relations among operating performance, the members and structure of the board.
  The study adopted the samples from the data of the year 2003 of 269 companies of the high-tech listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange. The samples were sourced from the data base of Taiwan Economic News Agency. And it was analyzed with SPSS for statistic purposes including Descriptive Statistic Analysis, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Duncan Test, Levene`s Test, Welch’s Test, Mann-Whitney U Test and Regression Analysis.
The results indicate 1. In respect of members of board: the relation is negative between the number and the officer with both positions of Chairman and CEO. The relation is positive between the number of the board and the volume of shares in the company held by institutional investors; 2. In respect of shareholder structure: the relation is positive between the total shareholding ratio of all board members and the total shareholding ratio of all institutional investors. The institutional investors are willing to invest in a the company of which its managers are dedicated to the profit; 3. The company with more number of employers and larger equity capital could have larger number of members in the board, and the institutional investors could also take more stakes in the company due to the larger-scaled company with better management systems; 4. The operating performance derived from the members of the board and the shareholder structure will be better, while it is honored with higher institutional investors’ shareholding due to its better auditing functions, the more the company has operating performance. Therefore, there is only institutional investors’ shareholding ratio has significant influence toward operating performance of the company.


論文目次 摘要........................................................... Ⅰ
目錄............................................................ Ⅲ
表目錄.......................................................... Ⅴ
圖目錄.......................................................... Ⅵ
第一章 緒論.................................................... 1
第一節 研究背景與動機........................................ 1
第二節 研究目的.............................................. 3
第三節 研究範圍.............................................. 3
第四節 研究流程.............................................. 4
第二章 文獻探討.............................................. 6
第一節 公司治理機制.......................................... 6
第二節 董事會................................................ 11
第三節 股權結構.............................................. 24
第三章 研究方法.............................................. 29
第一節 研究架構.............................................. 29
第二節 研究假設.............................................. 30
第三節 變數之操作型定義...................................... 33
第四節 資料分析方法.......................................... 34
第四章 研究方法.............................................. 37
第一節 樣本結構分析.......................................... 37
第二節 相關分析.............................................. 42
第三節 差異性分析............................................ 44
第四節 迴歸分析.............................................. 53
第五章 結論及建議............................................ 66
第一節 結論.................................................. 66
第二節 建議.................................................. 67
第三節 研究限制.............................................. 68
參考文獻...................................................... 69

表 2-1-1 董事會職能學派彙總.....................................15
表 2-1-2 董事會屬性與角色功能...................................17
表 4-1-1 樣本結構之敘述統計量...................................38
表 4-1-2 董事長兼任總經理(CEO)之次數分配表....................38
表 4-1-3 員工人數之次數分配表...................................40
表 4-1-4 公司成立年數之次數分配表...............................41
表 4-1-5 公司資本額之次數分配表.................................41
表 4-2-1 自變數之相關分析.......................................43
表 4-2-2 應變數之相關分析.......................................44
表 4-3-1 員工人數之 Levene`s 檢定結果............................46
表 4-3-2 員工人數之Welch’s 檢定結果.............................47
表 4-3-3 員工人數之Mann-Whitney U 檢定結果......................47
表 4-3-4 員工人數之變異數分析結果...............................47
表 4-3-5 公司成立年數之Levene`s 檢定結定.........................49
表 4-3-6 公司成立年數之變異數分析結果...........................49
表 4-3-7 公司成立年數之Welch’s 檢定結果..........................49
表 4-3-8 法人機構持股比例之Duncan多重比較檢定結果...............50
表 4-3-9 公司資本額之Levene`s 檢定結果...........................51
表4-3-10 公司資本額之變異數分析結果.............................52
表4-3-11 公司資本額之Welch’s 檢定結果.......................... .52
表4-3-12 法人機構持股比例之Duncan多重比較檢定結果...............52
表4-3-13 董監事持股比例(BH)之Duncan多重比較檢定結果.............53
表4-3-14 公司資本額之Mann-Whitney U 檢定結果....................53
表 4-4-1 董事會組成及股權結構與總資產報酬率迴歸分析.............58
表 4-4-2 董事會組成及股權結構與股東權益報酬率迴歸分析...........61
表 4-4-3 董事會組成及股權結構與每股盈餘迴歸分析.................65


圖 目 錄

圖 1-4-1 研究流程 ............................................. 5
圖 3-1-1 研究架構............................................. 29
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